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• •

938

It is commonplace to observe that "dual federalism" is dead,
replaced by something variously called "cooperative federalism,"
"intergovernmental relations," or "marble-cake federalism.''1 Ac
cording to this conventional wisdom, state and local officials do not
enforce merely their own laws in their distinct policymaking sphere.
Rather, as analyzed in a voluminous literature,2 state and local gov
ernments also cooperate with the federal government in many poli
cymaking areas, ranging from unemployment insurance to historic
preservation. These nonfederal governments help implement fed
eral policy in a variety of ways: by submitting implementation plans
to federal agencies, by promulgating regulations, and by bringing
administrative actions to enforce federal statutes. Thus, coopera
tive federalism offers us a vision of independent governments work
ing together to implement federal policy.
But what happens if this harmonious relationship breaks down?
What if state and local governments refuse to "cooperate"? Can
the federal government force the state and local governments to
implement federal policy? Or is the federal government able to
rely only on the
governments?

voluntary

participation of

state

and

local

The phenomenon of cooperative federalism, and notably its fail
ures, has brought into sharp relief a basic puzzle of federalism:3
1. Edward Corwin provided one of the earliest autopsies of "dual federalism" in Edward
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). For a more recent
declaration to the same effect, see MICHAEL D. REAGAN & -JoHN G. SANZONE, THE NEW
FEDERALISM 11-13 (2d ed. 1981); DEIL S. WRimrr, UNDERSrANDING lNrERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS 36-37 (3d ed. 1988).
2. For general overviews of the theory and empirical literature concerning intergovern
mental relations or cooperative federalism, see THOMAS J .ANroN, AMERICAN FEDERAl:ISM
AND PuBuc PouCY: How THE SYSTEM WoRKS (1989); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FED
ERALISM: CoMPE'IT110N AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); DONALD F. KETn., THE REGULA
TION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1983); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM
WoRKS (1986); WRimrr, supra note 1. For a history of intergovernmental programs from the
framing of the Constitution until the present, see DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FED
ERALISM: SLOUCHING TowARD WASHINGTON (1995). For a more detailed account of inter
governmental relations from the Nixon through the Reagan administrations, see TIMOTHY
S.

•

CoNLAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM: lNrERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN

(1988).
3. By federalism, I mean the delegation of governmental powers to territorially limited
governments within a nation; the policymakers of the limited governments are elected by the
persons residing within those governments' jurisdictions. This is not, of course, the only pos
sible definition of the term. For an extensive history of the term's changing meaning, see S.
RUFUS DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST OF A
MEANING (1978).
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Given our commitment to having both state governments with cer
tain powers and a national government with limited but supreme
powers, where do we draw the line between the two? The national
government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of fed
eral law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to
federal power and a corresponding reservoir of state power if feder
alism is to have any meaning at all. This article attempts to draw
that line, but not by appealing to abstract concepts such as "dual
sovereignty."
Instead, this article proposes a functional theory of cooperative
federalism to define the proper limits of federal power to obtain
state and local governments' implementation of federal policy. This
theory is consistent with judicial precedent and the original under
standing of the U.S. Constitution, as Part V of the article explains.
Nevertheless, I defend this theory primarily in terms of sensible
policy by applying the tools of basic transaction-costs economics to
modem intergovernmental relations. I argue that the framework
for intergovernmental relations proposed here serves intuitively
useful functions: it preserves the power of state and local govern. ments and yet also maintains the supremacy of the federal govern
ment. I call the theory a "functional" theory for this reason.
The essence of this functional theory is an analogy between
nonfederal governments - states, municipalities, counties, school
districts, and so on - and private organizations. Beginning with
broad empirical observations about intergovernmental relations,
the theory maintains that state and local governments should have
"autonomy" - that is, immunity from federal demands for regula
tory services. Such demands are just as unnecessary, economically
inefficient, distributionally unjust, and needlessly destructive of ex
pressive autonomy as governmental confiscation of private organi
zations' property or conscription of private organizations' services.
When the national government seeks goods and services from pri
vate organizations, it normally purchases such goods and services
from such organizations through mutually voluntary agreements.
The Pentagon, for example, does not confiscate military trucks from
private defense contractors. Rather, it purchases such vehicles
from contractors who submit acceptable bids. This reliance on vol
untary agreement rather than conscription or confiscation makes
eminent sense, because confiscation or conscription would be both
economically inefficient and distributionally unjust; it would deter
investors from investing money in military vehicle manufacture,
and it would place the cost of national defense on the shoulders of
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the owners of private defense contractors without any ethically
plausible reason for doing so.
This article maintains that identical considerations suggest that
the federal government should not confiscate the property or con
script the services of nonfederal governments. Rather, the federal
government should purchase such services through a voluntary in
tergovernmental agreement. This article maintains that a require
ment that the national government purchase rather than conscript
nonfederal governments' regulatory services will not impede useful
intergovernmental cooperation.

Moreover, such purchases will

avoid the inefficiencies, distributive injustice, and invasion of ex
pressive autonomy that probably would result from the national
government's commandeering of nonfederal governments' regula
tory processes. In short, by granting state and local governments
autonomy, the line between federal and state power is not fixed,
but fluid; it responds to the costs and benefits of intergovernmental
relations, seamlessly adjusting in that uncertain region where sover
eigns meet.
As this thumbnail sketch of the theory suggests, the justification
for nonfederal governments' autonomy presented here differs sub
stantially from the justification provided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Printz v.

United States4 and New York v. United States.5

In

these opinions, the Court ruled by narrow majorities that the na
tional government cannot unconditionally force state and local leg
islatures or executive officials to implement federal statutes by
regulating private persons according to federal standards.

This

holding that nonfederal governments should have autonomy is, of
course, the conclusion I reach as well.

The problem with the

Court's opinions is not the conclusion but the Court's reasoning.
The Court, largely abstaining from any empirical examination of
intergovernmental relations, relied on the abstract notions of dual
sovereignty and political accountability to support its doctrine that
the

national

government

cannot

commandeer

the

regulatory

processes of the state and local governments.
But, as Part I of this article explains, these concepts cannot ex
plain why federal demands for state or local services should be re
garded as more of an intrusion on state sovereignty than simple
federal preemption of state or local law. Federal demands that
state and local officials implement federal policies at least preserve
4. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
5. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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some role for ·such officials. By contrast, preemption eliminates
their role entirely. Moreover, even if one could explain why com
mandeering is especially threatening to sovereignty, why are state
and local governments protected only from unconditional federal
demands for regulatory services but not from conditional demands
- that is, demands extracted by threats of federal preemption of
state law or withdrawal of grant money? And why do Printz and
New York allow federal regulation of both nonfederal governments
and private organizations with generally applicable laws? To these
questions the Court's theory of "political accountability" has of
fered no acceptable answer. By contrast, my functional theory
makes sense of these limits on state autonomy.
If the functional theory makes so much sense, why has it not
been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court as the basis for state au
tonomy? The problem is that the Court's jurisprudence is still
haunted by a theory of state autonomy it inherited from nineteenth
century jurisprudence - a theory that I call nationalistic dual feder
alism. As I explain in sections I.A and l.B, this theory has its roots
in the ratification debates and some of the classic decisions of the
Marshall and Taney Courts - notably, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,6
McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 and Prigg v. Penn
sylvania. 9 The Marshall and Taney Courts, led by Justice Story,
used these decisions to develop a theory of state autonomy that,
ironically, was rooted in contempt and distrust for state officials.
The implicit premise of this theory - first laid out by Publius in
The Federalist but carried to its ultimate conclusion by Justice Story
in Prigg - was that state officials were parochial, deceitful, and
nonuniform policymakers whose incompetence or untrustworthi
ness disqualified them from exercising any federal functions. In its
purest form, such a nationalistic theory barred Congress from dele
gating federal responsibilities to state officials even when state offi
cials were willing to accept such duties.
As I explain in section I.B.3, the theory of nationalistic dual fed
eralism simply makes no sense in the late twentieth century. It is
now settled law that state and federal governments have largely
overlapping jurisdictions and routinely cooperate to implement
state-federal regulatory schemes. Yet the Court still invokes the
slogans and concepts of this jurisprudence, and, perhaps half con6.
7.
8.
9.

14 U.S.
17 U.S.
22 U.S.
41 U.S.

(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
(4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
(9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
(16 Pet) 539 (1842).
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sciously, provides a bad reason for a good rule - indeed, a justifi
cation that, if taken seriously, would deprive nonfederal officials of
some of their most important functions.
Thus, the justification traditionally offered for state autonomy in
judicial opinions no longer seems persuasive. Nevertheless, as ex
plained in the subsequent three Parts of the article, autonomy itself
- what I call the New York entitlementto - makes eminent sense
as a matter of policy. In Parts IT, m, and IV, I lay out a functional

theory to justify autonomy. As explained earlier, this functional

theory rests on one simple proposition: The federal government
should commandeer the services of nonfederal governments no
more than it should commandeer the services of private organiza
tions or persons.
Part Il of this article explains why it is

unnecessary

for the na

tional government to commandeer the regulatory processes of state
and local governments. The federal government can purchase the
services of state and local governments whenever it is cost-effective
to do so; it has no more need to conscript such services than it has
to conscript the services of secretaries, FBI agents, janitors, or
Supreme Court Justices. There is a vigorous intergovernmental
marketplace in which municipalities, counties, and states - like
private organizations and persons - compete with each other for
the chance to obtain federal revenue. Therefore, whenever the na
tional government values such services enough to pay nonfederal
governments the costs of providing them, the national government
can obtain the cooperation of state or local governments in imple
menting federal law.
Part

ID

uses the analogy between private organizations and

nonfederal governments to explain why federal conscription of
nonfederal governments' services is improper as well as unneces
sary. When the government conscripts specific types of private
services or confiscates specific types of private property, it can inef
ficiently discourage private persons or organizations from investing
resources in the production of such services or property. Moreover,
the distributive injustice of such confiscation is fairly obvious;.to the
extent that the conscripted service or confiscated property benefits
the public generally, it is difficult to argue that persons who happen
to have the ability to provide the service or good ought to bear the
costs of such programs exclusively.
10. I name the entitlement after New York v. United States rather than Printz v. United
States only because New York originally announced the doctrine.
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But, as P� ill argues, these same considerations suggest that
the federal government ought not to conscript services or confiscate
property from nonfederal governments. Section III.A notes that
one would expect such demands inefficiently to discourage involve
ment in state and local politics. Moreover, as section III.B explains,
one would also expect such commandeering arbitrarily and, per
haps, inequitably to place the costs of federal programs on the co
alitions of voters who control state and local governments. Finally,
as section III.C suggests, federal demands that state and local gov
ernments regulate according to federal standards unnecessarily bur
den the expressive liberties of state and local officials by forcing
them to endorse federal policies with their mandated votes.

In

short, federal demands for nonfederal governments' regulatory
services are improper for the same reasons that confiscation of pri
vate property or conscription of private action is improper.
Part IV applies the functional theory outlined in Parts II and III
to four specific problems in intergovernmental relations: (1) the is
sues of "generally applicable laws";
preemption;

(3)

(2)

the problem of conditional

the question of whether the federal government

should be able to "commandeer" the services of nonfederal execu
tive and judicial officers; and (4) the question of whether the fed
eral government should be able to impose
state and local governments. As Part

IV

funded

mandates on

explains, the theory out

lined in Parts II and III better explains the exceptions for generally
applicable laws and conditional preemption than the theories of
state sovereignty that are most frequently invoked to justify the
holdings in

Printz

New York

and

Printz.

The theory also suggests that

was correct to forbid commandeering of nonfederal execu

tive officers' regulatory services. Finally, the theory suggests that
Justice Souter's argument that the federal government be permitted
to impose funded mandates on state and local governments is im
practical and unnecessary.
In Part V, I offer some reasons to believe that the functional
argument suggested in Parts II and III might be inferred from con
stitutional sources other than the traditions of dual federalism, state
sovereignty, or political accountability that now provide it with such
an unpersuasive foundation. In particular, Part V argues that, by
reading the Necessary and Proper Clause11 in light of the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on takings of private property without
just compensation12 and the First Amendment's protection of the
11. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
12. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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freedom of speech,13 one can derive a stronger and more intellectu
ally satisfying foundation for the doctrine of state autonomy an
nounced in Printz and New York than the notion of dual
sovereignty that the Court invoked.
At the outset, it is important to make clear that this article will
discuss the issue of whether "state autonomy" would be ade

not

quately protected through the political process even without judi
cial enforcement of constitutional limits on Congress's power. I
have two reasons for such a limit on the article's scope.
Frrst, such "political process" theories of constitutional federal
ism are not really theories of federalism at all but theories of judi
cial review; they are addressed exclusively to courts and purport to
define when

judicial enforcement of constitutional constraints is ap

propriate.14 But I wish to ask a different question: Even assuming
that the courts should not protect state autonomy, what constitu
tional limits should

other,

nonjudicial decisionmakers - Congress

or the President - sensibly enforce? Theories of judicial review
have nothing to say to such decisionmakers, yet Congress and the
President have a crucial role in determining the Constitution's
meaning.15

This article is addressed to those political

decisionmakers.
Second, political process theories commonly rest on the premise
that federalism will be "adequately" protected through the political
process.16 It is impossible to know, however, whether the protec
tion afforded by the political process is "adequate" until one has
some sort of normative theory defining the proper role of the fed
eral and nonfederal governments.17 Otherwise, empirical verifica
tion of whether Congress adequately protects state autonomy
degenerates into a meaningless string of anecdotes describing state
victories or defeats; such anecdotes yield no normative conclusions
about the adequacy of the political process unless one knows when
13. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
14. The most famous of such theories are JESSE H. CHoPER, JumCIAL REVIEW AND nm
NATIONAL PoLrnCAL PRoCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF TIIE ROLE OF TIIE
SUPREME CoURT 180-84 {1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
15. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975). For an example of how Congress might consider such issues,
see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Refonn Act of 1995, 45 KAN. L. REv. 1113 {1997).
16. See, e.g., CHoPER, supra note 14, at 171-95; Lewis Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 847, 857-68 (1979).
17. For an acknowledgement of this problem, see Garrett, supra note 15, at 1119-20.
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This article provides a

benchmark for evaluating the political process, without which polit
ical process theories make little sense.

I.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ARGUMENTS
FOR STATE AUTONOMY

To understand the problem posed by

New York's

anticom

mandeering rule, it is useful to define carefully at the outset the sort

New York

might provide to the state govern

ments. Under a broad reading,

New York seems to give the highest

of entitlement that

state and local governmental decisionmakers - as defined by the
relevant state's constitution - a limited right to withhold their own
services and the services of state and local personnel subject to their
constitutional authority from the federal government. Moreover although again, New
seems to bar

all

York did not resolve the question - New York

federal efforts to commandeer the regulatory

processes of the state, even if the federal government were to
compensate the state governments for the costs of the
implementation.19
So understood,

New York

provides a particular kind of entitle

ment to state governments that is protected by a property rule. I
use the term

property rule

Melamed in their classic
by

New York -

in the sense defined by Calabresi and

1972

article.20 The entitlement provided

what I call the

"New York

entitlement" - gives

state governments a right to enjoin federal efforts to force state offi
cials to implement national law. To put this entitlement in perspec
tive, one can contrast it with three other possible allocations of
control over state regulatory processes:

18. For an example of such an incoherent "list" of state officials' victories in Congress,
see CHoPER, supra note 14, at 185-88. Choper never explains why these victories "outweigh"
the defeats that state officials incur - an impossible task for Choper given that he provides
no normative theory about what level of state autonomy is sufficient to ensure that federal
ism works. Thus, his argument resembles a race without a finish line: there simply is no
metric by which to determine whether or not Congress has adequately protected federalism.
19. Justice Scalia seems to have rejected the idea that Congress might impose funded
mandates on state officials when he suggested that calculating compensation would be judi
cially unmanageable. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997). As explained
in Part IV, infra, he was probably right.
20. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra� 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
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FOUR RULES FOR ALLOCATING CONTROL OVER A STATE
GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY MACHINERY

Property Rule to State Government
(the New York entitlement):

Liability Rule to State Government:

State governments' policymakers have
an entitlement to withhold regulatory
processes from the federal government.

The federal government can demand
that state governmental officials
implement national law so long as the
federal government provides objectively
reasonable funding to cover costs of the
demand.

Property Rule to National Government:

Liability Rule to National Government:

The federal government may demand
that state officials implement national
law.

The state government may withhold its
regulatory processes and refuse to
implement national law - but only
upon compensating the federal
government for the costs of such
national implementation.

In some sense, therefore, the

New York

entitlement is a powerful

rule. It allows state governments to hold out and refuse to imple
ment national legislation even when the costs to the state of such
implementation are trivial and the benefits to the national govern
ment are quite large. The New York entitlement also seems to al
low the state governments to resist fully funded mandates -..,... that is,
federal demands that the state governments implement national law
accompanied by grants-in-aid sufficient to cover the costs of such
implementation.
Yet in a second sense,

New York

and

Printz

are trivial, in that

they do nothing to prevent Congress from directly regulating pri
vate persons with national laws and administrators, thereby pre
empting inconsistent state laws.

To be sure, the doctrine of

enumerated powers - and, in particular, the so-called "substantial
effects" test of

Wickard v. Filburn21

-

places some modest limits

on the power of the national government to regulate private per
sons. These limits were recently restated and - perhaps - signifi
cantly reinvigorated in the recent decision of United States v.
Lopez.22 Under the best view, however, Lopez probably imposes
extremely modest constraints on the power of the national govern
ment to regulate private persons directly.23
21. 317 U.S.111, 125 {1942) ("[I]f appellee's activity be local ...it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce").
22. 514 U.S.549 (1995).
23. For an extended analysis both of Lopez and of recent lower court opinions that apply
Lopez in various contexts, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674
{1995).
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Seen against a background of almost unlimited national powers
to regulate private persons directly,

New York

and

Printz

present

something of a paradox: Why give state governments the right to
withhold their regulatory processes while simultaneously giving the
state governments nothing to regulate with those processes?24 Why
permit the national government to preempt virtually all significant
regulatory fields, leaving the state governments with no significant
jurisdiction remaining to them, while strictly forbidding the national
government from imposing even modest regulatory responsibilities
on state officials? In short, what good is the preservation of state
administrative autonomy, if the states are not guaranteed some area
of subject matter jurisdiction in which to exercise it?
This question takes two forms, both of which I address in this
article. First, one could ask why any intelligent framer would

want

such a policy. Second, one can ask whether the text and traditions
of the U.S. Constitution plausibly contain such a policy. Both Jus
tice O'Connor's opinion in New

Printz

York and Justice Scalia's opinion in

are gravely inadequate as efforts to answer either question.

This Part explains why I believe that the theories of federalism and
constitutional meaning canvassed by these two opinions simply can
not justify their holdings.

What Is the Function of the New York and Printz
Anticommandeering Rule? The Inadequacy of the
Argument Based on Political Accountability

A.

New York

offered a functional argument to justify the rule

against commandeering. The Court stated that the rule was neces
sary to protect "political accountability."

According to Justice

O'Connor,
[w]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Account
ability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local elec
torate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulations.25

Thus on the facts of New

York,

because the Federal Low-Level Ra

dioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments take the form of a re
quirement that the state make the final unpopular decision to site
24. But see text accompanying notes 194-201 (observing tbe existence of practical barriers
to tbe federal government's ability to extend its regulatory authority over areas ostensibly
within tbe scope of federal power).
25. New York v.United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).

February 1998]

825

State Autonomy

or subsidize waste,26 aggrieved voters will find it especially difficult
to trace the causes of these costs to the federal government. Be
cause the costs are imposed in the immediate form of a state law,
the voters will tend incorrectly to attribute the consequent rise in
their state tax burden or the construction of a state-owned landfill
to the state government. Since Congress will know that such com
mandeering obscures lines of political accountability, it will have all
the more incentive to engage in such commandeering.27
Such an argument is analogous to the argument commonly
made by lawyers and political scientists against broad congressional
delegation of legislative powers to federal administrative agencies.
Under this thesis - most famously expounded by Morris Fiorina28
and recently revived by David Schoenbrod29 - Congress will have
an improper incentive to evade voter scrutiny by taking credit for
vague and popular statutory schemes while delegating responsibil
ity for implementing such schemes - and their accompanying costs
- to federal administrative agencies. Voters burdened by agency
decision - say, a regulation requiring ignition interlock - will lash
out against the bureaucrats who imposed the decision and not the
legislators who ultimately enacted the scheme that required the
agency to make cost-imposing decisions.

Likewise, Justice

O'Connor seems to argue that, by forcing state officials to adminis
ter potentially unpopular federal programs, Congress will be able to
take credit for the benefits of such programs while shunting blame
onto the hapless nonfederal officials.

26.

See 505 U.S. at 177.

27. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997). This argument is made in
detail by Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amend
ment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1355 (1993).
As Zelinsky explains, the "political accountability" argument will not work unless one as
sumes that Congress commandeers state governments in response to well-organized interest
groups who are aware that Congress is the ultimate cause of the program. Otherwise, while
Congress would not receive any blame for the costs of the program, it would also not receive
any credit for the benefits of the program. Commandeering would be a wash. For comman
deering to make sense, Congress would have to deliver benefits to groups who would know
that Congress was responsible for the benefits but impose costs on other voters who would be
oblivious of Congress's ultimate responsibility for such costs. See id. at 1374-75. For a discus
sion of the concept of "traceability" of government action, see R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE
LoGic OF CoNGRESSIONAL AcnoN 47-51 (1990).

28. See generally Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative
Authority, in REGULATORY PouCY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Roger Noll ed., 1985).
The argument is made in simpler form in MoRRis P. FmRINA, CONGRESS: KEYsroNE OF THE
WASHINGTON EsTABUSHMENT (2d ed. 1989).
29. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, PoWER WITHOUT REsPONSIBILITY:
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
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Such.a thesis has been subjected to some persuasive empirical
challenges in the context of administrative law,30 and Justice
O'Connor's analogous thesis undoubtedly is similarly vulnerable to
the contention that it lacks empirical support.31 But there is a
deeper conceptual difficulty with the political accountability argu
ment: it proves too much. Such an argument seems to condemn
not merely federal laws that commandeer state or local services but
also even

voluntary

intergovernmental cooperation.

After all, whenever federal, state, and local officials jointly ad
minister some regulatory scheme, it may be difficult for voters to
determine which set of officials is responsible for which duties: in
tergovernmental schemes can be notoriously complex in their allo
cation of responsibilities.

Take, for example, block grants -

federal grants to state and local governments that give the grantees
broad discretion to choose how to spend the money. As several
commentators have noted, such programs tend to undermine the
political accountability of state and local politicians who receive the
cash, because they get the luxury of spending revenue without hav
ing the responsibility of raising local taxes to generate it.32 In ef
fect, block grants are exactly the reverse of federal laws that
commandeer state and local officials: such grants allow state and
local officials to impose costs on the federal government. If blur
ring the lines of political accountability is somehow constitutionally
problematic, then such grants ought to be suspect.
30. See, e.g., MURRAY J. HoRN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF Ptmuc ADMINISTRATION:
INSTITUTIONAL CH01CE IN nm Ptmuc SECTOR 44-46 (1995); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelega
tion: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0Ro. 81, 95-99
(1985). Hom argues that the thesis depends on an unusual degree of voter apathy and inabil
ity to trace the proximate cause of a particular burden. He notes that in parliamentary re
gimes, where such tracing should be easy because the executive and legislative branches
stand and fall together during elections, one still finds broad delegations of power to the
bureaucracy, indicating that a desire to evade voter scrutiny is not necessarily the cause of
such arrangements. See HoRN, supra, at 44-46.
31. See Evan H. Caminker, Sovereignty and Subordinacy: Can Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1061-67 {1995).
32. See PAUL PETERSON, THE PruCE OF FEDERALISM 63 (1995) {"Why
should the
•

.

.

federal taxpayer give unrestricted money to local governments? Would not local officials be
more accountable to their own citizens and taxpayers if they were not so dependent on fed
eral assistance?"); Thomas G. Donlan, A More Perfect Union: Welfare Refonn and the New
Federalism Raise Constitutional Concerns, BARRoN's, July 29, 1996, at 43; Alan Ehrenhalt,
The Locust in the Garden of Government, GOVERNING, Mar. 1995, at 7-8 (observing that
block grants are a convenient way for state officials to avoid political responsibility for costs
of their own spending decisions). Of course, voters migbt be astute enough to blame Con
gress for iniprudently giving unrestricted funds to nonfederal governments and blame
nonfederal governments for the waste of such funds. But, if voters are so adept at apportion
ing responsibility, it is hard to see why they could not also properly assign blame for uncondi
tional mandates on nonfederal officials. Why is iniprudent coercion easier to detect than
iniprudent expenditures?
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Indeed, one should go further:
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intergovernmental arrange

ments under which state officials carry out federal law ought to be
suspect, because all such arrangements have the potential to con
fuse voters about the ultimate responsibility for some policy deci
sion. Martha Derthick provides a detailed illustration of this
danger in her account of the public assistance program in Massa
chusetts.33 The federal Bureau of Public Assistance demanded in
the late 1940s that the state welfare commissioner exclude nonpro
fessional officials from administering federal welf�e grants in Mas
sachusetts.34 The federal agency, however, did not openly tell the
state legislature that it would forfeit federal funds if the state did
not change its system of having part-time selectmen administer
public assistance, because such overt threats might have made the
federal agency "vulnerable to congressional intervention."35 In
stead, the federal agency counted on the state agency to act as its
proxy with the state legislature. The state agency would warn that
federal funds might be terminated, while the federal agency re
mained discreetly in the background expressing no opinion on the
issue directly to the state legislature. When speaking directly to the
state legislature, federal agency officials were more circumspect in
order to assure Congress and the general public that the federal
agency was not meddling in state affairs.36
This practice of using state officials to inform state legislators of
federal program requirements led to considerable confusion about
exactly who was responsible for imposing requirements on the
state. The powerful Massachusetts senator, Henry Cabot Lodge,
forwarded complaints from taxpayers' groups to federal agencies,
which then sent them along to the state agency that was directly
responsible for promulgating the controversial regulations, which
would, in turn, cite the requirements of federal law.37 In the end, as
Derthick notes, "responsibility is hard to fix because it is shared:
when the federal administration compels the state agency to issue a
rule, but when the state agency drafts the rule and has some mea
sure of discretion as to its content, both have, but can deny, respon
sibility for the consequences."38
33. See MAR1HA DERTHICK, THE lNFx..UENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PuBuc AssIST·
ANCE IN MAsSACHUSETI'S (1970).
34. Derthick provides an account of the origins of the federal agency's interest in the
merit system. See id. at 98-102.
35. See id. at 117.
36. See id. at 117-19.
37. See id.
38.

Id.

at 118.
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In short, erosion of political accountability is endemic to

all

forms of cooperative federalism; whenever the federal government
induces states to act, whether with block grants or categorical
grants, there is a considerable risk that voters will be confused
about which level of government imposed the regulatory burdens of
the program. At least one scholar has suggested that Congress's
use of its spending power to impose conditions on federal grants
raises the same sort of problems of political accountability as com
mandeering legislation.39 To prevent such voter confusion, one
would simply have to prohibit the federal government from dele
gating responsibilities to state and local officials.
Indeed, even absent such delegation, one would have to bar the
federal and state governments from ever assuming any overlapping
duties in order to guarantee "accountability."

After all, voters

could be confused about which level of government is responsible
for the state of some regulatory field if both state and federal offi
cials could play some role in regulating that field. Such a use of the
rhetoric of political accountability is not an academic musing; Jus
tices Kennedy and O'Connor have deployed the political accounta
bility argument in their

Lopez

concurrence to condemn even

federal preemption of state law in regulatory fields traditionally
governed by the states.4o
The difficulty with such political accountability arguments is that
they overlook the complexity inherent in any system of federalism
that always has the potential to confuse voters and thereby under
mine political accountability. As de Tocqueville famously noted,
federal systems of government demand that voters possess high
levels of sophistication about the responsibilities of each level of
govemment.41 If one's goal is to maximize political accountability,
then one would simply adopt a unitary state. Otherwise, to ensure
that lines of political accountability are not blurred, one would not
merely have to prohibit commandeering; one would have to build
an unbreachable wall between state and federal responsibilities to
demarcate clearly the jurisdiction of each level of government.
39. ·See Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the Problem of
Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CoRNELL J.L. & Pun. PoLY. 482 (1995).
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that "political accountability" would be undermined if "the Federal Government
[were] to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern" because "the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political re
sponsibility would become illusory").
41. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 166 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945) ("The most prominent evil of all federal systems is the complicated nature of the means
they employ.").
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As section I.B observes, such a strict separation of state and fed
eral functions is not unprecedented: Justice Story developed pre
cisely such a theory of federalism in several important opinions for
the Marshall and Taney Courts. But such a theory logically implies
not merely that the federal government cannot commandeer state
and local officials, but also that the federal government cannot even
enter into intergovernmental bargains to purchase the voluntary
regulatory services of nonfederal officials.

In the language of

Calabresi and Melamed, such a theory of federalism would protect
state and local autonomy with an

inalienability

rule rather than a

property rule. Such an inalienability rule would deal a devastating
blow to the prestige and real power of state and local governments
by depriving them of some of their most important regulatory du
ties in administering federal programs. Thus, the logical if ironical
consequence of the political accountability theory expounded in
and Printz is erosion of state power.

New York

Justices Scalia and O'Connor do not share Justice Story's na
tionalistic agenda, and so they hardly can be expected to limit Con
gress's spending powers to exclude all cooperative federalism. But
they can provide no principled reason for why such an exemption
for conditional grants makes any sense in light of their worries
about political accountability. In the end, New York and Printz
cannot embrace the con,sequences of their political accountability
functional theory, and this inability suggests that the theory is a
poor foundation for any doctrin� of state autonomy.

New York

and

Printz

back away from the implications of their

political accountability theory in a second way. As O'Connor
states, the "state autonomy" doctrine in these opinions does not
apply to "generally applicable laws," meaning laws that apply to
both private and governmental entities.42 Yet Justice O'Connor
provides no explanation for why such generally applicable laws bur
den political accountability less than laws that apply only to govern
mental entities.43
42. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-78 (1992).
43. See D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovern
mental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982). Pro
fessor La Pierre, the academic who initially devised the "political accountability" theory, has
argued that "generally applicable laws" burden political accountability less than laws that
apply only to governmental entities because, by burdening private parties, they create incen
tives for governmental entities and private persons to form coalitions to fight such laws. See
id. at 1000..04. But this is a non sequitur: burdens that fall exclusively on governmental
organizations motivate them to form powerful lobbying groups such as the National League
of Cities, the National Governors' Association, and the National Association of Counties.
Cf. DAVIDS. ARNOLD & JEREMY F. PLANT, PuBuc OFFICIAL AssoCIATIONS AND STATE
AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT: A BRIDGE ACRoss ONE HUNDRED Y EARS (1994) (describing
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At bottom, the fundamental difficulty with the functional argu
ment offered by New

York and Printz - the political accountability

argument - is that it leads to unacceptably nationalistic conclu
sions. It casts suspicion on one of the nonfederal governments'
most important sources of power - the power to implement fed
eral legislation. As section l.B explains, this weakness is not pecu
liar to New York and Printz; judicial theories of state autonomy
have

long

been

rooted

in

a

nationalistic

distrust

of

state

governments.44

the formation and political clout of these organizations). Why should one believe that such
groups are somehow more vulnerable to political exploitation than lobbies composed exclu
sively of private interests? Moreover, as a recent commentator has noted, Congress fre·
quently extends regulatory burdens by stages, first imposing such burdens on private
enterprises and later imposing the burdens on governmental entities. See Larry Kramer, Un
derstanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1485, 1512-13 (1994). It is not obvious that private
enterprises would have any incentive to lobby against the latter extension, given that such a
regulatory burden would have no effect on their own compliance costs.
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 {1946), presents a similar debate over the rele
vance of "general applicability" in the context of federal taxation of state agencies. In that
case, the question arose whether the United States could impose a tax on the operations of
New York's water-bottling business at Saratoga Springs. See 326 U.S. at 573-74. According
to Justice Frankfurter, such a tax did not violate any implied state immunity from federal
taxes, because the tax also applied to similarly situated private persons. See 326 U.S. at 575·
76, 583-84. By contrast, federal property taxation of, say, a municipal government's city hall
would constitute an unconstitutional tax, because such a tax would fall upon local govern
ments alone; private persons do not own city halls and therefore would not pay the tax. The
difficulty with such a theory, as Justice Stone noted in his New York concurrence, is that it
does not provide any account of when a governmental entity is similarly situated to a private
enterprise. See 326 U.S. at 586-88 {Stone, J., concurring). For example, if municipal corpora
tions are analogous to private corporations, then a tax on city legislative buildings would not
discriminate against governmental entities but rather subject them to the same tax treatment
as private corporations, which must pay federal taxes on their assets.
44. Justice O'Connor tentatively invokes a fourth notion to support the decision in New
York: she cites Professor Merritt's work for the proposition that commandeering legislation
might deprive the persons of a "republican form of government" in violation of Article IV,
section 4. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 61-62
(1988)). According to this argument, when Congress forces state governments to enact legis
lation, those state governments are prevented from being responsive to their constituents'
interests; because they are forced to address federally established priorities, they are pre
vented from devoting state resources to problems of more pressing concern to their own
constituents.
To the extent that this argument simply restates the political accountability argument in
Guarantee Clause clothing, I have addressed it already. But to the extent that the argument
claims that state governments are no longer republican in form if they are unresponsive to
their constituents, then the argument does not distinguish commandeering legislation from
preemption. After all, if Congress bars state legislative action on some concern that is
deemed important by the state's residents, then the state government will be incapable of
responding to constituent concerns. How is a veto less of a threat to republican government
than an affirmative command?
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Searching for State Autonomy in Text, History, and Precedent:
The Nationalistic Origins of "State Autonomy"
Jurisprudence in American History

B.

The political accountability argument, of course, is not the only
arrow in the quivers of the New York and Printz Courts. At least as
important is their reliance on originalist history. Both decisions
rely heavily on sources from the ratification debates suggesting that
the framers intended to prohibit the national government from
commandeering the regulatory services of nonfederal officials.
How persuasive is this argument? The answer to this question is
paradoxical. On one hand, as explained in this section, there is a
long constitutional tradition maintaining that Congress cannot force
state officials to implement federal law. This tradition is embodied
in the objections to "requisitions" made by Federalists during the
debates over the ratification of the Constitution. It is also sug
gested by Justice Story's position in

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 45

which

was, in turn, rooted in the larger jurisprudence of the Marshall
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 46 McCulloch v. Maryland, 47 and Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee. 48
But, on the other hand, as noted in section I.C, there is a deeper
sense in which such tradition provides a dubious foundation for
New York and Printz. Ironically, the problem with the reasoning of
Publius, Justice Story, and the tradition of dual federalism on which
Story's views rested, is that such reasoning is excessively

nationalis

tic.

The fundamental assumption of both Publius's reasoning dur
ing the ratification debates and Story's reasoning in Prigg is that
state governments are unfit to implement federal law because state
officials are devious, demagogic, untrustworthy, parochial, and in

herently rebellious and, therefore, ought to be excluded entirely
from implementing federal policy.
The problem with such a nationalistic theory is that it proves too
much: it suggests not only that Congress should not commandeer
the services of state officers but also that Congress ought not use
such services even when they are volunteered by state governments.
In effect, such a doctrine of state autonomy is really a nondelega
tion theory: it bars Congress from delegating federal responsibili
ties to state officials. Such a theory is entirely unacceptable in the
45.
46.
47.
48.

41 U.S.
22 U.S.
17 U.S.
14 U.S.

(16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
(9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
(4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
(1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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late twentieth century, when systems of cooperative federalism are
commonplace and it is widely conceded that the federal and state
governments have largely, albeit not entirely, concurrent
jurisdictions.
Therefore, although there is a long constitutional tradition that
condemns the federal commandeering of state officials, the tradi
tion does not provide a persuasive justification for the condemna
tion. We have a rule without a reason. In Part II of this article, I
tentatively suggest how the functional argument presented here
might fill this void in constitutional doctrine by providing a more
satisfactory textual and precedential justification for the

New York

entitlement in an era of cooperative federalism.

The Antecedents of State Autonomy in the Ratification
Debates: Publius's Nationalist Case Against Requisitions

1.

New York, Printz,

and scholarly commentators root their argu

ments concerning state autonomy in the debates over the ratifica
tion of the U.S. Constitution.49

New York

and

Printz

note that

many ratifiers of the Constitution agreed that the Articles of Con
federation ought to be amended so that the new government would
be able to regulate private persons directly and not be required to
requisition the state governments to raise taxes and troops on be
half of the national government. In Hamilton's words, quoted with
approval by Justice O'Connor, "The new National Government
'must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in
need of no intermediate legislations.' "50
Against this originalist argument, Justice Stevens responded
that, by making these statements, the ratifiers simply wanted to
"enhance the power of the national government, not to provide
some new unmentioned immunity for state officers."51 The Feder
alists certainly believed that requiring the national government to
rely on state governments for enforcement of national law was
"cumbersome and inefficient."52

But, according to Stevens, it

hardly follows that the Federalists wished to prohibit the national
government from having the

option

of commandeering the state

49. The main scholarly treatments of New York all devote considerable space to parsing
the ratification debates. See Caminker, supra note 31; H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Ques
tion of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. RE.v. 633 (1993); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field
Office Federalism, 79 V A . L. RE.v. 1957 (1993).
50. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
51. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2389 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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governments, when such commandeering might not be so divisive.
Indeed, Justice Stevens relied on The Federalist No. 27 and The Fed

eralist No. 36 to argue that "the federal government was to have the
power to demand that local o+ficials implement national policy
programs."S3
Which side has the better view of history? The trouble with
both positions is that each overlooks how an intense nationalism
might be the basis for a rule against commandeering state govern
ments. As Stevens correctly noted, the New York-and Printz major
ities misleadingly imply that the Framers somehow opposed
requisitions to preserve state autonomy. Further, the majorities'
view ignores the fact that the Anti-Federalists - quintessential de
fenders of state power -

exclusively on the state
icy.s4 They feared that

wanted the

national government to rely

governments to implement national pol
preemption rather than commandeering

would destroy the state governments by depriving those govern
ments of meaningful subject-matter jurisdiction.ss Neither Justices
O'Connor nor Scalia ever explain how

allowing the federal govern

ment to do precisely what the strongest advocates of state power
wanted to

require the federal government to do would violate some

important norm of federalism in the eyes of the ratifiers of the
Constitution.
But Stevens is equally misleading when he implies that the Con
stitution's ratifiers merely wished to supplement the national gov
ernment's power to impose requisitions by giving the national
government an additional power to tax individuals directly. Such a
position ignores the vehemence with which the Federalists rejected
the system of requisitions established by the Articles of
Confederation.
A quick summary of Publius's views suggests that Stevens sub
stantially understated the Federalists' objections to requisitions.
According to Publius, the difficulty was that state politicians, moti
vated by "love of power," would inevitably display "an impatience
53. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27,
supra note 50, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 36, supra note 50, at 235 (Alexander
Hamilton)).

54. As one leading Anti-Federalist pamphleteer, the "Federal Farmer," argued, the Arti
cles of Confederation were preferable to the proposed Constitution because, under the Arti
cles, "the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union
operate on states, as such, and federally: Here, nothing can be done without the meetings of
the state legislatures." LEITER XVII OF THE FEDERAL FARMER (1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE A.Nu-FEDERALIST 330, 331-32 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
55. See, e.g., EssAY I OF BRurus (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE A.Nu-FEDERAL
supra note 54, at 363.
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with political control" and "look with an evil eye upon all external
attempts to restrain or direct [state power]."56 The courts would be
useless to force political bodies to comply with requisitions,57 and
the national government would lack resources sufficient to exact
obedience to requisitions through sheer military force.58 Moreover,
Publius argued in The Federalist No. 16 that the national govern
ment would not be able to determine whether state officials were
complying with requisitions in good faith.59 State officials might
plead "inability" rather than "disinclination," and the national gov
ernment would find it extremely difficult to determine whether the
states' bad faith was sufficiently flagrant "to justify the harsh expe
dient of compulsion."60
These arguments suggest a deep distrust and disapproval of
state officials.

Contrary to Stevens's assertion, Publius is not

merely arguing that state officials are somehow "cumbersome and
inefficient." Rather, he is arguing that state officials are disloyal
and dishonest, because they would deliberately resist and under
mine federal policies and then conceal their resistance. Such a view
of state officials is completely consistent with the Federalists' more
general ideological commitments. The Federalists' experience in
the Continental Congress or the Revolutionary Army - institu
tions in which many had served - led them to believe that state
politicians were parochial, narrow-minded, perhaps even unpatri
otic demagogues.61 State politicians, after all, had refused to ap
prove an impost needed to pay the veterans of the Revolutionary
Army,62 and they had failed to comply with requisitions needed to
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton).
57. See id. at 110.
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 50, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton).
59. See id. at 116-17.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton). This was
Hamilton's complaint about New York - that the state legislature "made an external com
pliance . . . to a requisition of congress" but "at the same time counteract(ed] their compli
ance by gratifying the local objects of the state so as to defeat their concession." 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787' at 295 (Max Farrand ed., revised ed. 1966)
(1911). Alexis de Tocqueville makes a similar argument about the inability of state govern
ments to monitor and control New England townships when those townships carried out
state law. See 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 41, at 78-80. Like Publius, de Tocqueville
notes that the election of township officials by the local electorate makes control of such
officials by the state extraordinarily difficult. See id.
61. See FoRREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL Oruoms
OF THE CoNSTITUTION 164-65 (1985); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN·
TION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 89 (speech by Edmund Randolph, as recorded by James
Madison, decrying "the local demagogues who will be degraded by (the proposed Constitu
tion] from the importance they now hold").
62. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF TIIE CoNSTITU·
TION, 1781-1788, at 72-102 (1961) (describing state politicians' opposition to proposals to pro-
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make payments on Revolutionary War bonds.63 Some states also
had refused to protect the property rights of Loyalists in violation
of national treaties,64 and Rhode Island notoriously had required
creditors to accept depreciated paper money as payment of debts,
in violation of contractual rights.65 The Federalists regarded this
misbehavior as endemic to state governments, blaming state politi
cians' misconduct on institutional factors such as excessively demo
cratic state constitutions66 or excessively small constituencies.67
State politicians, to the Federalists, were simply not suited for the
pursuit of "great and national objects."68
When read in light of these more general principles, The Feder
alist No. 15 suggests that Publius did not want merely to supplement
requisitions with direct taxation and regulation - a relatively mod
est reform that would have been acceptable to most Anti-Federal
ists.69 Rather, the Federalists wanted as much as possible to replace
such reliance on state officials with exclusive dependence on federal
officials, persons who would owe their entire loyalty to the national
government and the national characters who would presumably ocvide the Continental Congress with an impost on trade). As Main notes, this opposition was
directly Jinked with state politicians' fear of the Revolutionary Army: one purpose of the
impost was to finance life pensions for officers in the army - a project strongly opposed by
many state officials. See id. at 106-07.
63. See McDoNALD, supra note 61, at 170-71.
64. See id. at 155-56.
65. See id. at 175-76. As McDonald notes, Rhode Island was a bete noire of the Federal
ists, and the heat of their indignant rhetoric greatly exceeded the actual harm of Rhode
Island's action to creditors.
66. See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 61, at 157; MAIN supra note 62, at 42-48 (describing
the controversy over the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776). For the classic account of the
controversies concerning the radical democracy unleashed at the state level by the American
Revolution, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CoNFEDERATION: AN lNrERPRETA
TION OF THE SoCIAL-CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 17741781, at 17-53 (1940).
,

67. The classic account is, of course, THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra
FEDERALIST No. 35, supra note 50, at 216

note 50, at 83 (James Madison);'see also THE
(Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that national
politicians will have the opportunity for "extensive inquiry and information" that less-edu
cated state politicians will lack).
69. Most Anti-Federalists did not condemn direct federal taxation of individuals out of
hand, but instead argued that the national government should try requisitions first and resort
to direct taxation of private individuals only if the state governments proved unwilling to
satisfy the requisitions. Anti-Federalists proposed such a mixed system of requisitions and
direct taxes in the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, North
Carolina, Maryland, and New York. See MAIN supra note 62, at 145-46. Martin Luther, the
garrulous Anti-Federalist leader from Maryland, proposed such a mixed system at the Phila
delphia Convention. See 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTioN OF 1787, supra
note 60, at 359.
,
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cupy Congress and the Presidency.70 In short, both Justice Scalia
and Justice Stevens are correct: the Federalists' case against requi
sitions did not depend on any regard for state autonomy, but the
Federalists nevertheless probably wished to discourage state imple
mentation of national law for totally nationalistic reasons.
To be sure, as a concession to the Anti-Federalists, Publius ar
gued in

The Federalist No. 36

that the national government would

be able to "make use" of state tax collectors.71 But, given Publius's
general skepticism about the federal governments' ability to en
force demands on obstinate state politicians by court injunction, it
is implausible to read these statements as suggestions that the fed
eral government could simply conscript state tax officials by enact
ing a statutory demand for their services. Rather, Publius seems to
recommend a more subtle policy of what we would now call condi
tional preemption. According to Publius,
[T]he existence of such a power [of direct federal taxation] will have a
strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States
know that the Union can supply itself without their agency, it will be a
powerful motive for exertion on their part.72

70. For the Federalists, national or diffuse characters were persons whose military or
political achievements had won them honor throughout the entire continent. A crucial as
pect of the new Constitution for the Federalists was that it provided a forum of sufficient
dignity for persons with such a reputation - quintessentially, George Washington. For sum
maries of how the Federalists believed that large jurisdictions encouraged control of govern
ment by the natural aristocracy - the most educated, patriotic, cultivated, and wealthiest
persons with the greatest degree of fame and ambition for fame - see GARRY WILLS, Ex
PLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 216-47 (1981); GORDON Wooo, THE CREATION OP
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 471-518 (1969). For an interesting discussion of
how James Wiison believed that voters themselves would adopt a disinterested style of poli
tics in a larger jurisdiction, see Stephen Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's
Theory ofFederal Union, 13 L. & Soc INQUIRY 1, 47-49, 57 (1988). For the classic account of
the Framers' obsession with widespread fame, see Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding
Fathers, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: EssAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 3, 7 (Trevor
Colboum ed., 1974). For more detailed evidence of this obsession, see STANLEY ELKINS &
Brue McKrrruCK, THE FOUNDING FATHERS: YoUNG MEN OP THE REVOLUTION (1962) (ar
guing that the Framers were motivated by a desire for reputations within the larger empire of
the new republic); Wiiliam Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 695, 713-39 (1997).
.

71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The na
tional legislature can make use of the system ofeach State within that State [for assessing and
collecting property taxes]. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each
State can, in all parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government. . [I]f the
exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be judged . . . inconvenient,
the federal government may forbear the use of it and have recourse to requisitions in its
stead.").
•

•

72. Id. at 221. Given the context of the paper, it seems a reasonable conjecture that The
Federalist No. 36 was written as a concession to Anti-Federalists like the "Federal Fanner,"
who wished to preserve some state influence over any federal system of taxation. In light of
Publius's argument in The Federalist No. 15 that commandeering strategies would be ineffica
cious, see THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton), it seems
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In other words, rather than defend a power to commandeer the
states through unconditional orders, a power that Publius had al
ready decried as futile in The Federalist No. 15, Publius recom
mends a classic strategy of cooperative federalism: threaten to
bypass state officials unless they comply with federal requisitions.
The state officials' interest in obtaining implementation powers will
give them the incentive to obey federal commands when direct or
ders would necessarily fail.
Such a power of conditional preemption might also explain

Federalist No. 27,

The

a passage of which was cited by both Justices

Souter and Stevens as evidence that the ratifiers of the Constitution
authorized Congress to commandeer the states.73 In this para
graph, Publius argued that Congress's power to regulate private in
dividuals directly would "enable the government to employ the
ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws."74 Accord
ing to Publius,

It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confed
eracy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will
become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which
all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each state will be
bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the legislatures, courts, and
magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the
operations of the national government as far as its just and constitu
tional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforce
ment of its laws.75

According to Justice Scalia, this passage suggests only that state of
ficials have a duty "not to obstruct the operation of federal law."76
Justice Souter disagreed, arguing that the natural import of the lan
guage is that state officials have a duty also to "take appropriate
action" to obey the federal government's commands.77
But there is also a third reading that makes the most sense in
light of the topic sentence of the paragraph. According to this sen
tence, Publius believed that the national government, by virtue of
its ability to regulate "the individual citizens of the several States,"
will be able "to employ the ordinary magistracy of [the states] in the
unlikely that Publius regarded the requisition power as an important or even useful aspect of
national supremacy.
73. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2389 (1997) {Stevens, J., dissenting); 117
S. Ct. at 2402 {Souter, J., dissenting).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 50, at 176 {Alexander Hamilton).
75. Id. at 177 {footnote omitted).
76. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374.
77. 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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execution of [the national government's] laws."78 The puzzle of

The Federalist No. 27,

therefore, is to explain how this might be so

- how direct federal regulation of private persons might help Con
gress use the states' magistracy.

The Federalist No. 36 and its

implicit concept of conditional pre

The Federalist No. 27: the power
to regulate private persons might induce the states to participate in
federal regulatory schemes, because, as Publius noted in The Feder
alist No. 36, if the states refuse to enforce federal laws, then the

emption might provide the key to

federal government simply can threaten the states with the ultimate
weapon - the weapon of bypass.79 In short, state officials will be
come agents of the national government, because conditional pre
emption of state power will provide a "powerful motive" for
intergovernmental cooperation80 when direct coercion, according to
The Federalist No. 1581 and The Federalist No. 16,82 would surely
fail.
To be sure, this reading of

The Federalist No. 27 is

not unques

tionably correct. But it has the virtue of reconciling Publius's state
ments in

The Federalist No. 27 with

his frequently expressed belief

that the legal power to coerce state officials by direct order is a
useless, futile power. Any other view makes Publius praise the
Constitution for bestowing a power on the national government
that Publius has elsewhere condemned as pointless and divisive.
In sum, read in context of the general ratification debates,
Publius seems to · argue that Congress practically would never be
able to demand state officials' services through court injunction or
even military force because state officials are too parochial, recalci
trant, and devious to be coerced and will defeat any direct order
through evasion and passive resistance that Congress might not
even be able to detect, let alone effectively remedy. At most,

Federalist No. 36

The

suggests that state officials might voluntarily aid

the national government if they know that their disobedience will
lead to their exclusion from national affairs because "the union can
supply itself without their agency."83
Does this distrust of state officials necessarily imply that
Publius, or the Federalists more generally, believed that the pro78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 50, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 220-21 (Alexander Hamilton).
See id. at 221.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 50, at 115-17 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton).
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posed Constitution barred Congress from attempting to comman
deer state regulatory services? In support of Justice Stevens and
the other Printz dissenters, one can reply: not necessarily. One can
believe that a regulatory technique is foolish and futile without be
lieving that it is unconstitutional. On the specific question raised by

Printz

the legal power of Congress to demand that state officials
regulate private persons according to federal standards - both the
-

text of the Constitution and the debates surrounding its. ratification
are silent.
Yet while the Federalists never expressly stated that they wished
to prohibit commandeering, the historical record nonetheless sug
gests that such an immunity would not have bothered them in the
least - that, indeed, such an immunity would be perfectly consis
tent with their general views. But before applauding the Printz ma
jority, note the deeper irony to such an originalist defense of state
autonomy. Publius's dislike of requisitions, after all, is clearly
rooted in contempt for state officials - in an extremely nationalis
tic view that parochial political loyalties drive state officers to sub
vert federal policies either covertly or overtly. Slandering the good
faith of state politicians seems like a strange way to vindicate state
autonomy. As the next section discusses, this contempt for, and dis
trust of, state officials becomes the explicit basis for the theory of
state autonomy recognized by Justice Story. Indeed, the whole doc
trine of state autonomy, as it is first recognized in Kentucky v.

Dennison84 and Collector v. Day, 85

springs directly out the extreme

nationalism of the Marshall Court and Justice Story.

2. State Autonomy in the Marshall and Taney Courts: The
Nationalistic Roots of Dual Federalism
What about postratification political practice or judicial prece
dent? As the Printz dissenters note, there were numerous instances
in which the national government relied on state officials to carry
out federal laws.86 But, as the Printz majority notes, it is difficult to
say whether Congress believed that it could force the state govern
ments to undertake these duties, because the state governments
never resisted their performance.87 Again, there simply was no oc
casion for Congress to rely on force when it could obtain state serv84. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
85. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
86. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2391-92 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370-71.
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ices through cooperation. Thus, Congress never addressed clearly
the question asked by the

Printz

court.

But there is a source of authority that, at least at first glance,
seems to suggest much more clearly that the

Printz

and

New York

majorities were correct in their view of constitutional tradition: the
opinions of Justice Story. This section first explains how Story's
views provide support for

Printz

and New

York.

But it then shows

how these views - and the larger edifice of dual federalism upon
which they rest - actually are a weak and unconvincing basis for
modem doctrines of state autonomy. Story indeed defended the
notion that the federal government cannot impose regulatory duties
on nonfederal officers, but he did so not out of respect for state
autonomy but out of contempt for state officials' capacities. The
best view of the limited evidence available is that Story wanted to
exclude nonfederal officials from even

voluntarily

implementing

federal law. Story's doctrine of state autonomy, therefore, is more
a nondelegation doctrine, requiring Congress to create federal
agencies and barring state officials from carrying out federal
responsibilities.
Consider Story's dissent in

Houston v. Moore, 88

an

1820

deci

sion holding that Pennsylvania courts could try militiamen for re
fusing to serve in the United States forces during the War of 1812.
Justice Story thought that the state courts had no such power, but in
his dissent he went even further:
There is no pretence to say, that Congress can compel a State Court
to convene and sit in judgment on such an offence. Such an authority
is no where confided to it by the constitution. Its power is limited to
the few cases already specified, and these assuredly do not embrace it;
for it is not an implied power necessary or proper to carry into effect
the given powers. The national may organize its own tribunals for this
purpose; and it has no necessity to resort to other tribunals to enforce

its rights. If it do [sic] not choose to organize such tribunals, it is its
own fault; but it is not, therefore, imperative upon a state tribunal to
volunteer in its service. 89

Again, in

Prigg v. Pennsylvania,90

Story stated that the Penn

sylvania officers could not enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause of Ar
ticle IV. As in Houston, Justice Story went further, arguing that the
national government could not force the state government to en
force the Fugitive Slave Clause even if it had wanted to do so. He
wrote:
88. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 {1820).
89. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 67 {Story, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. 41 U.S. {16 Pet.) 539 {1842).
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The clause is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any
state. It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action
to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be com

pelled to enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional
exercise of the power ofinterpretation, to insist that the states are bound
to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national govern
ment, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution.91

In short, Justice Story's dicta suggests that, well before Kentucky v.
Dennison, 92 Justice Story believed that the national government
could not require the state governments to implement national law.
Of course, Justice Story was merely one justice on the Court,
and his statements were either dicta, in Prigg, or dissenting state
ments, in Houston. But his views seem to have been widely shared.
As Justice McLean noted in Prigg, "It seems to be taken as a con
ceded point . . . that Congress had no power to impose duties on
state officers."93 Justice Marshall himself seems to have dropped
hints in

Wayman v. Southard94

that he was sympathetic to Justice

Story's views, and there is historical evidence that Marshall en
dorsed Story's opinion in

Houston.9s

There is another, more important reason to pay special heed to
the views of Justice Story on the issue of state autonomy: Justice
Story is famously an ultranationalist of the Marshall Court, a justice
who had little patience for Calhoun's confederation theory or the
notion of state nullification.96 One might conclude, therefore, that

if a justice as nationalistically inclined as Justice Story embraced the
theory of New York and Printz, then such a theory does not require
one to accept antebellum antinationalist views of state sovereignty
that are now best viewed as Gone with the Wmd of the Civil War.
Is

Prigg

the forgotten foundation for

New York

and

Printz

-

the constitutional authority suggesting that Justices Scalia and
91. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 615-16 (emphasis added).

92. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
93. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 664 (McLean, J., concurring). Even Justice McLean himself
conceded that "[a]s a general principle, this is true," but he drew an exception for Article
!V's Fugitive Slave Clause which expressly imposed duties on state governments. See Prigg,
41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 664 (McLean, J., concurring).
94.

23

U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 (1825).

95. In Wayman, Marshall stated that "the laws of the Union may permit such agency [i.e.,
state executive officers' implementation of federal laws], but it is by no means clear that they
can compel it." 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 39-40. The issue in Wayman was whether state law
governed the manner in which federal marshalls executed judgments of federal courts. 23
U.S. (10 Wheat) at 3.
96. Story certainly did not accept the notion that "affirmative" burdens on state officials
were somehow contrary to the "spirit" of the Constitution. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 343-44 (1816) ("It is a mistake that the constitution was not
designed to operate upon states, in their corporate capacities.").
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O'Connor were right after all? Oddly, neither Justice Scalia nor

Prigg. Perhaps this omission is sensible, be
reading, Prigg and the jurisprudence from which it

Justice O'Connor cites
cause, on close

emerges provide deeply paradoxical support for any modem theory
of state autonomy. Ironically, the problem is not that
devoted to states' rights, but rather that

Prigg

Prigg is

too

and its intellectual

foundation in the Marshall Court's jurisprudence - like the writ
ings of Publius - are too nationalistic:

Prigg

springs out of the

same deep suspicion of state governments that seems indefensible
in an era of cooperative federalism. The legacy of dual federalism
that Justice Scalia invokes is, indeed, a nationalistic legacy, forged
by the Marshall Court and carried forward by Justice Story out of
distrust for state institutions rather than love of state autonomy.
Consider Justice Story's logic in the passage above quoted from
Story contends that the Necessary and Proper Clause

Houston.

does not authorize Congress to force state tribunals to adjudicate
federal crimes, because, given that Congress can create its own fed
eral tribunals, Congress has no necessity to demand such tribunals
from the states. But this argument, if taken seriously, would seem
to prohibit Congress from using state tribunals even with the con
sent of state legislatures. After all, if one can create federal courts,
then it is not strictly speaking necessary to delegate business to
state courts even if they voluntarily accept it. Embedded in Story's
rhetoric of state autonomy is a deeply nationalistic nondelegation
theory.
Story had already elaborated such a theory in Martin v. Hunters'
Lessee. 97 In Martin, Justice Story argued in dicta that Congress has
an obligation to create federal courts sufficient to hear every class
of case enumerated in Article III, section 2 of the Constitution.98 A
large and sophisticated literature analyzes Story's claim.99 For the
purpose of this article, it is important to rehearse only the undis
puted essence of Story's argument. According to Story, by declar
ing that the judicial power "shall be vested" in Article III courts,
section

1 of Article ill bars Congress from "vest[ing]

any portion of

the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained
97.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
98. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 327-33.
99. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle Ill: Separating the 1lvo
Tiers ofFederal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory
View ofFederal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding ofArticle
Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 39, 55-58; Robert J. Meltzer, The His
tory and Structure of Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990).
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and established by itself."100 The essence of Story's argument is a
nondelegation theory: Congress simply cannot give final authority
to adjudicate any Article III case to state tribunals, and Congress
cannot give any authority to state courts to adjudicate certain
classes of federal business - in particular, maritime and admiralty
cases and federal crimes.101 If the state courts are to have any
power to hear federal cases, it is only because federal issues inevita
bly arise during the course of ordinary state judicial business under
the state court's preexisting jurisdiction.
As Houston suggests, this nondelegation doctrine also can be
the basis of a doctrine of state autonomy: if state courts are unfit to
hear certain types of federal cases, then Congress a fortiori cannot
force them to hear such cases. But, as both Houston and Martin
suggest, this doctrine of state autonomy is hardly a tribute to the
dignity of state government. Rather, Story's theory is rooted in the
belief that "[t]he constitution has presumed (whether rightly or
wrongly we do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices,
state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or
control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular adminis
tration of justice."102 This is not to say that state courts cannot hear
some federal business that incidentally arises in the course of their
state duties. But Story's strong suggestion in both Houston and
Martin is that Congress cannot encourage such state exercise of fed
eral duties by delegating them as a matter of federal law.
In short, Story simply transforms Publius's prudential advice not
to trust state officials into a constitutional command. Martin thus
extends The Federalist No. 15's suggestion that state institutions are
simply too parochial, disuniform, populistic, and prejudiced to be
trusted to carry out federal business.
Like his Houston dissent, Story's dicta in Prigg v. Pennsylvania
that "the states cannot . . . be compelled to enforce [the Fugitive
Slave Clause of Article IV]"103 appears to reflect a nationalistic
nondelegation doctrine rooted in Martin rather than any high re
gard for state institutions' independence. According to Story, Con
gress cannot force county magistrates to enforce slaveowners'
100. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 330-31.
101. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337. Story could be read to go even farther: he might be
arguing that Congress must create federal district courts to exercise original jurisdictions over
all federal business to the exclusion of state courts. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 336. But, as
Michael Collins notes, this seems to be wistful acknowledgment of an argument rather than
adoption of it. See Collins, supra note 99, at 57 n.45.
102. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347.
103. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842).
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claims arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause, because "the clause
is found in the national Constitution" and "does not point out any
state functionaries . . . to carry its provisions into effect."104
But this logic, like the logic of Houston, implies that Congress
could not make use of county magistrates even if they consented to
such duties. After all, the magistrates' consent would not alter the
fact that Article IV duties are "duties of the national government,
nowhere delegated or intrusted to [state officials] by the Constitu
tion. "105 Story, indeed, seems to invoke Martin by suggesting that
Congress cannot rely on state institutions to enforce slaveowners'
rights, stating that "the natural, if not the necessary conclusion is
that the national government . . . is bound, through its own proper
departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may re
quire, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it
by the Constitution."to6
This is not to say that Story believed that state officials could not
adjudicate slaveowners' claims to recover their slaves. To the con
trary, he states that "state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise
that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation."107 Story
seems to be arguing here only that state officials have a preexisting
police power to "arrest and restrain runaway slaves and remove
them from their borders," a power that "may essentially promote
and aid the interests of the owners" but was "designed generally for
other purposes, for the protection, safety, and peace of the
state."1°8 Such a view would mirror his theory in Martin and Hous
ton that, while state courts may "incidentally" hear federal business
pursuant to their preexisting jurisdiction, Congress cannot deliber
ately delegate such business to them, because such delegation
would interfere with the uniform administration of federal law. It
follows incidentally from such a nondelegation theory that Con
gress cannot force state officials to hear Article IV claims. Such an
immunity is not rooted in any high regard for state autonomy but
104. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615.
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616.
106. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616 (emphasis added). While Story does not cite Martin, counsel
for respondent did, stating that "so far as [the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act] attempts to vest this
or any jurisdiction in state officers, it is unconstitutional and void. The solemn decision of
this Court [in Martin] has branded such attempt with condemnation." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at
598.
107. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622.
108. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625. As David Currie notes, Story's argument against state en
forcement of Article IV seems to rest on "the need for uniformity." See DAvio CuRRIE, THE
CoNSTITIJTION IN nm SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDru!D YEARS 1789-1888, at 242
(1985).
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rather in distrust for state officials; the Constitution simply does not
trust them to carry out federal business.109
Story's rejection of intergovernmental cooperation is not an
anomaly. It springs directly out of what I call the Marshall Court's
jurisprudence of "nationalistic dual federalism," referring to the de
sire of Marshall to protect the integrity of the federal government
by excluding state governments from meddling in federal affairs.
The presupposition of this jurisprudence is that state and national
governments should enforce their own laws with their own bureau
cracy, each avoiding any dependence on the other. As Marshall
stated in

McCulloch:

No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a
dependence of the government of the Union on those of the States,
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are
adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely

for the accomplishment of its ends.110

The "intention" to which Marshall refers is best exemplified by the
Federalists' rejection of requisitions and the creation of a national
government with its own executive and judicial officials. By con
tending that the new government was "expected to rely" on its own
institutions "alone," Marshall asserts that direct taxation and regu
lation of individuals replaced rather than supplemented requisi
tions. Put another way, the federal government had a duty as well
as a right to be independent of the states.
One might object that McCulloch is simply rejecting the notion
that the national government would be required to rely on state in
stitutions. This does not imply necessarily that the national govern
ment lacks the

option

to rely on such state institutions if it wishes.

But Marshall's broad argument for separating state and federal
functions carries a not-so-subtle hint of such a prohibition. In argu
ing for a categorical bar against even possibly good-faith state taxa
tion of federal institutions, Marshall compares state governments'
relations with the national government to the relations between two
separate states: "Would the people of any one State trust those of
another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of
their State government?" Marshall asks rhetorically. "Why, then,
should we suppose that the people of any one State should be will109. See JAMES MCLELLAN, JosEPH STORY AND nm AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 263
(1971) (noting that Story's opinions "seem to discount the possibility of cooperation between
the national and state governments and rigidly divide jurisdictions into compartments, nearly
always at the expense of state power").
110. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.)

316,

424

(1819) (emphasis added).
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ing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations
of [the national government]?"lll
If one accepts this analogy, then it is natural to bar the national
government from delegating regulatory power to state govern
ments. After all, it would be odd to allow the Minnesota legislature
to delegate regulatory duties to the Wisconsin legislature. If
federal-state relations are analogous to state-state relations, then it
ought to be equally odd to allow Congress to delegate its regulatory
responsibilities to state officials.112 For Congress to delegate signifi
cant regulatory responsibilities to state officials would be to invite
the "abuse" that "the people" - that is, the Constitution - pro
hibit. To borrow Marshall's phrase, "[t]his was not intended by the
American people. They did not design to make their government
dependent on the States. "113
In short, Marshall's opinion in McCulloch suggests a nondelega
tion theory that is defended explicitly by Justice Story in Martin,
Prigg, and Houston. While Marshall is never as clear as Justice
Story in prohibiting Congress from delegating responsibilities to
state officials, he seemed to presuppose just such a bar in Gibbons
v. Ogden when he stated that "[a]lthough Congress cannot enable a
state to regulate, Congress may adopt the provisions of a state on
any subject."114
Why would Marshall and Story be so distrustful of Congress
that they would want to bar Congress from delegating powers to
state governments? It seems that they did not believe that national
ism would be protected through the national political process; per
haps they believed that there was simply too much danger that
Congress might be captured by parochial - or, at least, Jefferso
nian - state interests, turn over too much responsibility to state
governments, and thus undermine the purposes of the Union.us If
state governments were simply too disuniform or parochial to carry
111. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431.
112. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431 ("The legislature of the Union alone . . . can be trusted
by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence
that it will not be abused.").
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432.
114. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 207 (1824).
115. As Professor Vikram Amar has noted, this worry may have been much more plausi
ble prior to enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, because state legislatures controlled
the U.S. Senate. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347, 1378 (1996). One
might speculate that Marshall's distrust of state officials might have been related to the polit·
ical reality that, by 1819, most state governments - and, thus, state courts - were being
taken over by Republican followers of Thomas Jefferson. By contrast, much of the federal
judiciary still remained firmly under the control of Federalists appointed by John Adams.
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out federal responsibilities, as the Court has sometimes sug
gested,116 then the Court would have to step in to control Con
gress's susceptibility to delegate such responsibilities to state
officials.
In any case, the earliest judicial expressions favoring state au
tonomy in Prigg and Houston seem to owe their existence to this
hostility toward state officials and to the belief that Congress must
be barred from relying on them. State autonomy follows naturally
from the nationalistic dual federalism set forth in Martin, McCul
loch, and Gibbons
the view that state and federal governments
must have rigidly separate jurisdictions, pursuing different purposes
with different sets of officials. While it might seem ironic to us that
the theory of state autonomy has its origins in fear and loathing of
states, such a view is not so distant from the arguments of Publius
upon which Justice Scalia relied so heavily in Printz.
-

3.

The Demise of Nationalistic Dual Federalism: From Dennison
and Day to the Intergovernmental State

The problem with the theory of nationalistic dual federalism and
the doctrine of state autonomy based on it is that the nationalistic
premises of the theory were simply untenable. Simply put, advo
cates of state power destroyed Marshall's and Story's basis for state
autonomy because they refused to accept the nationalistic premise
that state governments cannot be trusted with federal responsibili
ties. Starting with Chief Justice Taney's concurring opinion in Prigg
and ending with the New Deal Court's repudiation of the Marshall
Court's nondelegation doctrine, the Court's growing trust of state
governments rendered obsolete the theory of state autonomy an
nounced by Justice Story in Prigg.
But, while the Court quickly rejected dual federalism, it never
replaced Story's analysis with a more persuasive basis for state au
tonomy. This is not to say that the Court did not embrace the con
cept of state autonomy. To the contrary, it continued to repeat
Story's formula that the national government could not demand
that state officials implement federal law. But, unlike Story, the
Court has never come up with a logically consistent reason for the
rule.
116. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (barring Congress
from permitting state officials to apply state workers' compensation law to longshoremen and
other maritime workers). Jensen demonstrates a deep concern, also reflected in Martin, that
federal jurisdiction over maritime matters is nondelegable.
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Kentucky v. Dennison117

and

Collector v.

illustrate both the inadequacy of nationalistic dual federal

ism as a basis for state autonomy and the Court's inability to re
place such a theory with a different analysis. Justice Taney could
not rely on the theory of nationalistic dual federalism in

Dennison;

he concurred in Prigg expressly to reject Story's argument that state
officials could not enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article
section

2,

IV,

contending that Congress had properly "counted upon

[state officials'] cordial co-operation" in the enforcement of the

1793

Fugitive Slave Act.119 As a practical matter, Taney worried

that, by excluding state officials from enforcing Article

IV,

Story's

views would effectively cripple slaveowners' ability to recover fugi
tive slaves.120 But, quite apart from this immediate practical con
cern, the Taney Court generally promoted the notion that state
governments could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with Congress,
most famously in

Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 121

Story's exclusion

of state officials from federal responsibilities may have rankled this
commitment to state power.
Thus, Taney had to come up with a new theory of state auton
omy, one that did not imply that state officials could not voluntarily
carry out federal duties. In

Kentucky v. Dennison,

Taney rewrote

Prigg to advance such a theory. The issues before the Court were,
first, whether the antislavery governor of Ohio had violated federal
constitutional or statutory extradition law by refusing to extradite
Willis Lago, a man who had helped a slave escape, and, second,

117. 65 U.S.

(24 How.)

66 (1861).

118. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
119.

See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.

(16 Pet.) 539, 631 (1842).

120. In Taney's view, the federal government lacked a sufficient bureaucracy to ensure
such recovery, and the states' police powers were insufficient to ensure the recovery of fugi
tive slaves. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 632-33. Story may have intended his theory of
state autonomy to impede the recovery of fugitive slaves. This was, at least, the spin that his
son later placed upon his father's Prigg opinion, arguing that Story's argument actually repre
sented the triumph of freedom, because, by allowing state officials to withdraw from the
enforcement of the fugitive slave laws, the doctrine would make recovery of fugitives practi
cally impossible. See Paul Fmkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Penn
sylvania and Justice Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 247, 249. It remains
controversial whether Story actually intended to promote the freedom of fugitive slaves with
his opinion. Story later wrote a letter to Senator Berrien from Georgia instructing him on
how to draft a new fugitive slave law that would not offend Prigg's anticommandeering prin
ciple. See McLELLAN, supra note 109, at 262 n.94.
121. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (upholding a state law requiring ships to hire a
local pilot on the ground that such port regulations, while involving "the power to regulate
commerce," also involved "the local necessities of navigation").
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whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus to the governor
requiring him to extradite the man as Kentucky had requested.122
Taney agreed with Kentucky that the governor had violated fed
eral extradition law, but he refused to issue the writ of mandamus,
holding that "the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has
no power to impose on a state officer, as such, any duty whatever,
and compel him to perform it."123 There was nothing new about
this opinion; Taney had expressed the same view in- his Prigg con
currence.124 But Taney could not defend this holding by invoking
the dual federalism of Story without contradicting his own theory of
concurrent jurisdiction laid out in Prigg. Thus, Taney's Dennison
opinion did not mention the classic statement of dual federalism,
written by Taney himself three years earlier in Ableman v. Booth,
that "the powers of the General Government, and the States,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres,"125 because his own views as expressed in Prigg concerning
Article IV contradicted every word. In Taney's view, the state and
federal governments had concurrent rather than separate and dis
tinct powers to enforce the Article IV Extradition Clause, and they
did not act independently and separately but rather with "cordial
co-operation."126 In short, precisely because Taney wished to en
hance state powers, dual federalism would be of no use to Taney in
making the first systematic defense of state autonomy.
Instead, Taney relied on two new arguments to support the right
of state officials to decline federal commands. These assertions
would, in both their vagueness and unpersuasiveness, later become
typical of state autonomy jurisprudence. First, Taney argued that
there was no "clause or provision in the Constitution which arms
the Government of the United States with th[e] power [to issue
commands to state officials]."127 Second, Taney argued that, if Con
gress could impose duties on state officers, then "it might overload
122. See Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 97-99; 5 C. SWISHER, HisroRY OF THE SUPREME
UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864, at 686-87 (1974).
123. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107.
124. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 630 (Taney, J., concurring) ("[S]tate officers . . . are
not bound to execute the duties imposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to do so
or are required to do so by a law of the state.").
125. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). Edward Corwin credits
Taney with providing the first clear statement of dual federalism in this passage. See
EDWARD CoRWIN TOTAL WAR AND THE CoNSTITUTION 173 (1947).
126. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 631.
127. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107.
CoURT OF THE

,
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the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable
him from performing his obligations to the State, and might impose
on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity
to which he was elevated by the State. "128
These arguments are decidedly underwhelming. While the Con
stitution does not mention any congressional power to demand
services from state officials, an argument could be made that such a
power is nonetheless given to Congress implicitly because it is
plainly adapted to accomplish a legitimate end of Congress namely, enforcement of rights under Article IV.129 As for the bur
dens that such demands might impose on state officials, Taney pro
vides no reason to distinguish them from the normal burden of
preemption of state policies, which might also "disable [an officer]
from performing his obligations to the state"13o simply by making
those obligations illegal. Of course, demands for state officers'
services will cost the state government money, but so will preemp
tion of state taxes by congressionally conferred tax immunity.131 In
short, having abandoned Story's theory of dual federalism, Taney
could not come up with any alternative theory justifying state au
tonomy that was minimally persuasive.

Collector v. Day132 differs from Dennison in that the Day Court
had no compunction about relying upon the notion of dual federal
ism or separate and distinct spheres. Moreover, Day correctly ex
pounded the logic of dual federalism as it was expressed in
McCulloch. The problem with Day is that such a theory never re
flected intergovernmental reality in the United States - not even
at the time Day was handed down.

Day involved a federal income tax imposed on the income of a
state probate judge. The state judge paid the tax under protest and
then sought recovery in federal court.133 In affirming the right of
the state judge to refuse to pay the tax, the Court restated
Ableman's classic formulation of dual federalism:
The general government, and the States, although both exist within
the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, act
ing separately and independently of each other, within their respec
tive spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the

128. Dennison, 65 U.S. {24 How.) at 108.
129. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 {1819).
130. Dennison, 65 U.S. {24 How.) at 108.
131. See McCulloch, 11 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 376-77 (argument of Luther Martin, Maryland
Attorney General).
132. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 {1870).
133. See 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 113-14.
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States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the lan
guage of the tenth amendment, "reserved," are as independent of the
general government as that government within its sphere is independ
ent of the States.134

Having invoked the notion of dual federalism, the Court then sim
ply turned the leading precedent of nationalistic dual federalism
McCulloch v. Maryland
on its head. "[I]f the means and instru
mentalities employed by [the national government] to carry into
operation the powers granted to it are, necessarily, and, for the sake
of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are
not those of the States . . . equally exempt from Federal
taxation?"13S

_
,

-

Justice Nelson's conclusion followed neatly from the premises of

McCulloch and, more generally, from the notion that the federal
government ought to be completely independent of the states. By
taxing the salary of the probate judge, the national government in
directly was taxing the revenue used to pay that salary, and there
fore arguably relying on requisitions against state revenue to fund
its operations.136 Such dependence on the states was not expressly
forbidden by McCulloch, but it certainly was inconsistent with the
theme of national independence that ran throughout the opinion.
If the national government was supposed to rely on its resources
alone, as Marshall implied, then why should it lay a tax on a salary
that was the product of a state legislature's appropriation of state
revenue?137
134. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124.
135. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 127.
136. The conclusion was not necessary, but it was implied by the Court's earlier holding
that, by taxing the income of federal officers, the state governments violated the federal
government's tax immunity. See Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
135 (1842).
137. Marshall himself had attempted to distinguish federal from state tax immunity by
observing that the state governments and people were all represented in Congress, whereas
the national government and people were not represented in the legislature of the trucing
state. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819). Marshall implied
that this difference in representation gave the Court better reason to believe that Congress
would not abuse its authority to tax state institutions. Justice Bradley repeated the argument,
see Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 128-29 (Bradley, J., dissenting), but it is notably unpersuasive:
even Marshall did not rest on the argument but instead stated that "if the full application of
this argument [equating state and federal tax immunity] could be admitted, it might bring
into question the right of Congress to tax the State banks, and could not prove the right of
the States to tax the Bank of the United States," McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. The
problem with the argument is that, if each state's representation in Congress sufficiently pro
tects it from federal taxation, then it is difficult to see why such representation does not also
adequately protect the states from the taxes of sister states. After all, if a state legislature
were to tax some federal agency abusively, the other states' congressional delegations could
use their power in Congress to bestow express tax immunity on the federal agency, preempt
the state tax, and thereby end the abuse. That is, if federalism were adequately protected
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The difficulty with Collector v. Day was not logical but empiri
cal. Day's deductions from the premises of McCulloch and
Ableman was unpersuasive because those premises were unpersua
sive. In particular, it had never been the case that the federal and
state governments operated in "separate and distinct spheres" pur
suing independent and distinct objects with distinct resources. The
federal government, for example, had bankrolled state govern
ments from the outset of the republic by assuming state Revolution
ary War debt, an action that subsidized state operations until the
end of the eighteenth century.138 The state governments had subsi
dized federal operations by, for example, subscribing to shares of
the national bank, and the national government had subsidized
state banks by making them federal depositories after 1836.139 By
1870, when Day was decided, the rudiments of the system of inter
governmental aid had been in place for almost a decade: the Mor
rill Act, enacted in 1862, had provided the state governments with
Western land to subsidize state educational policy.140
This is not to say that a full-blown system of intergovernmental
relations existed before the twentieth century.141 But the theory of
federalism implied by McCulloch, Martin, Gibbons, Prigg, and
Ableman
the nationalistic notion that the federal government
should deeply distrust the states and should not rely on state offi
cials to carry out federal duties - had never really reflected the
nation's practice. Indeed, given that the state and national govern
ments governed almost the same population and territory with the
same tax base and pursued overlapping regulatory purposes, inter
governmental separation of the sort assumed by McCulloch and
Day was utterly impractical.142
-

through the national political process, then a fortiori nationalism would also be adequately
protected through the same political process.

See WILLIAM J. SCHULTZE & M.R.

CAINE, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF nm
STATES 117-18 (1937). For an account of the politics of assumption, see STANLEY
ELKINS & Eruc McKrnuCK, THE AGE oF FEDERALISM 146-161 (1993).
138.

UNITED
139.
140.
(1972).

See DANIEL ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 89-99 (1961).
See AR'IHUR MAcMAHoN, ADMINISTERING FEDERALISM IN A DEMOCRACY

72

141. See Harry Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion ofPower: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. Tor.. L. REv. 619, 633-34 (1978) (attacking the Elazar thesis
that federal involvement in state projects and intergovernmental relations were common
before the Civil War).
142. Even in Ableman, where Taney had provided the definitive formulation of dual fed·
eralism and intergovernmental separation, the facts of the case suggested intergovernmental
dependence: the federal prisoner whose release by a state writ of habeas corpus had been
overruled by Ableman in the name of federal supremacy and independence had been con
fined by the federal district judge in a county jail because there was no federal jail in Wiscon·
sin. See 5 SWISHER, supra note 122, at 661-62.
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By 1883, the Court acknowledged that the national government
could delegate at least some regulatory responsibilities to state offi
cials. In United States v. Jones, 143 the Court held, that Congress
could delegate to a state board the responsibility for determining
the amount of compensation owed by the federal government to
landowners who suffered flooding from federal government-owned
dams. The Court did not formally reject Story's nondelegation doc
trine; to the contrary, the Court formally declared that the national
government's "power of appropriating private property . . . cannot
be transferred to a State any more than its other sovereign attrib
utes."144 The Court could hardly deny, however, that Congress re
peatedly had delegated administrative duties to state courts and
officials since the founding. So the Court instead reconciled the
practical reality of intergovernmental relations with the formal
nondelegation doctrine by stipulating without explanation that the
power to ascertain compensation owed was not a "sovereign" func
tion and, therefore, could be delegated to a state's administrative
agency.145
Even this formalistic acknowledgment of Story's nondelegation
theory was soon exploded completely by the development of coop
erative federalism during and after the New Deal. There is no need
to rehash the broad range of federal programs that. are adminis
tered by state officials in areas ranging from environmental protec
tion and worker safety to unemployment insurance and historic
preservation. In light of this reality, described in section II.A of this
article, the Court has thoroughly repudiated the notion that the fed
eral government should not rely on state officials to carry out fed
eral responsibilities. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 146 for
example, the Court held that Congress could authorize state gov
ernments to regulate interstate commerce in insurance, even
though such regulation would not fall within the states' police
power absent such authorization. In upholding this delegation of
federal responsibilities to the state governments, the Court emphat143. 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
144. 109 U.S. at 518-19.
145. See 109 U.S. at 518-19.

The Court's distinction between "sovereign" - and there
fore nondelegable - functions and nonsovereign functions is analogous to the distinction
drawn by Story between attempts by Congress to bestow federal jurisdiction on state courts
- which, Story suggests, is prohibited - and the state court's independent power to hear
federal claims pursu�t to their preexisting jurisdiction conferred by state law, which is gen
erally permitted... As Paul Bator has noted, Story's distinction seems "theological." See Paul
M. Bator, The Constitution as 'Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Ar
ticle Ill, 65 !ND. LJ. 233, 240-43 (1990). The Jones Court's distinction seems equally cryptic.

146. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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ically rejected Justice Story's notion that state officers should not
exercise federal responsibilities, stating that Congress has "broad
authority" to regulate interstate commerce "in conjunction with co
ordinated action by the states."147
How does the untenability of nationalistic dual federalism bear
on the doctrine of state autonomy? Recall that state autonomy
doctrine first arose in the form of a nondelegation doctrine. Its ear
liest coherent justification seems to be Justice Story's suggestion
that the federal government could not demand services from the
state governments because the national government instead should
rely on its own officials to carry out federal law.
The problem with the modem doctrine of state autonomy is
that, while the premises of such nationalistic dual federalism gener
ally have been rejected by the Court in other doctrinal areas and
completely rejected by national political practice, the doctrine of
state autonomy has never really weaned itself from these origins.
Some of the precedents, like

Collector v. Day,

seem to rely on the

notion that the federal and state governments somehow operate in

Dennison and its lineal
National League of Cities v. Usery, 14s instead nebu

separate and distinct spheres. Others, like
descendant

lously assert without much in the way of explanation that, by de
manding services of state governments, the federal government
somehow endangers the "sovereignty" or existence of state govern
ments more than when it preempts state law. But no "state auton
o my"

decision

provides

a

convincing

reason

for

why

commandeering is worse than preemption except by invoking the
theory of nationalistic dual federalism, a theory that seems inconsis
tent with well-known facts of intergovernmental relations.

Printz

and

New York

are no exceptions. Both opinions rely

heavily on the Federalists' objections to requisitions. But, as ex
plained in section I.B.1, this history suggests more a nationalist hos
tility towards state governments than a high regard for state
autonomy. Both

New York

and

Printz

also invoke the notion that

federal mandates threaten political accountability. But, as noted in
section I.A, these objections would seem to apply just as well to
voluntary intergovernmental cooperation, because such "political
147. 328 U.S. at 434. The Cqurt reinforced this holding 12 years later in United States v.
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), when it held that Congress prospectively could adopt
whatever criminal laws a state legislature might choose to enact in the future as the criminal
code governing federal enclaves.
148. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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accountability" arguments imply that federal and state programs
ought to be separate and distinct.
Finally,

Printz

adds a new rationale that suggests a complete re

turn to the nondelegation doctrine first proposed by Justice Story.
According to Justice Scalia, by demanding that nonfederal govern
ments administer federal programs, Congress undermines "the sep
aration and equilibration of powers between the three branches of
the Federal Government itself. "149 According to Scalia, when Con
gress requires state officials to enforce federal laws, Congress
thereby reduces the power of the President to control the execution
of the laws.
But, as Justice Stevens notes, such a defense of Presidential
power would seem to indict all forms of cooperative federalism, in
cluding programs rooted in state acceptance of federal grants or
state submission of implementation plans to avoid federal preemp
tion.150 After all, every such program of cooperative federalism de
prives the President of the power to execute the laws just as much
as congressional "commandeering" of state governments. Justice
Scalia's only response to this argument is to suggest that it is diffi
cult for Congress to induce nonfederal governments to implement
federal law with conditional grants or conditional preemption.151
This, however, is a

non sequitur:

it confuses likelihood of success

with constitutionality of result. Maybe conditional grants are less
likely to succeed in depriving the president of his Article II powers.
Nevertheless, when they

do

succeed, Scalia's logic would suggest

that they deprive the president of his powers to control the execu
tion of the laws and, therefore, should be invalidated.

Justice

Scalia's Article II argument is, in short, a revival of Justice Story's
argument against delegation of federal powers to state officials. As
Justice Story realized, such an argument works just as well against
voluntary state implementation of federal law as against involun
tary implementation.
II.

W"HY COMMANDEERING Is UNNECE S SARY: AN EcoNoMic
ANALY SI S OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRAN SACTION S

The justifications for state autonomy, as they exist in judicial
precedent, are deeply unsatisfying. Does this mean that the doc
trine itself is misguided? As I argue in the next three Parts, the
149. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.2365, 2378 (1997).
150. See 111 S. Ct. at 2396-97 ( Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See 111 S. Ct. at 2378 n.12.
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doctrine can be defended on grounds of policy: it serves extremely
useful functions. Recall the basic nature of the

New York

entitle

ment. The entitlement allows nonfederal governments to refuse to
implement national law even when the national government fully
funds the mandate. Therefore, as noted above,

New York protects

nonfederal governments' control over their regulatory machinery
- their administrative agencies, legislative bodies, and other of
ficers - with a "property rule," an absolute power to "hold out"
for the highest price that the national government is willing to offer.
Why might it be worthwhile to give nonfederal governments this
entitlement?

Part

II starts from the premise that federalism is a

useful structural arrangement.152 The- challenge of constitutional
law, therefore, is not deciding
rather deciding

how to

whether

to protect federalism, but

do so at an acceptably low cost, without en

croaching on other important values like a free national market or
protection of important national rights.153 Unlike previous doc
trines designed to protect state power, the doctrine of state auton
omy in New

York and Printz is useful because it costlessly promotes

federalism by distributing power to nonfederal governments with
out impeding any useful national programs.
Section II.A demonstrates that the

New York

entitlement pro

vides nonfederal governments with significant power in a federal
system, contrary to the widespread academic belief154 that New

York

and

Printz

are merely formalistic hurdles that provide

nonfederal governments with little useful power. This section de
scribes the process by which nonfederal governments can use the

New York

entitlement to extract revenue and policymaking discre

tion from the federal government when bargaining over a potential
agreement for nonfederal implementation of federal policy.
152. For reasons too familiar to bear repetition here, federalism is widely recognized to
be a useful structural arrangement. For a concise summary of arguments in favor of federal
regimes, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1484, 1491-511 {1987). McConnell notes, among other things, that, by devolving
power to territorially circumscribed states responsive to a local electorate, federal regimes
allow groups smaller than a national majority to satisfy their preferences for public goods,
multiply opportunities for political participation, and diffuse power in a way to promote elec
toral competition. See id. at 1493-94. This catalogue now makes a regular appearance in U.S.
Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 {1991). For more
lengthy and detailed arguments on behalf of federalism, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING
FEDERALISM {1987); VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CON
STITUTING A SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY 223-48 {1991); ALICE M. RivLIN, REVIVING THE
AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, TIIE STATES, & TIIE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT {1992).
153. See Kramer, supra note 43, at 1511.
154. For an example of such an attitude, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court
Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1652 (1994) (stating that New
York does not significantly affect the power of Congress or the states).
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Section II.B argues that this grant of power to state and local
governments is essentially costless, because the national govern
ment easily can use its spending power to reclaim the power
granted to nonfederal governments: the federal government can
purchase such services whenever it is cost-justified for nonfederal
governments to assist the national government. As section II.B ex
plains, intergovernmental bargains are not likely to be plagued by
transaction costs such as "holdout" problems or other sorts of stra
tegic b ehavior that would prevent such intergovernmental
transactions.
The ease with which the national government can purchase the
entitlement protected by

New York

and

Printz

distinguishes those

cases from past j udicial efforts to protect federalism - for example,
the doctrine of

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 155 holding that state

governments have exclusive powers to regulate manufacturing.
Whatever the value of those past doctrines to the promotion of fed
eralism, such doctrines seriously impeded important interests in na
tional supremacy that simply could not be vindicated through
voluntary intergovernmental transactions. By contrast, the national
government has no need to commandeer state or local govern
ments' regulatory processes, because Congress easily can purchase
those processes through its spending powers supplemented with its
power of conditional preemption. Commandeering of nonfederal
governments' regulatory power, therefore, is

pointless

centraliza

tion; it sacrifices an important protection of federalism for no useful
purpose.

In this respect, New

York is similar to any rule forbidding point

less confiscation or condemnation of private property.156 One argu
ment for (sometimes) protecting private owners' control of assets
with a "property rule" - an injunction rather than an entitlement
to just compensation - is that transaction costs are sometimes so
low that the government can purchase private assets through volun
tary exchange rather than through forced sales.157 The government
simply does not need eminent domain or the power of confiscation
155. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
156. One such rule is the doctrine - still sometimes enforced by state courts - that
governments may not condemn private property without a "public purpose." For a rare ex
ample of a court actually imposing such a limit on government's eminent domain power, see
City of Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993), where the court
struck down a city's condemnation of an easement for a cable on the grounds that the con
demnation lacked "public purpose."
157. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 61
(1986).
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to obtain computers, ' pencils, squad cars, or any other items for
which there is a competitive market; if it wants them, then it can
simply buy them like anyone else. We expect government to do so,
because,

ceteris paribus,

we wish to promote private autonomy, and

this method of promoting private autonomy is essentially costless.
Likewise,

Part II

argues that, if the federal government wants

state or local governments' regulatory services, then they should
buy them through voluntary sales. The federal government has no
more need to commandeer state regulatory processes than it has a
need to confiscate office supplies or conscript janitors. If one ac
cepts even a weak presumption in favor of federal regimes and their
implication of state power, then

New York

and

Printz

make emi

nent functional sense.

An Overview of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Is Valuable to State and Local Governments

A.

In understanding how New York provides a valuable entitle
ment to state and local governments, the essential point to remem
ber is that New York does not merely give the states something to
use but, just as important, something to sell. The value of the New
York entitlement, in other words, must be measured not simply by
what the states can do with it but also by what they can get for it.
How can the states sell their

New York entitlement?

Such sales

occur routinely in the broad category of legislation first described
by Morton Grodzins as "marble-cake federalism."158 In all such
legislation, Congress purchases the use of state regulatory machin
ery to implement federal law. The two mechanisms by which such
purchases occur are described in New York itself - conditional
grants and conditional preemption.

1.

The System of Conditional Grants

Barrels of ink have been spilled describing the multitude of con
ditional grant systems, their probable effect on state behavior, the
nature and need for federal oversight, and the character of the fed
eral "strings."159 The following brief summary, however, suffices to
158. See MoRTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEw VIEW OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
159. See, e.g., James L. Barr & Otto A. Davis, An Elementary Political and Economic
Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments, 33 S. EcoN. J. 149 (1966); Edward M.
Gramlich, Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Com
parison of Their Effects, 21 NATL. TAX J. 119 (1968); E.M. Gramlich, The Effects of Federal
Grants on State-Local Expenditures: A Review of the Econometric Literature, in PROCEED·
INGS OF THE 62D ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 569 (1969).
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Conditional grants are exercises of Congress's spending power
as it has been understood since Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.16o
Congress provides funds to the states on the condition that the state
spend the funds in accordance with federal priorities. As a general
matter, such conditional grants involve a two-step process. The first
step concerns the original design of the grant: Congress enacts leg
islation defining the purposes of the grant, establishing the criteria
for getting the money, any matching requirements, and so on. Dur
ing this stage, nonfederal government entities161 and their various
intergovernmental lobbying organizations may press for federal
money with little or no conditions on how the funds are spent.
State and local governments accomplish this end by asking for
either (1) (relatively) unconditional grants - for example, so-called
block grants and general revenue sharing - or (2) grants with con
ditions that, as a practical matter, are already consistent with the
states' own spending priorities - for example, so-called "develop
mental programs" that promote the states' economic welfare and
do not redistribute wealth.162 Against such state and local lobbying
efforts, various organizations - sometimes private nonprofit
groups such as the NAACP, the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights, and the Children's Defense Fund,163 but sometimes rival
state and local government agencies164 - urge more careful restric160. 301 U.S. 548, 590-91 (1937). The widespread use of such grants actually precedes the
New Deal. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); WALKER, supra note 2, at
76-91.
161. It is important to avoid treating the state governments as unitary "black boxes" by
assuming that the grants provided by the federal government to nonfederal levels of govern
ment benefit the "states" without distinguishing between the subdivisions of the states school districts, municipalities, counties, and so on - or branches of the state government for example, the governors' office, state departments of transportation, and state legislatures
- to which such funds might actually be directed. Of course, at least since the New Deal and
perhaps as long ago as the early 19th century, the Federal Government also has provided
assistance directly to local governments within the states, often against the wishes of the state
governments that are, at least nominally, the creators of the localities receiving the funds.
Congress also might provide funds to the "state" that are spent by the governor without
being appropriated by the legislature. These intragovemmental controversies are an impor
tant part of the intergovernmental lobbying process and are discussed infra section II.B.
162. For a general theoretical account of the differences between categorical and block
grants, see PETERSON, supra note 32, at 23-37. For an argument that the practical distinction
between categorical and block grants can be largely illusory, see PETERSON ET AL. , supra
note 2, at 22-23.
163. For a description of such lobbying by private interest groups, see PETERSON ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 137-38.
164. For descriptions of specific instances in which one level or department of state gov
ernment struggled against another for control over federal funds, see CoNLAN, supra note 2,
at 37-38 (describing the efforts of state departments of transportation to prevent the Nixon
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tions to prevent states from diverting federal funds to nonfederal
purposes.

In response to such pressures, Congress may impose various
substantive conditions on both the federal grant money and preex
isting state funds165 to ensure the federal grant is spent for specified
classes of beneficiaries or specified federal purposes. Congress may
also demand that state agencies responsible for spending the fed
eral revenue comply with various structural or procedural require
ments such as

"public participation" requirements,166 "single

agency" requirements,167 and merit selection of state personnel.168

In the second stage,

individual states decide

whether to accept

the conditions and apply for the funds. This second stage provides
a second opportunity for one-on-one bargaining between state and
administration from creating a transportation block grant program that would effectively
transfer power over federal funds from departments to state governors); DONALD H.
HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND IN·
TERGOVERNMENTAL LoBBYING 98-113 {1974) {describing the rivalry between governors and
mayors for control of federal funds).
165. Congress may, for example, impose a "nonsupplanting" or "maintenance of effort"
condition on federal funds, requiring state governments to provide assurances that funds pro·
vided to the State will be used only to supplement, and not to supplant, the amount of fed·
eral, state, and local funds otherwise expended for the federal purpose in the State. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a{C) {1988) (enacting a "maintenance of effort" provision for the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988). Such requirements bar states from reducing preexisting
state spending on programs that serve purposes similar to programs funded by the federal
grant in order to ensure that federal dollars are not effectively converted from federal to state
purposes. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 79.
166. For examples of public participation requirements, see JoHN C. DONOVAN, THB
PoLmcs oF POVERTY 35 {2d ed. 1973); SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SocIETY's PooR LAW:
A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY 63-64 {1969). For more recent provisions requiring that
state law allow consumers of federally funded services to participate in decisionmaking re·
garding such services, see the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(7) {1994) (requiring that states assure that the school district consult with parents of
children with disabilities concerning the student's individual education plan); Tice v.
Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200 {4th Cir. 1990).
167. "Single agency" requirements essentially force state governments to delegate re
sponsibility for administer,ing a federally funded program to a single state agency that special
izes in the program. Such requirements tend to strengthen the position of unelected state
civil servants who specialize in the particular federally funded service. See, e.g., Charles L.
Schultze, Federal Spending: Past, Present, and Future, in SETTING NATIONAL Pruoru11BS:
THE NEXT TEN YEARS 323 (Henry Owen & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1976). Such ostensibly
state bureaucracies can have a greater degree of loyalty to federal program goals than elected
state officials. See liARoLD SEIDMAN, PoLmcs, PosmoN, AND PoWER: THE DYNAMICS oF
FEDERAL ORGANIZATION 174-190 (3d ed. 1980). Not surprisingly, state elected officials dis·
like the intrusion on their discretion. Governor Mark Hatfield, for example, fought unsuc
cessfully against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1961 to avoid the
"single agency" requirement. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 128.
168. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(4) (1986).
For implementing regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3(g), (h) (1989) (requiring state programs
to hire "qualified personnel").
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local officials and the national government.169 Even if the grant
system consists of "formula grants" with specifically defined criteria
for eligibility,110 the states and localities can bargain with the na
tional government over how stringently the national government
will enforce the conditions ostensibly attached to the national
funds. State and local officials may induce individual members of
Congress to pressure federal agencies to relax their oversight of
state and local expenditures of nonsource revenue.171 If the pro
gram consists of "project" or other nonformula grants based on
general criteria providing federal administrators with significant
discretion to deny or approve applications for federal money, then
an even greater opportunity for intergovernmental lobbying exists.
At this stage of the process, states and localities lobby federal ad
ministrators for funds through various degrees of "grantsmanship."
Again, members of Congress predictably intervene in the applica
tion process on behalf of state and local officials from their
constituencies.
Conditional grants-in-aid, therefore, resemble fee-for-service
contracts under which the national government provides nonsource
revenue resembling "fees" in return for state-provided services.
Assuming that the state and local governments possess the New
York entitlement, each nonfederal government can independently
decide whether to proffer the requested services for the tendered
"price." In this sense, conditional grants-in-aid do not differ in kind
from other methods by which the national government purchases
goods and services from private persons. By accepting the money,
the public or private contractor signals that the costs of performing
the service are less than the revenue provided by the grant.
Before I discuss conditional preemption, the second method by
which the national government obtains state and local governmen·

169. See RoBERT D. PurnAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WoRK: Civic TRADmoNs IN
MODERN ITALY 22-23 {1993) {distinguishing between intergovernmental relations based on
"all-on-one," in which all regions lobby for more autonomy against the central government,
versus "one-on-one," in which a single region seeks greater autonomy from the central gov
ernment, and finding that the former was more effective than the latter).
170. In this category, one can place various tax expenditures that benefit the states. For
example, the federal fax code allows taxpayers to deduct state and local property and income
taxes to reduce their adjusted gross income on the federal tax returns. See WRIGHT, supra
note 1, at 143. By reducing residents' federal tax liability in proportion to their state and
local tax liability, these deductions reduce residents' opposition to state and local taxation.
There is, however, great uncertainty about how much such deductions actually increase state
and local revenues. See 1 OFFICE OF STATE AND LocAL FIN., U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
FEDERAL-STATE-LoCAL FISCAL RELATIONS: TECHNICAL PAPERS 313-552 {1986).
171. See, e.g., John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 19 AM.. PoL. Sa.
REv. 994, 1008-11 (1985).
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tal services, I must digress and analyze one objection to the analogy
between conditional grants-in-aid and other contracts. According
to one line of reasoning, every offer made by Congress is an offer
that the states cannot refuse.

If Congress offers a grant-in-aid

earmarked for particular purposes and with matching conditions,
then the states will be compelled, as a matter of practical political
necessity, to accept the money - for which the state's residents are
already paying federal taxes - and accept Congress's conditions

that follow the grant.112

What justifies this dim view of states' ability to decline federal
money? The intuitive reason seems to be that state governments
rarely

do

decline federal grants, even when the conditions attached

to the funds seem onerous. But this is hardly compelling evidence
that the conditions attached to grants are coercive; state and local
willingness to sell services might mean only that Congress has made
a correct estimate of the nonfederal governments' opportunity costs
of providing the requested services. After all, Congress designs the
grant package with input from nonfederal governments and their
organizations, such as the National League of Cities and the Na
tional Governors' Association. Therefore, it should not be surpris
ing that, when Congress actually offers the grant, nonfederal
governments accept it. One might as well argue that one coerces
storeowners by buying their products because, when one presents
the requested price for a product, the sales clerk invariably hands
over the product.173
Indeed, the evidence suggests that, when state governments face
special opportunity costs in complying with the conditions attached
to federal grants, they are willing to forgo the federal funds. So, for
example, Arizona initially opted out of the Medicaid system by de
clining funds available under the Social Security Act on the ground
172.

See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez,
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CoLUM. L.

REv. 1911, 1935-39 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1989 SuP. Cr. REv. 85, 100-01; William Van Alstyne, "Thirty

Pieces ofSilver" for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of
State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 303 passim (1993).
173. As Martha Derthick notes, "the acceptance of grants would not be so prompt and
widespread if the conditions accompanying them were very costly and were known to be
strictly enforced." MARTHA DERnncK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS 196 (1970).
This is not to say that all nonfederal governments benefit equally from such grants. To the
contrary, any nonfederal governments that already provide the federally requested service to
their constituents will receive the grant and incur zero opportunity costs; such governments
will obtain pure rents from the grant. Indeed, one would expect governments that provide
services to their constituents to urge the national government to provide grants to cover the
cost of the service simply as a way of getting a cross-subsidy for the service from taxpayers
residing in other states. Such rent-seeking behavior is not commendable, but it is hard to see
why it is "coercive" in any meaningful sense of the word.
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that the burden of providing services for its Native -American popu
lation exceeded the value of the grant.174 Likewise, more than half
of all states have declined funds available under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970,175 despite the fact that such funds
cover ninety percent of the cost of devising the state OSHA imple
mentation plan and fifty percent of the cost of the actual implemen
tation.176 Moreover, Congress is acutely conscious of the danger
that nonfederal governments may decline federal funds in order to
avoid what they regard as onerous conditions. For example, in con
gressional hearings concerning regulatory barriers to affordable
housing, both witnesses and members of Congress have expressed
skepticism that threats to withdraw federal funds provided by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development would induce
suburban communities to discontinue exclusionary zoning prac
tices.177 Such skepticism might be justified: communities have
been known to decline federal funds as a way of escaping obliga
tions to provide access or services to nonresidents.178
174. See Hearings Before ACIR on Intergovernmental Problems in Medicaid 26 (San
Francisco, Sept. 16, 1968) (statement of Charles H. Shreve, Director, Region IX, U.S. Dept.
of Health, Education, and Welfare); Arizona State Medicaid Chart, 3 Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 'JI 15,554 (1997); Introduction to Medicaid, 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 'l! 14,010 (1996). The Colorado legislature threatened to follow Arizona's example in
1992 when it voted to withdraw from the Medicaid system in response to the cost of federal
conditions on Medicaid money. Only a veto by Governor Romer prevented such withdrawal.
See Eric Anderson, Quayle Opposes Bird Medicaid Plan: Proposal to Opt Out of System
Called Unwise, DENY. Posr, Feb. 20, 1992, at 5B.
175. See State Activity, 1 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 'll'll 5300-5840 (1996).
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 672(f)-(g) (1985); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1950-51 (1994).
177. Economist William FJSchel testified that "[t]he reward system of giving extra money
to communities who will take low-income housing is simply apt to be ignored by the subur
ban communities that are the most restrictive. These communities are simply apt to ignore
the Federal program entirely." Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and
Insurance and the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development ofthe House Comm.
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong. 27 (1990) (statement of William Fischel,
Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College). Testifying the same day, economist Susan
Wachter also doubted "that there is very much room for incentives, especially from HUD
alone," but she suggested that conditions on funds "from other Federal sources" might in
duce states to prevent exclusionary practices. Id. at 28 (statement of Susan Wachter, Associ
ate Professor of Fmance, University of Pennsylvania).
The Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing recommended
that the federal government discourage such barriers by requiring states to take steps to
remove the barriers as a condition of enjoying the tax exemption on the interest of mortgage
revenue bonds for single-family home ownership and the tax credit for interest on Industrial
development bonds issued to build multifamily housing under the Low Income Housing Tax
Credit program. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE
HOUSING, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDA
BLE HOUSING, 6-4, 7-1 to 7-11 (1991).
178. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. RICH, FEDERAL PoLICYMAKING AND THE PooR: NATIONAL
GOALS, LoCAL CHOICES, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES 233-34 (1993) (describing the
refusal of suburban communities to apply for community block grant funds in order to avoid
an obligation to accept low-income housing); ROBERT D. THOMAS & RICHARD W. MuRRAY,
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Such anecd0tes do not, of course, establish that the federal gov
ernment ought to be permitted to place onerous conditions on fed
eral funds. They suggest, however, that overblown statements
about the "coerciveness" of federal grant conditions require a more
careful analysis of what is meant by "coercion." There does not
seem to be any

a priori reason

to believe that state and local gov

ernments are any more coerced by such conditions than any other
federal contractor who is required to provide services in return for
payment of federal monies.
Some commentators have made the more theoretically elabo
rate argument that Congress somehow has monopoly power over
the tax base of the United States.179 According to this view, the
federal taxes from which federal grants-in-aid are derived occupy
the "tax space" available to the states. As federal taxes increasingly
burden each state's residents, such residents are increasingly unwill
ing to pay additional state taxes, and the state legislatures find it
politically prudent to avoid reliance on own-source revenues. In
stead, the states become more dependent on federal revenues to
replace their shrinking tax bases. In effect, the federal government
siphons off the state legislatures' revenue sources through federal
taxes and converts state tax revenue into federal grant revenue,
forcing the states to rely on the latter rather than the former.
The difficulty with this theory is that it is hard in practice to see
how the federal government has any monopoly over tax revenue.
State and local governments also have taxing powers and used them
with surprising effectiveness to replace federal grants-in-aid elimi
nated by the Reagan administration.180 To be sure, the federal govPROGROWfH POLITICS: CHANGE AND GOVERNANCE IN HOUSTON 284-88 (1991) (describing
the adamant refusal of Houston to apply for federal funds available for urban renewal or
subsidized housing prior to the late 1960s); James Bennet, Keeping Its Shores to Itself: Green
wich Eschews Federal Aid to Repair Recreational Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Bl
(describing Greenwich, Connecticut's refusal to apply for federal disaster relief to repair
beaches damaged by a hurricane for fear that conditions on federal money would require
giving the general public access to the beach).
179. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 150-57 (1993); Baker,
supra note 172, at 1935-39.
180. See Richard P. Nathan & John R. Lago, Intergovernmental ·Fiscal Roles and Rela
tions, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. AssN. PoL. Soc. SCI. 36 (1990). State revenue-raising devices
are not limited to taxes. States also make heavy use of user fees, impact fees, special assess
ments, and other benefits charges, as well as financing devices like revenue bonds and special
assessment bonds that are linked to such charges. See WruoHT, supra note 1, at 130-32. By
contrast, the federal government makes much more limited use of these devices. See Clayton
P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 61
B.U. L. REv. 795, .797 {1987). For a description of five significant federal systems under
which taxes linked to infrastructure are dedicated to the infrastructure, see APOGEE RE
SEARCH, lNc., FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS: OPTIONS TO UsE THE CASH (report prepared for the
National Council on Public Works Improvement, Sept. 28, 1987).
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ernment has some taxation advantages: federal taxes, for instance,
respond more elastically - meaning, more immediately - to in
creases in wealth than state taxes.181 Against this federal advan
tage, however, one must consider that state taxes seem to be
relatively more popular than federal taxes; according to the Ameri
can Council of Intergovernmental Relations's surveys of public
opinion, state sales and income taxes consistently are ranked more
fair by the public than the federal income tax.182
By contrast, the federal government, burdened by deficits and
public impatience with additional federal taxes, has discovered
since at least the 1980s that it is hardly the financial juggernaut
some have suggested. Far from having a monopoly on any revenue
source, it cannot offer unlimited bribes to nonfederal governments
in return for unlimited cooperation.183 While it is true that federal
taxes make it more politically risky for state legislatures to impose
additional state taxes upon their constituents, the converse is also
true; state taxes "crowd out" federal taxes by occupying tax space
that Congress could otherwise occupy. Whether the voters will
smite Congress or the state legislatures first for their temerity in
raising revenue will depend on numerous considerations concerning
the relative visibility of the taxes, the relative popularity of the pro
grams financed by the taxes, the general standing of the govern
ments imposing the taxes, and so on. All of these are complex
empirical questions about which only one fact is certain: the evi
dence does not support the conclusion that the states are so depen
dent on federal revenue that they cannot just say "no" to federal
grants.184
181. See Steven D. Gold, The Federal Role in State
1992, at 42-46 (explaining the concept of tax elasticity).

Fiscal Stress,

22 PuBuus, Su=er

182. See ACIR, CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS
(1986); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 136-37.

AND TAXES

at S-15

183. See PETERSON, supra note 32, at 175-83 (describing the demise of President Clinton's
public investment programs in the face of congressional skepticism ab9ut further federal de
velopmental spending). As the national government, led by Ronald Reagan, reduced or
eliminated federal grants-in-aid, state and local governments redirected their attention away
from Washington, D.C., which suggests that the national government's influence over the
nonfederal governments was also being diminished. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: A Vmw FROM TIIE STATES 252 (3d ed. 1984); RICHARD NATIIAN ET AL., REA
GAN AND TIIE STATES 14-17 (1987); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 99.
184. Tue more realistic argument for the position that conditional grants-in-aid are "coer
cive" stems from the congressional practice of imposing new "cross-cutting" conditions on
"old" grant money. This practice began during the New Deal but became even more preva
lent during the 1960s under President Johnson's promotion of "creative federalism." Tue
practice reached its height, ironically, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, despite
Reagan's early commitment to a program of New Federalism. Such new conditions come in
at least two varieties. First, Congress may impose so-called "cross-over" conditions on grant
money by enacting new legislation that would withdraw future funds provided under some
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The System of Conditional Preemption

Aside from the use of conditional grants, Congress can also
"hire" the states to carry out federal programs through the use of
conditional preemption. Under this system, Congress enacts a gen
eral regulatory scheme, delegating implementation to the states on
the condition that the states submit an acceptable implementation
plan to the federal government.
·

As with conditional grants, conditional preemption occurs in
two stages. In the first stage, Congress creates the general federal
regulatory scheme, responding to, among other interests, the inter
governmental lobbying organizations. So, for example, the national
government may enact a statute providing that, unless the state
governments submit an acceptable plan for reducing airborne pollu
tants, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
will promulgate and enforce a purely federal plan that will preempt
any inconsistent state law. Again, during the legislative process,
states and localities may lobby to insert clauses preserving state
common law from preemption, limiting the ability of federal agen
cies to turn down state implementation plans, or delaying the time
by which the states must achieve compliance. Such systems of con
ditional preemption frequently are accompanied by federal grants
to cover the costs of state implementation of federal law,185 and
state governments may lobby to ensure that the percentage of sup
port provided by the federal government is as high as possible.
There is an opportunity for a second stage of intergovernmental
lobbying that depends on the specificity of the federal acceptance
conditions.

Conditions that lodge considerable discretion in the

hands of federal administrators in evaluating state implementation
specific preexisting grant program - for example, highway funds - if the states did not
enact some new federally mandated regulation - for example, regulations concerning the
drinking age. Second, Congress may enact more global "cross-cutting" conditions on all fed
eral aid, requiring, for example, that the state facilitate public participation for all federally
funded programs. See U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FED
ERALLY INDUCED Cosrs AFFECTING STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS, M-193, at 21-22
(1994).
To the extent that such "cross-cutting" and "cross-over" conditions impose unanticipated
obligations on state and local governments, one perhaps can argue that the Congress coerces
the states with such conditions. Under this "bait-and-switch" model of coercion, Congress
first "addicts" the states to federal money by getting the state to commit some of its own
resources to some program that is partially funded by federal dollars and that has few costly
conditions attached to the federal money. After the state has committed the matching funds
and becomes politically incapable of discontinuing the program, Congress then adds new
conditions, that, if apparent from the outset, would have deterred the states from accepting
the funds in the first place. So put, the argument is analogous to equitable estoppel.
185. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 672(f)-(g) (1986);
29 C.F.R. §§ 1950-51 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7544 (1995).
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plans186 give states another opportunity to "lobby" the federal gov
ernment by submitting its implementation plan for approval. At
this stage, each state can work out individually tailored enforce
ment "deals" with the agency within whatever parameters have
been set by Congress - sometimes with the aid of their congres
sional delegation.187 Of course, individual states can always refuse
to submit any plan - and they do, when the combination of discre
tion and federal funds provided for implementation is insuffi
cient.188 To summarize, programs for conditional preemption
resemble programs for project grants; rather than presenting every
state with the same package of conditions and benefits, Congress
establishes a set of criteria that each state might be able to meet in a
different manner by individually applying to a Federal agency for
approval of its implementation plan.

If conditional grants-in-aid can be analogized to fee-for-service
contracts, conditional preemption can be analogized to the various
conditional duties that the federal government frequently imposes
on private enterprises. So, for example, when the national govern
ment requires private employers to pay a minimum wage,189 take
precautions to protect consumer safety,19o finance unemployment
insurance,191 give notice to workers about pending layoffs,192 or
bargain in good faith with employees organized in a certified bar
gaining unit,193 the national government effectively "preempts"
business activities that are not consistent with national standards.
Likewise, when the national government conditionally preempts
186. See, e.g., John C. Gray, Jr. & Jane Greengold Stevens, The Law and Politics of the
Enforcement of Federal Standards for the Administration of Unemployment Insurance Hear
ings, 29 U. Mrca. J.L. REFORM 509, 512-16 (1995) (discussing political constraints on the
strict enforcement of unemployment insurance standards). The Environmental Protection
Agency's implementation of the Clean Air Act is a salient example of an administrative
agency taking advantage of such discretion. See Gary Lee, Compromising on Clean Air Act:
Under Republican Pressure, EPA Reduces Enforcement Efforts, WASH. Pos-r, Feb. 21, 1996,
at Al (quoting Administrator Browner's statement that "[b]y giving the states flexibility in
enforcing the law, we hope to avoid a congressional fight over the act").
187. So, for example, the State of Michigan has authority delegated by the Army Corps
of Engineers to enforce federal regulations concerning wetlands. See Mary Goodenough,
Public Participation in a State-Assumed Wetlands Permit Program: The Michigan Example,
10 J. ENVTL. L. & LmG. 221, 222 (1995).
188. So, for example, over half of all states have not submitted any plan for the imple
mentation of OSHA workplace safety standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1952 (1997); Current Status
of State Approved Plans, 1 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 'l['l[ 5003-5840 (1996).
189. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
190. See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2054-2055 (1994).
191. See Subchapter III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1994).
192. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994).
193. See National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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state laws regulating worker safety, the national government de
mands that the state governments must either regulate worker
safety according to federal standards or "get out of the business" of
safety regulation, leaving the field to the federal government. In
either case, the national government presents the public or private
entity with a choice of ceasing to engage in some activity or follow
ing federally specified standards in the performance of the activity.
Like conditional grants-in-aid, conditional preemption has been
criticized as a "coercive" infringement on state autonomy.194 As
with conditional grants, however, it is not obvious what is meant by
"coercion" or why such coercion is especially threatening to state
governments. With conditional grants, Congress is constrained by
its limited fiscal capacity. With conditional preemption, Congress is
constrained by its limited regulatory capacity. Congress cannot ob
tain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemp
tion. But preemption is politically costly. Especially where federal
regulators are inexperienced in some field, they might not be capa
ble of replacing state law with equally popular federal laws. Fed
eral inexperience might turn any federally implemented regulatory
scheme into a political liability for Congress.
So, for example, state governments' refusals to perform eligibil
ity reviews of disabled persons under the Social Security Act in

1982-1983 helped to cripple the Social Security Administration's ef
forts to perform such eligibility reviews. The Social Security Ad
ministration simply lacked the trained personnel and experience to
"federalize" this function on such short notice.195 Likewise, the na
tional government could make no credible threat after

New York

that it would replace state siting systems for low-level radioactive
waste with some system of federal sites, because Congress lacked
the institutional will and constituent trust necessary for such a fed
eralization of siting law.196 Similar considerations prevented the
194. See, e.g., THE NATIONAUZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT (Jerome J. Hanus ed.,
1981).
195. See MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESs: THE SocIAL SECURITY ADMIN
ISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 37-46 (1990).
196. Anecdotal evidence suggests that congressional not-in-my-backyard sentiment de
feated post-New York attempts to create a purely federal system of low-level radioactive
waste site selection. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1996, H.R. 3394, 104th
Cong. (1996), was defeated in part because Senator Barbara Boxer feared that the Act would
result in approval of the Ward Valley site for waste in California. See 142 CoNG. REc. E71803 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lewis) (denouncing the "emotional demagogu
ery of California's junior Senator" in opposing the Act). Aside from Congress's institutional
incapacity to take on such a controversial question, the federal government's poor track rec
ord of building up public trust in federal siting activities when dealing with high-level radio
active waste might have blocked any comprehensive federal scheme. See WRIGHT, supra
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from implementing its
own transportation plan when California officials refused to pro
mulgate a state implementation plan within the deadline set by the
Clean Air Act. As EPA officials noted, the federal agency lacked
the personnel and experience necessary to regulate the driving hab
its of millions of commuters in Southern California.191
This inability to federalize regulatory fields at will is consistent
with conventional political theory about the relative capacity of dif
ferent levels of government to regulate. According to one promi
nent theory, lower levels of government serving smaller numbers of
constituents have a comparative advantage in delivery of labor
intensive services, while higher-level governments with greater cap
ital resources have a comparative advantage in delivering capital

intensive services where there are significant economies of scale.198
. So, for example, some commentators have argued that metropoli
tan governments are better equipped than small municipalities to
provide capital-intensive services like light rail, sewage systems, and
expensive forensic labs, while smaller municipalities are better
suited to provide labor-intensive services like basic police patrols,
zoning hearings, and building inspections.199 Analogous reasoning
suggests that the federal government is well-equipped to provide
capital-intensive services like the construction of deep salt-lined
storage facilities for high-level nuclear waste,200 but is likely to be
note 1, at 378-82. While the federal government has exclusive responsibility for such waste, it
has managed simultaneously to fail at providing viable sites while also generating public dis
trust about the fairness or competence of its siting procedures. See EARNING PUBLIC TRUST
AND CoNFIDENCE: REomsITES FOR MANAGING RADIOACTIVE WASTES (Fmal Report of the
Secy. of Energy's Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management Nov. 1993) (noting the
widespread lack of public trust in the Department of Energy's radioactive waste management
policies).
197. See JAMES E. KruER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE EssAY
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 19401975, at 233 (1977). As one EPA administrator noted, the Ninth Circuit decision in Brown v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), barring the EPA from forcing
California officials to promulgate an implementation plan "may virtually paralyze our pres
ent efforts to reduce auto pollution in metropolitan areas." KruER & URSIN, supra, at 233.
As one commentator has noted, state governments' "option to do nothing" gives them "con
siderable political leverage because most environmental programs are complex and require a
skilled staff to administer. Thus, as a practical matter, the federal government has few op
tions as attractive as delegating operational responsibility to the states." Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27
PAC. LJ. 1461, 1463 (1996).
198. See VINCENT OSTROM ET AL., LocAL GOVERNMENT IN TIIB UNITED STATES 97-99
(1988).
199. See id. at 113-37.
200. See Dauiel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570,
613 (1996) (arguing that the federal government may be better equipped than the states to
develop technological standards for environmental regulation).
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inept at conducting labor-intensive services like the management of
public hearings to minimize public opposition to waste sites.201 If
different levels of government have different comparative advan
tages, then one would expect that the federal government would be
less capable of credibly threatening to preempt fields where the
states enjoy the greatest advantage. The political costs of likely fed
eral bumbling would simply be too high for members of Congress
to bear.
In sum, there are practical limits on Congress's ability to tax and
to regulate, and these limits also necessarily place limits on Con
gress's ability to obtain state and local regulatory services with con
ditional grants and conditional preemption. In either case, the
nonfederal government's threat to decline the money or accept pre
emption of nonfederal activities places an important constraint on
the national government's power over state and local governments.
In this respect, nonfederal governments are exactly like private
firms. Private contractors refuse to provide services for the na
tional government when the price offered for such services is too
low, and private investors reduce their investment in regulated in
dustries - by allowing the government to "preempt" their eco
nomic activities - when the regulatory conditions, analogous to
"mandates," imposed on such activities become too expensive.202
Such private capacity to abstain from action forms an important
constraint on governmental regulation of private enterprises. Con
sider, for example, legislators' fear that raising the minimum wage
would cause businesses to reduce their economic activities by laying
off or refusing to hire workers. One can view laws like the Fair
Labor Standards Act203 as a sort of "conditional preemption" of
economic activity, the effectiveness of which will vary with the pri
vate persons' interest in pursuing the activity - what one might call
the cost-elasticity of supply.
201. For a detailed examination of the relative effectiveness of siting procedures used by
Minnesota, Massachusetts, Manitoba, Alberta, and other jurisdictions, see BARRY G. RAnE,
BEYOND NIMBY: HAzARnous WAi::ra SITING IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(1994). Rabe concludes that "command-and-control" preemption systems of siting are rela
tively ineffective at actually siting waste, whereas more labor-intensive systems of early par
ticipation by the residents of the site area are more effective. See id. at 44-57.
202. William A. FISchel notes that the willingness of private investors to exit a regulated
industry forms a powerful constraint on governmental regulation. He offers the additional
insight that if exit is difficult and investment is cost-inelastic, then heightened judicial scrutiny
may be appropriate. See William FISchel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 865, 887-94 (1991). Fischel
explores this thesis more generally in WILUAM A. F1sCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
EcoNoMics, AND PoLITics 135-36, 301-02 (1995).
203. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (1994).
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Conditional grants to private persons and conditional preemp
tion of private activities, in short, hardly give the federal govern
ment unlimited power over private enterprises. Likewise, one
should not expect that such grants or preemption would give the
national government unlimited power over nonfederal govern
ments. In either case, the ability of the private or public organiza
tion to exercise the New York entitlement - that is, abstain from
action - imposes an important constraint on the ability of the na
tional government to obtain their services.
B. Why State Autonomy Permits All Cost-Justified
Intergovernmental Bargains

So far, this article has argued that, far from being a formalistic
hurdle, the New York entitlement could prove to be a valuable enti
tlement to the states. The measure of its value will be the measure
of Congress's need for the states' cooperation, for such need will
determine the amount that Congress will be prepared to pay for the
purchase of the New York entitlement. But the question remains
whether such an entitlement is harmful to the nation. How can we
be sure that such promotion of federalism is not purchased at too
great a sacrifice of other important values or interests?
In this Part of the article, I explain that the New York entitle
ment costlessly protects federalism, because the national govern
ment can purchase such an entitlement from nonfederal
governments whenever intergovernmental cooperation is cost
justified. Section II.B.1 argues that New York and Printz will inter
fere with no co�t-justified form of cooperative federalism assuming
that (1) state and national elected officials faithfully represent their
constituents' preferences and (2) no significant transaction costs af
fect intergovernmental bargaining. In section IT.B.2, I relax the as
sumption of no "transaction costs" and consider whether there
might be "hold-out" problems that could prevent cost-justified in
tergovernmental arrangements. Section IT.B.2 concludes that few
transaction costs impede intergovernmental transactions. There
fore, if the national government's need for nonfederal govern
ments' services exceeds the nonfederal governments' interest in
autonomy, then the national government can purchase nonfederal
governments' services. In section IT.B.3, I relax the assumption of
no "agency costs" and briefly consider whether "agency costs"
might interfere with cost-justified intergovernmental arrangements.
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The Effects of.State Autonomy Assuming No Agency Costs or
Transaction Costs
For the purpose of initially explaining the effect of New

York on

the incentives of the federal and state governments to cooperate, I
start with two simplifying assumptions that I will later relax. First, I
assume that there are no significant agency costs affecting the rela
tionship between state and federal elected officials and their respec
tive constituencies. That is, I assume that elected officials generally
vote in order to maximize the satisfaction of their constituents'
preferences. Second, I assume that there are no transaction costs
impeding state-federal bargains. That is, I assume that

(1) it is rela

tively inexpensive for the state and local governments to negotiate
with the national government, using the various institutions of in
tergovernmental lobbying, and

(2)

problems of strategic behavior

such as "hold-out" resulting from bilateral monopoly do not im
pede bargains.
With these assumptions in mind, what is the effect of the

York entitlement? New York permits

New

Congress to use the states to

implement federal law only when Congress purchases the services
of the states in the marketplace of intergovernmental relations. If
Congress is willing to pay the price - in federal money or imple
menting discretion - demanded by each state, then Congress can
use each state's regulatory machinery to implement federal law; if
not, then Congress must rely on purely federal methods of
implementation.
Under these circumstances, the New

York entitlement ought not

interfere with any cost-justified scheme of intergovernmental coop
eration. As with any other property entitlement, unless there are
significant transaction costs, the

New York

entitlement will be

transferred to the level of government that values it the most. If
Congress is willing to pay what the states demand, then Congress
can acquire the states' implementation of federal law in the market
place of intergovernmental deals. By contrast, if Congress is not
willing to meet the market price demanded by the states for their
regulatory machinery, then use of the states to implement federal
law is probably inefficient, and federal law would be implemented
more cheaply by purely federal means.
Why should one equate the respective reservation prices of poli
ticians sitting in Congress and state legislatures with the true value
of cooperative federalism? The answer is based on the assumption
of no agency costs. Under this assumption, each legislator would
wish to take responsibility for implementing a program only if

(1)
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the legislator's constituency favors the goal of the program and (2)
the officials implementing the program are capable of effectively
implementing those goals. To the extent that legislators believe
that they are well-equipped to "sell" the program to their constitu
ents and that their level of government will be relatively effective at
implementing the program, legislators will be more eager to take
responsibility for the program.204
An example illustrates the principle. Suppose that Congress is
considering the possibility of using the state governments to site
low-level radioactive waste. Assume what is probably true - that
the federal government enjoys certain economies of scale in setting
technological standards for siting waste,2°5 indicating that the fiscal
costs of siting such waste are relatively lower for the federal govern
ment than the state governments.
But nonfiscal costs - that is, the likely private resentment that
the governmental decision would generate - might be higher for
the federal government. As suggested above, smaller-scale govern
ments systematically may be better than larger-scale governments
at managing nonfiscal costs like community resentment through
labor-intensive methods such as regular appearances at hearings,
easy availability to constituents by mail or telephone, and personal
campaigning in neighborhoods affected by waste. 206 If this is true,
204. It would be a mistake, however, to assert that elected representatives' willingness to
take responsibility for a regulation is solely a function of the costs of such regulation to their
constituents. Willingness to impose costly regulations may also depend on the proportion of
the representative's constituents who are burdened by the program and, therefore, on the
size of the representative's constituency. One would expect, for example, that members of
Congress systematically would be more willing to take responsibility for enacting programs
that imposed costs on geographically discrete groups than state or local legislators with over
lapping constituencies, because the costs of the program would tend to incite anger from a
smaller proportion of the federal representatives' constituencies. Thus, the federal govern
ment, in bargaining with state and local governments, might undervalue costs imposed on
geographically discrete groups too small to capture a congressional seat. This, of course, is a
persistent fear in the history of both American federalism and electoral law. See RosEMARIE
ZAGARRI, THE PoUTics oF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1776-1850
{1987) {discussing the problems of federalism in the context of large and small state
controversy).
205. See Esty, supra note 200, at 603.
206. On the empirical evidence suggesting the ability of officials elected from smaller
constituencies to make contact with constituents and generate voter satisfaction, see ROBERT
A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TuFrE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 73-88 {1973); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL.,
PARTICIPATION AND PoLmcAL EQUALITY: A SEVEN-NATION CoMPARISON 269-85 (1978)
{finding lower rates of political participation in urban than in rural areas); JEFFREY M.
BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 49 {1993) (describing the relationship
between neighborhood size and effectiveness of neighborhood self-government). On the ef
fectiveness of state governments in creating participatory structures addressing the issue of
waste disposal, see RABE, supra note 201, at 90-106 {describing how early participation of
citizens reduced neighborhood opposition to Manitoba waste disposal). The evidence sug
gests that state governments have performed more effectively than the federal government in
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then one might conclude that the political costs to state politicians
of state implementation of any siting system might be lower than
the political costs to federal politicians of a purely federal system.

If Congress is willing to pay more to avoid the fiscal and nonfis
cal costs of a federal siting system than it would cost state govern
ments - in terms of both fiscal and nonfiscal costs - to create a
state waste-siting system, then conditions exist for an intergovern
mental deal. Congress could create a grant package to induce the
states to regulate according to federal standards.
But note that, if the states' total costs exceeded the federal gov
ernment's costs - and therefore its willingness to pay to bribe the
states to create a waste-siting system - then no deal

should take

would

or

place. There would be no deal because the minimum

bribe that the state government would accept would be greater than
the maximum that Congress would offer. There

should be

no deal

because, under such circumstances, intergovernmental cooperation
would be a bad idea; there would be no political or fiscal advantage
to employing the state governments. In such a case, siting of waste
would be best served by a purely federal program.

In reality, there is no easy way to ascertain the popular hostility
that waste siting would excite against a state versus a federal legisla
tor, nor is there any easy way to measure the relative efficiencies of
each level of government. But this is precisely the point: it is hard
to know when intergovernmental cooperation is a good idea. The
great advantage of intergovernmental deals is that they excuse third
parties like judges from the necessity of trying to determine how
much federal interference with state independence is "too much."
The state and federal politicians themselves, if they are not irra
tional, will reveal the relative merits of state and federal implemen
tation with their offers and demands. Thus, Congress's offer will be
a function of the fiscal savings and political insulation that state co
operation provides; as an outside limit, Congress will offer the
states no more than it would cost Congress to implement the fed
eral statute through purely federal means. Likewise, the states will
demand a price that varies directly with the political risk and fiscal
burden imposed by the law. If a state's minimum reservation price
exceeds Congress's maximum reservation price, then there will be

winning public trust in disposal of radioactive waste.
84.

See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 378-
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no deal, and Congress will rely on purely federal means to imple
ment the federal law.201
In sum, so long as there are no agency or transaction costs, New

York

should not impede any cost-justified system of intergovern
mental cooperation. To the contrary, New York allows "free-trade
federalism" to flourish. It allows each level of government to trans
fer powers to some other level whenever such transfer would mini
mize the fiscal and political costs of implementing federal programs.
Unless one can identify some sort of agency cost or transaction cost

New York's
New York on the ground

that makes this description of

effects unrealistic, it is

difficult to attack

that it would somehow

interfere with useful systems of cooperative federalism. It may be
the case that New York might doom some intergovernmental coop
eration - but only because such systems ought to be doomed; they
are not cost-justified.2os

2.

The Problem of Holdouts and Other Transaction Costs

One might respond to such a sanguine defense of New

York by

noting that the market for the services of nonfederal governments is
a good deal thinner than the market for services of private contrac
tors. When the national government wants to purchase military ve
hicles, it can request bids from various private manufacturers who

will then bid against each other to obtain the contract. Any con
tractor that attempts to misrepresent its production costs to obtain
207. One might object that this account improperly treats fiscal and nonfiscal costs as
equally legitimate, when some nonfiscal costs might seem plainly irrational or selfish. Should
we really design institutions to cater to such base constituent fears, greed, and aversion? For
example, neighbors may oppose waste sites simply because they want other communities to
bear the entire cost of waste disposal and selfishly refuse to accommodate their fair share of
landfill space. Should our systems of cooperative federalism allow the state or local repre
sentative of such neighbors to opt out of systems of cooperative federalism simply because he
is unusually vulnerable to such selfish constituent opposition to landfill sites?
I argue that they should, if only because even irrational or selfish preferences are capable
of derailing a regulatory program if they are not managed by politicians capable of - or
interested in - defusing them. So, for example, siting standards that acknowledge only tech
nical criteria and ignore likely neighbor reactions tend to founder on the latter, because
neighbors are extremely effective at using political pressure, litigation, and administrative
procedures to stall sites contrary to their interest. See RABE, supra note 201, at 44-57 (detail
ing ways in which neighbors stop landfill sites chosen through systems that give neighbors no
role in site selection).

208. This account of intergovernmental relations is similar to the account in Jonathan R.
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: To
ward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 16 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990), in that it as
sumes that political incentives will lead state and local legislators into an equilibrium as they
exchange money and regulatory discretion. This account differs from Macey's in that my
account ignores the problem of agency costs, deferring its discussion until section II.B.3,

infra.
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a more lucrative contract may soon find itself without any contract
at all.
By contrast, the conventional wisdom is that state governments
do not typically bid against each other to enforce federal law; within
any given piece of territory, there is often only one state govern
ment from which to purchase such services. Why, then, should the
national government trust state government assessments of the cost
of state implementation? What mechanism guarantees that the in
tergovernmental lobby will correctly inform Congress of the costs
of nonfederal implementation? Might state and local governments
strategically exaggerate the fiscal and political costs of implement
ing federal law?
Such strategic behavior might actually prevent some otherwise
cost-justified system of cooperative federalism. Incessant demands
for more money by governors and mayors might persuade Congress
that nonfederal governments are inefficient service providers. At
the least, Congress may become distrustful of state and local offi
cials as reliable sources of information about implementation costs,
and might be deterred from using nonfederal governments when it
otherwise should.

This consequence of strategic behavior casts

doubt on the argument that New

York allows

all cost-justified inter

governmental agreements.
I believe that these dangers of strategic behavior are overstated.
My reasoning is that the intergovernmental marketplace is more
competitive than one might believe. State and local politicians usu
ally are extremely reluctant to turn down federal money in order to
avoid grant conditions, because voters are notoriously willing to re
taliate against politicians who fail to apply for "free" federal
money.209 But, in order to obtain such funds, state and local politi
cians do not merely cajole or berate Congress; they also compete
209. As Nelson Rockefeller observed when he was Governor of New York, "If you don't
apply for this money, somebody will get up and say 'Why don't you ask for this money?
Here is this free money in Washington you are not using.' Then it becomes a political issue.''
liAIDER, supra note 164, at 97.
Recent experiences in Virginia and New Hampshire illustrate this tendency. Republicans
in both states declined Goals 2000 grant money for the reform of public school curricula,
based in part on objections to federal meddling with education and opposition to such funds
by religious conservatives. In New Hampshire, after a campaign where this decision became
a major issue, the Republican candidate, who had been the Chairman of the State Board of
Education when the funds were declined, was defeated by his Democratic opponent. See
M.L. Elrick, Shaheen Claims Historic Win, CoNCORD MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al. Repub
lican Governor Allen of Virginia was not defeated, but he suffered at the polls for his deci
sion to decline the grant money and eventually reversed it. Indeed, he retaliated against
Democrats in the state legislature by accusing them of declining federal money for charter
schools. See Michael Hardy & Jeff E. Schapiro, Allen Successful in His Last Session, RICH·
MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 1997, at All.
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against each other, private organizations, and federal agencies for
authority to implement federal programs. This competition
presents a substantial obstacle to nonfederal governments' ability
strategically to misrepresent the costs of implementing federal law.
In short, the premise that there is merely one nonfederal govern
ment that can implement federal policy within a single state govern
ment's jurisdiction is simply false.
Consider first the various nonfederal governments that compete
with each other for federal funds. There may be three or four
nonfederal governments within any given piece of a state's terri
tory, because most states' territory is distributed among several dif
ferent types of subdivisions - municipalities, counties, townships,
school districts, and so on - many of which are legally and practi
cally capable of administering federal programs. These subdivisions
aggressively compete with the state government and with each
other for enforcement responsibility. So, for example, state and
municipal governments actively competed with each other to imple
ment the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,210 counties fought
hard with cities to receive funds under the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964,211 and state and municipal governments struggled from
the Nixon through the Bush administrations to control the Commu
nity Development Block Grant Program.212 Indeed, the fight be
tween mayors and governors for control over federal funds directed
to the "state" has been a perennial controversy of intergovernmen
tal relations since the 1960s.213 The litigation over the Brady Act in
Vermont presents an interesting illustration of such intergovern
mental competition. The Brady Act requires "local law enforce
ment officers" to perform background checks on prospective
purchasers of firearms.214 When the sheriff of Orange County, Ver
mont, refused to perform these duties, the Vermont Department of

210. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 187-90, 194-95. The Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3797 (Supp. 1995).
211. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 168-69. The Act itself is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2751-2996L (Supp. 1995).
212. The state governments were able to gain control over the Small Cities component of
the program during the Reagan administration, but President Bush was unable to consolidate
the entire program as a megagrant to the states as he proposed to do in 1991. See RicH,
supra note 178, at 107-13. The Community Services Block Grant Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9901-9912 (1994).
213. See, e.g., CoNLAN, supra note 2, at 58-60; RicH, supra note 178, at ch. 4.
214. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Public Safety volunteered their services to the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms, which accepted them.21s

Such competition between nonfederal governments limits the
ability of any one type of nonfederal government to "hold out" for
more than the fiscal and political cost of implementing federal law.

If governors are too recalcitrant in meeting federal demands, then
cities will be ready to displace them as federal agents. Counties and
school districts, likewise, have their own intergovernmental lobby
and also attempt to win enforcement authority from Congress. In
short, intergovernmental competition for federal authority is re
markably vigorous.
One might object to this argument on the ground that, because
the state's subdivisions are regarded as "creatures of the state" that
the state government is free to destroy or restrict, such subdivisions
cannot provide genuine competition with their parent state govern
ment. But this argument mistakes legal theory for political reality.

It is certainly true that, as far as the U.S. Constitution is concerned,
state governments have the legal power to prevent their municipali
ties, school districts, and counties from implementing federal law.216
Indeed, if one follows the logic of New

York,

the national govern

ment should not have the power to prevent the state from control
ling its own subdivisions.217 Therefore, it is theoretically possible
for a state government to eliminate municipal competition by bar
ring its subdivisions from accepting federal funds or using them for
federal purposes.

215. See Frank, 18 F.3d at 821. The sheriff protested against such competition, arguing
that the state department did not constitute "local law enforcement" within the meaning of
the Act, but the Second Circuit deferred to the Bureau's interpretation of the statute that it
was charged with enforcing. See Frank, 18 F.3d at 822-23.
216.

See Hunter v.

City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177-79 (1907).

217. If cities, special districts, and counties are really subdivisions or "creatures" of the
state government, then the federal government effectively commandeers the state govern
ment when it makes use of these subdivisions against the will of the state government. The
fact that the subdivisions' political leaders wish to be so employed might be legally irrelevant,
because, according to Hunter, they derive their legal personality from state law. See Hunter,
207 U.S. at 177-79.

It is unclear, however, whether the Court would accept this reasoning. In at least one
case, the Court has suggested that a state may not require a local government to expend
federally derived payments in lieu of taxes on purposes specified by the state legislature. The
Court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause barred such state interference with funds that had
been earmarked by the federal government for different purposes. See Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985). There has also been some
controversy among lower courts concerning whether a federal agency can give a municipality
the power to resist state law.
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In practice, however, such state interference with local-federal
relations is extremely rare.218 Especially in states where municipali
ties have general "home rule" powers, such state interference with
municipal powers may violate deep political traditions of local au
tonomy that state officials might be reluctant to disturb.219 More
over, if the national government makes funds available to
subdivisions of the state, state decisions barring the subdivisions
from accepting such funds might be doubly unpopular, both as bur
dens on local autonomy and as exports of state residents' tax dollars
to other states.220 Given these political constraints, one would ex
pect to see what actually occurs - vigorous competition between
governors, mayors, counties, and other nonfederal entities to obtain
federal funds. Such competition should mitigate any theoretical
tendency of state governments to act strategically in withholding
information about implementation costs from Congress.221
State governments also face competition from nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). These organizations play an extraordinarily
important role in implementing federal laws that do not involve
regulation of third parties.222 Such NGOs include universities, legal
services organizations, hospitals, churches, health clinics, and cul
tural or social organizations like the Boy Scouts of America.223 The
national government may be barred from delegating regulatory re218. At the dawn of extensive federal-city relations, some state governments were slow to
give their municipal governments authority to float revenue bonds; such authorization was
required for cities to take advantage of federal loans to ameliorate the municipal debt crisis
arising out of the Great Depression. See MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933-1965, at 49-59 (1975). In the context
of municipal bankruptcy, state governments sometimes have attempted to prevent their mu
nicipalities from seeking protection under Chapter 9 of the federal bankruptcy code. The
most famous example remains Connecticut's effort to prevent the City of Bridgeport from
filing for bankruptcy. See Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy
Filing ofBridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625
(1995).
219. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I
The Structure ofLocal Government
Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990) (describing powerful home-rule traditions that limit state
-

interference with local governments' powers).
220. So, for example, although Governor Allen used his veto to prevent Vrrginia from
accepting federal funds for education under the Goals 2000 program, he permitted individual
school districts to apply for the money. See supra note 209.
221. There is, however, a worrisome trend of increased centralization of state govern
mental structure. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 317-19. As Wright notes, this centralization
creates "increasing difficulty [for] any national government efforts to target or channel funds
to local governments for purposes that are independent of, or contrary to, state policies." Id.
at 319.
222.

See generally ANTON, supra note 2, at 157-79.

See LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE
NON-PROFIT SECTOR 9-19 (1982).
223.
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sponsibilities to ·such private organizations,224 but there is an enor
mous range of federal income maintenance, health care, and service
provision that do not involve regulatory responsibilities. These pro
grams are frequently delegated to private organizations that effec
tively compete with nonfederal governments for federal money.225
Aside from nonfederal governments and nongovernmental or
ganizations, the state governments face competition from federal
executive agencies. The absolute ceiling on the price that state gov
ernments can exact from the national government is the cost to the
federal government of providing the services "in-house" through
federal agencies.226 Depending on the ingenuity that Congress is
prepared to exercise in designing federal agencies, this ceiling could
be quite low. In theory at least, Congress might be able to design
federal agencies that can match any efficiencies provided by state or
local governments.
This statement is not inconsistent with the earlier contention
that different levels of government have different comparative ad
vantages in delivering governmental services. It may be true that
"local governments" - meaning agencies with jurisdiction over rel
atively smaller numbers of persons who elect the governments'
policymakers

-

will tend to be more effective at delivering labor

intensive services than larger scale governments. But nothing in
principle prevents Congress from creating such small-scale govern
ments with locally elected policymakers and territorially limited ju
risdictions. Congress has chartered corporations,227 funded locally
based community action organizations to manage poverty pro224. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). See generally George W. Liebmann, Dele
gation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L J 650 (1975).
.

.

225. Perhaps the most controversial instance of the federal government encouraging
competition between public and private entities occurred pursuant to the Economic Oppor
tunity Act of 1964, which authorized "community action programs" - private, nonprofit
agencies - to carry out the programs funded under the Act. See Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 201, 78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964) (repealed 1981). While state
governments could also compete for grants and contracts, the reliance on private nonprofit
organizations - "private federalism" - was clearly intended to prevent nonfederal govern
ments, distrusted by federal program administrators, from monopolizing the implementation
of federal law. See DAVID M. WELBORN & JESSE BURKHEAD, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA
TIONS IN THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 63-74 (1989).
226.

See supra section 11.B.l.

227. See, e.g., American Natl. Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 274 (1992). Some of these
corporations strongly resemble municipalities. See, e.g., Martha Hirschfield, Note, The
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE
L.J. 1331 (1991) (describing the powers of Alaska Native corporations that manage land and
mineral rights belonging to Alaskan native tribes).
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grams,228 and created special districts with territorially circum
scribed jurisdictions;229 these are all forms of federally sponsored
local governments that can compete with and even displace conven
tional municipalities created under state law. Despite their appar
ently innocuous titles, these federally sponsored local governments
are sometimes immensely powerful.230 To be sure, under McCul
loch, the national government can choose only those means that are
"plainly adapted" to legitimate purposes.231 But, to the extent that
some federally chartered local governments enforce only federal
laws that are otherwise within Congress's power to enact, it is diffi
cult to see the constitutional obstacle that would prevent Congress
from creating such organizations. The notion that there can be only
a single federal rule promulgated by a single national agency is sim
ply a prejudice born of habit rather than legal or practical
necessity.232
Of course, Congress may be extraordinarily reluctant to create
local elective offices. Unlike appointed bureaucrats whose profes
sional culture might encourage anonymity,233 such elected politi
cians might become rivals to incumbent members of Congress,
taking credit for successful federal programs that Congress would
like to claim. But such congressional reluctance is not the same as
practical or legal impossibility. It does not imply that non.federal
228. See supra note 225 (discussing the Community Action Program under the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964).
229. So, for example, the United States has subsidized and guide\:i the formation of soil
conservancy districts since the New Deal. See Soil Conservation an,d Domestic Allotment
Act of 1936, Act of February 29, 1936, ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1148; SOIL CoNSERVATION SERV.,
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC , A STANDARD STATE SOIL CoNSERVATION DISTRICTS LAW (1936).
Since 1902, the United States has provided subsidies for the creation of 600 water reclama
tion districts in 17 states, governed by boards elected by certain agricultural end-users of the
water. See Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in 'scattered sections of 43
U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498) (1994); see also U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVI
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION
RuLES AND REGULATIONS ch. 3, at 2 (1996); Joseph Sax, Problems ofFederalism in Reclama
tion Law, 37 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 49 (1964-65). More recently, Congress funded the crea
tion of air quality districts under the Clean Air Act to manage state and federal air quality
programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 (1995); see also KRIER & URSIN, supra note 197.
.

230. The Salt River Project in Arizona, a reclamation district, employs 5000 persons, has
its own security force, supplies Phoenix with much of its electricity and water, and uses its
power to affect policies on matters ranging from zoning density to acid rain. See JOEL
GARREAU, EDGE CrrY: LIFE ON TiiE NEW FRONTIER 192-97 (1988).
231. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
232. See James Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal
System - and Why It Matters, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1226, 1238 (1995).
233. For an example of such willingness, see MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY 18-20 (1979) (describing the culture of professional anonymity and indif
ference to credit taking cultivated in the Social Security Administration).
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governments somehow have a monopoly on the power to create
elective institutions for local governance.
Congress's regulatory discretion to fashion its own national in
stitutions helps to ensure that the states will lack any monopoly on
implementation services. The states constantly are competing with
existing or proposed national institutions - the Office of the Presi
dent, cabinet and subcabinet departments, independent regulatory
agencies, and so on - for the right to implement national law.
When confronted by the states' demands for larger grants or more
implementing discretion, Congress can compare such demands to
the fiscal and regulatory costs of purely national implementation.234

If the states' bids to implement national law are higher than
these bids by purely national institutions, then Congress can opt for
the latter, bypass the states, and thwart any state holdouts.235 Con
gress also can compare the nonfederal governments' track records
for being faithful agents of Congress,236 assisted by the information
provided by federal agencies and other monitors of state con
duct.237 If Congress finds that nonfederal governments consistently
are misappropriating federal funds, Congress can pursue a strategy
of preemption rather than cooperation. By contrast, if the national
government has greater confidence in elected state and local lead
ers, then the national government can force national agencies to
provide such leaders with greater discretion or at least more infor
mation through block grants,238 general revenue sharing,239 or con234. These costs are reflected in, for example, agencies' budget requests that are con
tained in the budget prepared by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and submit
ted by the President, the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) and OMB's rival baseline
projections, and various regulatory "impact statements" on the nonfiscal costs of regulations.
See ALLAN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: PoLmcs, POLICY, PROCESS 12-48 (1995)
(describing the process by which the budget is developed).
235. This is not to say that there are not legal barriers to Congress's ability to create
administrative agencies. For example, Congress cannot itself execute the laws through a leg
islative veto on administrative agencies' actions, nor can Congress itself hire or fire, except
through impeachment, executive officers in charge of implementing national law. But such
separation of powers doctrines ought not to affect Congress's choices between national and
state implementation of national law, because the doctrines apply to both sorts of implemen
tation. If Congress cannot impose a unicameral legislative veto on the Immigration and Nat
uralization Service, it also cannot impose such a veto on a state's department of community
affairs.
236. See, e.g., KETTI., supra note 2, at 98-101 (discussing Senator Proxmire's hearings con
cerning Community Development Block Grants).
237. For an account of such monitoring, see

id.

at 76-98.

238. For a detailed account of the operation of the Community Development Block
Grant program, see DONALD K=, MANAGING CoMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW
FEDERALISM (1980); RICH, supra note 178.
239. For an overview of general revenue sharing, see RICHARD NATHAN
NUE SHARING: THE SECOND ROUND (1977).
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sulting requirements.240 The history of cooperative federalism is, in
part, a history of struggles between elected policy generalists mayors, governors, state legislatures, and city councils - and fed
eral agency specialists for greater control over federal programs,
with Congress favoring one or another type of organization de
pending on the political climate and perceived regulatory needs.241

In effect, the President and the cabinet and subcabinet depart
ments, states, local governments, and independent regulatory agen
cies compete with each other to obtain implementation authority
from Congress. Each entity seeks from Congress larger appropria
tions or more discretion in enforcement responsibilities. But, be
cause Congress will seek the most faithful and efficient agent, each
entity is forced to keep its requests for budget authority and imple
menting discretion in check by the possibility that Congress will
delegate implementation responsibilities to the other competing en
tities. Likewise, each level may tend to exploit its control of infor
mation about the costs and benefits of implementation to influence
Congress's appropriation and oversight decisions.242 Thus, national
agencies might exaggerate the costs of enforcement to inflate their
budgets. But the other state and local governments' lobbying ef
forts provide Congress with another source of information about
the costs and benefits of implementation, and Congress can use this
source to correct the estimates provided by its own agencies.
Thus, the redundancy created by overlapping state and federal
jurisdictions allows Congress to play state and federal officials off of
each other to avoid dishonesty or corruption by either. As Susan
Rose-Ackerman has noted, such competition among governmental
officials reduces the risk of bribe-taking and other illegal bureau
cratic behavior.243 But analogous reasoning also suggests that inter240. For a detailed account of President Johnson's decision to protect the position of
elected state and local officials from national agencies' failure to consult with them concern
ing nonfederal implementation of national law, see HAIDER, supra note 164, at 114-23
(describing Johnson's promulgation of Executive Order A-85 requiring federal agencies to
consult with state and local elected officials).

241. For an account of such struggles in the context of so-called "picket fence" federal
ism, see TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967). Sanford uses the metaphor
of a picket fence to suggest the rivalry between appointed state and federal agency specialists
(the "vertical" fence posts) and elected state and federal "generalist" politicians (the hori
zontal fence boards).
242. For discussions of the difficulty faced by Congress in maintaining control of the fed
eral bureaucracy, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE Gov
ERNMENT (1971); WILLIAM F. WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1995).
243. See SusAN RosE-ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTION: A STUDY IN PoLmcAL EcoNOMY 13751 (1978).
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governmental competition reduces the costs of state autonomy by
depriving both the states and national agencies of the ability to hold
out indefinitely for national benefits in excess of their opportunity
costs.244 In sum, the risks that strict enforcement of the New York
entitlement would lead to strategic withholding of that entitlement
by state and local governments seem low, given competition from
nonfederal, federal, and private sources.
This relative absence of holdout problems distinguishes the New
entitlement from other entitlements previously possessed by

York

United
States v. E. C. Knight Co.,245 Hammer v. Dagenhart,246 A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States,247 and Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 248 which bestowed upon state governments the exclusive enti
the state governments under pre-New Deal precedents, like

tlement to regulate private noncommercial activities like manufac
turing even when such activities produced interstate spillover
effects.
Unlike the

New York

entitlement, this

"E. C. Knight

entitle

ment" would be extremely costly for the national government to
purchase. To the extent that a given state's regulation would im
pose less cost on commercial activity than would federal regulation,
that state would not sell its entitlement for fear that it would drive
its commercial activity to a state that did not accept federal regula
tion. It would only sell when it was certain that all other states
would sell their entitlement as well, thus uniformly imposing higher
costs.249 In order to enforce a federal regulation in one state, there244. This complex relationship between the power to regulate private persons directly
and the power to induce the states to regulate private persons according to federal standards
was recognized by Publius in The Federalist No. 36, in which Publius remarked that "[w]hen
the States know that the Union can supply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful
motive for exertion on their parts [in executing national law]." THE FEDERALIST No. 36,
supra note 50, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton).
245. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
246. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
247. 295 U.S. 495 {1935).
248. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
249. The argument here is familiar. See, e.g., Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics ofFeder
alism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555
(1994). For example, one state's refusal to allow federal regulation of wages and hours might
put pressure on other states to abstain from such regulation in order to prevent state resi
dents from fleeing the regulating jurisdiction to the jurisdiction without the redistributive
regulations. If even a few states refuse to accept federal regulations requiring employers to
pay a minimum wage, then there will be a risk that the adopting states' industry and other tax
bases will flee to those recalcitrant states, depressing the economies of those states that ac
cept the federal grant and regulate according to federal standards.
The same sort of analysis applies to state decisions to allow federal regulation of activities
that impose "spillover" costs on persons in other states. For example, if a state refuses to
allow federally proposed environmental regulations limiting the airborne pollutants that
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fore, Congress would simultaneously have to bribe every state to
allow enforcement of the proposed law. But it might be difficult for
Congress to obtain the agreement of every state simultaneously to
yield their E. C. Knight entitlement. Because each state could de
feat the entire federal scheme, each state might act strategically by
demanding a premium in order to allow the entire regime to be
enacted. The costs of dividing such a premium among the contend
ing states might exceed the value of the regime to Congress and
thereby cause its defeat. Like a land developer trying to assemble
fifty parcels of land owned by fifty strategically inclined landown
ers, the federal government's efforts to create cost-justified regula
tory regimes would be defeated by transaction costs and holdouts if
Congress had to obtain the simultaneous consent of fifty individual
state governments.
By contrast, Congress has less to fear from state holdouts when
it bargains to purchase the states'

New York

entitlements because,

so long as Congress enforces federal law within a state's territory
using federal personnel, no state's refusal to sell the entitlement can
prevent federal law from being enforced in every state. Thus, one
state's refusal to sell the New York entitlement would not affect the
costs of purchasing the New York entitlement in other states. For
example, if some states refuse to implement OSHA with their state
administrators, the federal government can and does administer
OSHA directly in the recalcitrant states with the federal Depart
ment of Labor. Because the federal government can achieve regu

New York
every state to sell its New York

latory uniformity without purchasing every state's
entitlement, there is no necessity for
entitlement in order for

any

state to sell it.

Of course, it is theoretically possible that if a state refused to
implement federal law then purely federal enforcement of such law
within the state's territory would be practically impossible. Imagine
services that the federal government is so utterly inexperienced in
providing - say,

K-12 education - that provision through federal

personnel would be practically impossible. If a school district re
fuses to assist the federal government in enforcing federal standards
manufacturers can emit, then manufacturers within such a state may be able to emit pollu
tants affecting primarily residents in "downstream" states - in effect, using the airspace
above the "downstream" states as a storing area for their emissions. Under such circum
stances, it would be politically difficult for the "downstream" states to enact emissions restric
tions on their own manufacturers, for the residents of the downstream states would not see
any benefit - that is, cleaner air - resulting from regulations that, nevertheless, would
burden its economy. For an elaboration of this argument, see Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating

Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environ
mental Regulation, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1222-24 (1992).
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in public schools, then it might be impractical for the federal gov
ernment to create its own federal schools to implement such stan
dards. Thus, state refusal to assist the federal government could
conceivably amount to a state veto on some federal regulatory
scheme, disrupting its uniform enforcement throughout the nation
and giving rise to the "holdout problems" described above.
But there are reasons to believe that this theoretical possibility
is not a pressing practical danger. First, to the extent that the fed
eral government completely lacks any capacity to provide the regu
latory service because nonfederal governments utterly dominate
the regulatory field, one might question whether federal involve
ment in the field is really necessary. Such a field would seem to be
a traditional state function best left to nonfederal institutions.zs0
Second, federal inefficiency can actually encourage state or local
officials to sell their New

York entitlement rather than tolerate fed

eral administration: the prospect of dealing with slow, inexperi
enced, or incompetent federal administrators may impel regulated
interests within a state to lobby the state's legislature to preserve
state implementation of federal law.251

3. The Problem of Agency Costs
A

second objection to this argument for the efficiency of

York is to dispute the realism of the assumption on which the

New

argu

ment is based - insignificant agency costs. In fact, state and fed
eral legislators are not equally responsive to the voters within their
constituencies. In particular, it is simply not the case that every
level of regulatory costs imposed by implementation translates au
tomatically into an identical level of political risk. The political risk
to state and federal lawmakers arising out of some regulatory cost
imposed on constituents will depend to a large extent on

which con

stituents are burdened. Well-organized groups of constituents that
experience concentrated regulatory costs may make a politician's
political career much more risky than the same level of costs dis-

250. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
251. See Rhode Island Gets Unprecedented Warning from Feds over Water Quality Pro·
grams, STATE CAPITALS NEWSL., Feb. 24, 1997, at 2 (noting a state agency director's warning
that, if the state legislature does not increase funding for cleanup of the Bay, EPA will take
over administration of the Clean Water Act in Rhode Island, which "would be harmful to
Rhode Island businesses, which would have to deal with regulators in Boston rather than
Providence").
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tributed among diffuse groups of disorganized constituents who are
less adept at lobbying and turning out to vote at election time.252
How might relaxing the assumption concerning agency costs af
fect the optimistic assessment of New York provided above? If
elected officials respond to different constituents' identical regula
tory costs with different degrees of attention, then one could not
assume that the bargains between state and federal officials actually
distributed the New York entitlement in a way that minimizes regu
latory costs. Because local and state governments might be more
sensitive to the ideological objections of well-organized interest
groups, state and local governments might refuse to implement fed
eral schemes to which such well-organized groups object, even
when such implementation might be cost-justified. Local govern
ments might tum down federal grants for low-income housing, for
example, because the consumers of such housing have muted voices
while the middle-class homeowners who oppose such housing are
vocal and well-organized in their opposition.253
Agency costs can also arise because nonfederal officials are

themselves

a powerful interest group with interests that can be in

consistent with the well-being of their constituents. Intergovern
mental programs may, for instance, suffer from the "flypaper
effect" - the tendency of nonfederal government officials to retain
federal grants to m�tain or increase the size of state and local
budgets, even when such funds can be passed on to residents to
reduce their tax burden.
In response to the perception that some constituents are over
or underrepresented in the local political process by which federal
grant money is spent, Congress has required state and local govern
ments applying for such money to provide for public participation
in the programs funded by such money.254 These "public participa252. There is, of course, a voluminous public choice literature analyzing the formation of
interest groups and the possibility that well-organized interest groups will disproportionately
affect the political process. For some representative samples, see RussELL HAR.DIN, CoLLEc.
TIVE ACTION (1982); TERRY M. MoE, THE ORGANIZATION OF lNTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND
THE lNTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL lNTEREST GROUPS (1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE
Lome OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); Terry Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organizations,
7 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 106 (1991).
253. See supra note 177. Other possible explanations of local government hostility to
ward redistributive programs are, perhaps, more plausible. According to a widely held view,
the local government that is reluctant to accept funds for redistributive programs like low
income housing is actually acting as a faithful agent of all of its constituents, including low
income constituents, because such programs erode the tax base that the local government
needs to survive. See generally PAUL E. PETERSON, CrrY LIMITS (1981).
254. See Terrance Sandalow, Federal Grants and the Reform of State and Local Govern
ment, in MoRE MoNEY Is NoT THE ONLY ANsWER: REFORM OF GoVERNMENTAL Smuc.
TURES 175 (1969).
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tion" requirements are ubiquitous and take numerous forms mandatory hearings, consultation with consumers of federally
funded programs, and so on. They also have raised the ire of some
local government officials - most famously in the case of the Eco
nomic Opportunity Act's requirement of "maximum feasible partic
ipation. "255 But such grant conditions will not, by themselves,
completely solve the problem of agency costs, because the condi
tions will be imposed only if elected officials accept these grants.
Such conditions, therefore, cannot improve the fairness of the poli
ticians' decisions to apply for or accept the grant.256
One might ask whether Congress should have the power to
commandeer state and local regulatory processes in order to ensure
that all interested constituents are appropriately represented. If the
state and local officials do not represent their constituents, then
neither do their bargains with the national government. At the very
least, Congress might commandeer state and local government
structure to require the state or local government to extend the suf
frage to all residents within their boundaries, impose limits on how
such boundaries might be drawn, and require certain governments
to elect their members by single-member districts to prevent the
dilution of constituencies unpopular with a local majority.
Indeed, the Court's New York doctrine may accommodate such
commandeering, because the New York entitlement might not limit
Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or its Article I, section 4, power to require state gov
ernments to regulate federal elections according to federal stan
dards. The New York Court did not address the issue of whether
New York's anticommandeering rule applied to any exercise of the
255. See J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN UR·
BAN PoLmc:s: COMMUNITY pARTICIPATION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 4-6 (1973); SAR LEVI
TAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY (1969); DANIEL
PA1RICK MOYNIHAN, MAxlMtJM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN
THE WAR ON POVERTY 110-13 (1969) (expressing skepticism about community action pro
grams). Consider also the statutory requirements for school districts to consult with parents
of handicapped children in designing an individualized education plan under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1995); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (1997).
For a detailed description of the purposes that such a requirement can serve, see JOEL
HANDLER, THE CoNDmONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY ch.
7 (1986).
256. See, e.g., RICH, supra note 178, at 233-34; Elizabeth Provencio, Making the Silent
Voices of the Colonias Heard: Examining the Lack of CDBG Funding in Dona Ana County,
New Mexico (unpublished seminar paper, subinitted Apr. 23, 1997, on file with author)
(describing the failure of border counties to apply for small cities CDBG funds despite eligi
bility). In particular, as noted by Greenstone and Peterson, powerful mayors like Chicago's
Mayor Daley simply refused to create community action organizations with genuine auton
omy from the city government, but Chicago still received federal grant money. See Green
stone & Peterson, supra note 255, at 19-24.
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Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has upheld provisions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965257 that arguably commandeer the electo
ral process of state governments,258 and, as early as its 1879 decision
in Ex parte Siebold,259 the Court upheld Congress's power to com
mandeer state officials' services pursuant to Congress's power to
regulate the "time, place, and manner" of federal elections.260 To
be sure, the Court has been more reluctant to allow Congress to
grant voting rights to groups other than racial minorities in
nonfederal elections.261 But the functional argument outlined here
suggests that Congress's need to commandeer nonfederal govern
ments' electoral process is greater than its need to commandeer
nonfederal governments' regulatory processes.
One should be wary, however, about too casually invoking the
unresponsiveness of state and local legislators to their constituents
as a way to justify congressional imposition of duties upon
nonfederal officials. Congress, too, is affected by agency costs, and
giving Congress the power to demand regulatory services from state
and local governments unconditionally might exacerbate such costs.
Consider, for example, the often recognized tendency for Con
gress to favor programs that maximize its ability to perform
casework for constituents and take credit for "unsticking" the bu
reaucratic process.262 This incentive can encourage Congress to de
prive elected policy generalists - governors, mayors, state and
local legislators - of influence in intergovernmental arrangements
even when such influence might be desirable. After all, members of
Congress may regard elected policy generalists like mayors, gover
nors, and state and local legislators as potential challengers in re
election campaigns.263 Therefore, Congress might disfavor any
257.
258.
259.
260.

42 u.s.c. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-l (1994).
See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980).
100 U.S. 371, 397-99 (1879).
Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-52 (1986) (describing vote dilution). Both

of these powers have been invoked to uphold the so-called "motor voter" law, a measure
designed to increase the registration of racial minorities and other underregistered groups.
See Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 967 (D.S.C. 1995) (upholding the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994)).

261. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-296 (1970) (striking down an amendment
of the Voting Rights Act that bestowed the right to vote in state and local elections on per
sons between 18 and 21 years of age).
262. The thesis was initially propounded in FIORINA, supra note 28. It is developed with
more data and sophistication in BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VoTE: CONSTITUENCY
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987).
263. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 98-101. Haider cites "Egger's Law" of intergovern
mental relations - "the contempt that a U.S. Senator feels for his Governor is equal and
opposite to the contempt that the Governor feels for his U.S. Senator." This fear of state
elected officials as potential rivals for office is thoroughly justified. The state house is essen-
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form of cooperative federalism that gives such potential rivals op
portunities for credit-taking that the members of Congress would
prefer to reserve for themselves.264 Such a suspicion of state and
local elected leaders is not necessarily inefficient.265 Congress,
however, might use such power in perverse ways to strip elected
officials of most policymaking discretion, transferring that discre
tion to state bureaucrats who are less likely to be challengers to
federal incumbents and more easily controlled by federal office
holders, both elected and unelected. By allowing state and local
elected officials to withhold their state bureaucracy, New York gives
them bargaining power against Congress to counteract what John
Chubb calls the "bias for centralization."266

In short, the safest conclusion is that, to the extent that one is
willing generally to trust the electoral process to ensure that elected
officials fairly represent their constituents, then one should also
trust intergovernmental bargains to ensure that the New York enti
tlement will be transferred to the level of government, state or fed
eral, that can make the best use of it. If one believes that elected
officials, as a general matter, fairly represent their constituents,

New York and the intergovernmental
York entitlement is transferred. By con

then one should also endorse
bargains by which the New

trast, if one distrusts elected officials' incentives to act as faithful
agents of their constituents, then one might favor limits on the New
York entitlement. One would need to go further, however, and
identify precisely the type of agency cost that justifies such limits.
If, for example, state and local governments systematically under
represent racial minorities or other disadvantaged or disorganized
constituencies even more than the national government, then it
might make sense to allow the national government to commandeer
tially a training ground for half of the U.S. Congress. See generally MICHAEL BERKMAN, THE
STATE Ro01s OF NATIONAL PoLmcs: CoNGRESS AND THE TAX AGENDA, 1978-1986 (1993).

264. See ANToN, supra note 2, at 111 (asserting that members of Congress tend to disfa
vor grant programs that diminish their opportunities to take credit for benefits delivered to
their constituencies); CoNLAN, supra note 164, at 38 (attributing congressional opposition to
a proposed transportation block grant to Congress's "desire to retain control over pork bar
rel projects"); John Chubb, Federalism and the Bias in Favor of Centralization, in THE NEW
DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 273, 284-85 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1985).
265. Especially where Congress is using local officials to administer a program with the
purpose of protecting the welfare of low-income persons, it might be essential to insulate
such programs from state and local political control and develop an intergovernmental bu
reaucracy dedicated to the redistributive function of the program. See PETERSON ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 131-59 (describing how development of a state bureaucracy sympathetic to
the purposes of federal redistributive programs can help assure that such programs are insti
tutionalized and insulated from misdirection into developmental ends).

266. See Chubb, supra note 264, at 273.
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the states and bypass the intergovernmental marketplace. Other
sorts of agency costs, however, might lead one to strengthen

York's

New

rule. For now, it is important only to see that the relation

between agency costs and

New York

is complex and that, absent

agency costs affecting the state but not the national governments,
such costs are not a good reason to reject

New York.

* * *

It shotild not be surprising that the national government can ac
quire state and local regulatory services through voluntary ex
change.

This is how the national government normally obtains

services from private persons.

When the national government

wishes private persons or companies to serve as defense contrac
tors, mail carriers, FBI agents, park rangers, or cabinet secretaries,
it does not conscript them but instead purchases the services with
revenues generated by taxes. If conscription is unnecessary to ob
tain private services, then why should it be necessary to obtain state
or local services? In both cases, there is a competitive marketplace
in which to purchase such services, and, if a nonfederal seller's ask
ing price is too high, the federal government can frequently, if not
always, instead enforce federal law through a variety of other
nonfederal and federal entities. In particular, unlike the sort of ex
clusive state entitlement to regulate private persons asserted by the

E. C. Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, Schecter Poultry, and
Carter Coal, the New York entitlement need not lead to hold-out
Court in

problems that would prevent the entitlement from moving to the
level of government that can use it most effectively.
Thus,

New York

and

Printz

promote federalism by providing

nonfederal governments with a valuable entitlement but without
depriving the national government of any useful power. Assuming
that one is willing to indulge even the weakest presumption in favor
of federal regimes,

New York

and

Printz

make eminent functional

sense.

ill.

How COMMANDEERING LEADS TO INEFFICIENCY,
DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE, AND INVASION OF
EXPRESSIVE AUTONOMY

One might not be willing, however, to presume that promotion
of state and local governments' power is an intrinsically valuable
goal. If one lacks such a minimum presumptive commitment to fed
eral regimes, then the argument presented in Part II will be unper
suasive for two reasons.
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First, Part II shows only that the allocation of entitlements pro
vided by New York is one possible efficient allocation. But it does
not show that the national government's commandeering of state
and local governments' services is inefficient. After all, Coasean
bargains might run either way. It is at least theoretically possible
that state and local governments could ensure that Congress did not
overburden their regulatory resources by offering Congress state
generated revenue - reverse grants-in-aid - for the right to forgo
implementation of federal law. One might argue that, if Congress
declined the state funds, this would provide conclusive evidence
that Congress placed a higher value on nonfederal implementation
than the state and local governments valued their autonomy.267
What loss of efficiency, therefore, can result from allowing Con
gress to commandeer state and local regulatory processes?
Second, the argument in Part II does not address any concerns
besides the smooth and efficient sale of the New York entitlement
to the level of government that values it the most. But efficiency is
not everything. One might also wish to consider the distributive
consequences of New York. New York, after all, makes the national
government pay nonfederal governments for the right to use their
regulatory machinery. It makes the nonfederal governments rela
tively richer and the national government relatively poorer. If one
generally favors diffusion of power in a federal regime, then this
distributive consequence will seem self-evidently desirable and re
quire no further defense, assuming that the distribution sacrifices
no efficiency, as Part II argued. But, if one does not indulge such a
presumption, then one will want further justification for this distrib
utive consequence.
267. The argument for such reverse grants-in-aid is highly speculative, because the device
has never been tested. For practical reasons, nonfederal governments probably would have
to buy their way out of federal mandates by offering revenue to federal administrative agen
cies rather than to Congress. There are, however, reasons to believe that federal agencies
would prefer inefficiently continued control over nonfederal governments' personnel than
additional revenue. The agencies might fear that Congress would reduce their appropriation
by the amount of the revenue that they receive from nonfederal governments. Such a fear of
an offset has made agencies reluctant to accept fees in other contexts. See Barry S. Read,
The Permit Fee Program of Title V of the Clean Air Act of1990: Developing State Fee Pro
grams, 44 Sw. L.J. 1553, 1556 (1991) ("[T]he prospect that an agency's legislative appropria
tion might be reduced by an amount equal to the fees collected may reduce the agency's
incentive to establish and implement a fee system."); see also Joyce M. Martin et al., Funding
State Environmental Programs: Indiana's Solution, 1 ENVrL. LAW. 435, 444 (1995) (describ
ing how the Indiana legislature reduced the Indiana Department of Environmental Manage
ment's budget by "the exact amount IDEM would have raised from municipal fees"). By
contrast, Congress could not reduce easily an agency's budget by the value of the nonfederal
officials' services that it receives, if only because such services are nonfungible and difficult to
value. Agencies, therefore, might perversely prefer mandates on nonfederal officials over
reverse grants-in-aid as a way to protect their budgets from congressional offsets.
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Part III of this article addresses these two concerns by arguing
that even those lacking a minimum presumptive commitment to
federalism must embrace the functional theory to the extent they
argue that the utility of commandeering depends on states qua
states - independent governments established and maintained by
subnational constituencies. Pervasive commandeering would
render state governments indistinguishable from the various species
of federal local government that advocates of commandeering feel
are inadequate in the first place.
The analogy to private property is straightforward: a king desir
ing com for his warehouses, yet unwilling to exert royal effort to
grow com, may firmly renounce any belief in private property and
further state than any com in the kingdom is his for the taking. But
because com is a type of property that depends on the efforts of
others for its existence, such a policy would likely discourage farm
ers from devoting their efforts to producing com. Thus, Part III
suggests that commandeering is both inefficient and distributionally
improper by drawing an analogy between state regulatory processes
and private property. Section III.A explains that the inefficiency
springs from the possibility that commandeering state and local in
stitutions will tend to undermine voters' and politicians' incentives
to participate in state and local government, just as confiscation of
private property tends to undermine incentives of investors to in
vest in property likely to be confiscated. Sections III.B and III.C
suggest that commandeering might also be distributionally unjust in
some of the same ways that confiscation of private property and
forced speech is conventionally regarded as unjust - because it in
equitably distributes the costs of government and forces nonfederal
policymakers to vote for federal policies with which they might
disagree.
A.

Commandeering as Inefficient Demand for In-Kind
Contributions of Goods and Services

Why might it be inefficient for the national government to de
mand regulatory services from state and local governments? When
the national government commandeers services from nonfederal
governments, it essentially demands that such governments provide
in-kind contributions to the national government. But such de
mands can inefficiently deter voters and politicians from participat
ing in state and local politics.

In effect, when the national

government commandeers state and local regulatory processes, it
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undermines the very institutions that the national government seeks
to exploit.
To illustrate how commandeering can undermine the incentive
to participate in state and local politics, consider why conscription
of private services might be undesirable. Suppose, for example, that
the national government wished to ensure that there were a suffi
cient supply of sites for the storage of low-level radioactive waste.
In order to accomplish this goal, the national government might
require certain private operators of landfills designated by the En
vironmental Protection Agency to "take title" to low-level radioac
tive waste generated by other persons and store such waste on their
property.
Quite apart from the possible constitutional problems raised by
such a scheme of waste disposal,268 such conscription of property
and services from private landfill operators might be an extremely
inefficient method of :financing landfill space. By demanding that
landfill operators alone bear the cost of storing low-level radioac
tive waste, the hypothetical statute effectively would impose an ex
cise tax on the production of landfill space. Depending on the
elasticity of supply of such space, this "tax" on investment in landfill
space might deter private investors from investing money in the cre
ation of further space. Through conscription, then, the government
might actually find itself confronted with an even more dire
shortage of landfill sites than that which it wished to remedy. Such
selective conscription of specific service-providers' labor or prop
erty, in short, functions as an inefficient excise tax.269
The national government's demands for state and local regula
tory services can be analogized to such inefficient conscription of
private services. When the national government commandeers the
268. One might argue that such a measure might constitute a permanent physical inva
sion of private property and, therefore, a per se takings. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Man
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Given the grotesque formalism of takings doctrine,
however, the Court might conceivably hold that, because the landfill owner takes title to the
waste, there would be no physical invasion within the meaning of Loretto.
269. For an account of how excise taxes might lead to "excess burden" - inefficient
disincentives to engage in the taxed activities - see KARL CAsE, EcoNOMics AND TAX PoL
ICY 142-43 (1986); JosEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 192-94 (5th ed. 1987). Con
fiscation of specific sorts of property can have similar effects. See William A. Fischel, The
Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military Draft for the Takings
Issue, 20 liARv. J.L. & PuB . POLY. 23, 26 (1996) (noting that "if the king did not pay for corn,
horses, or boats for his army, then farmers, teamsters, and sailors would make them hard to
find or be discouraged from producing them at all"). It is a familiar point that conscription
can lead to a similar sort of deadweight loss, because the threat of conscription can lead
potential conscriptees to engage in wasteful efforts to avoid conscription. See, e.g., Walter Y.
Oi, The Economic Cost of the Draft, AM. EcoN. Assoc.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May
1967, at 39, 59.
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services of state or local governments, it necessarily reduces either
the revenue or the policymaking discretion available to such gov
ernments' officers.270 It is logical to infer that such erosion of the
power, money, and prestige of nonfederal offices can only reduce
the incentive of voters and politicians to expend time, energy, and
money in voting, running for office, monitoring representatives, and
otherwise engaging in political activities to control such offices.271
Moreover, the (admittedly limited) empirical evidence concerning
voters and politicians' incentives suggests that, as the real poli
cymaking discretion of nonfederal office decreases, ambitious and
civic-minded citizens would abandon nonfederal politics and in
stead substitute other activities where their public spirit and
ambition can be satisfied more fully.272 In this way, federal com270. At first glance, this statement might seem incorrect. After all, state and local offi
cials gain significant powers when they administer federal statutes. This factual observation
is certainly correct - but also irrelevant. Nonfederal officials can obtain such federal re
sponsibilities even if the national government lacked the power to demand their services.
They merely would have to offer to assist the national government on mutually acceptable
terms. By giving the national government the power to conscript nonfederal officials' serv
ices, one simply diminishes nonfederal officials' capacity to bargain for either greater
amounts of policymaking discretion, nonsource revenue, or both. It is difficult to see how
this loss of bargaining power would enhance the desirability of nonfederal office.
271. The intuition suggested here is more formally elaborated in Robert P. Inman &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense ofthe Antitrnst State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political
Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1203,
1214 n.34 (1997); see also JACK H. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 43 (1987) ("[P]eople are more
willing to take part in decision making when there is more at stake.").
272. The evidence suggests that innovative policymakers, sometimes known as "public
entrepreneurs," tend to emerge when there are offices with policymaking discretion - for
example, "strong" mayor positions - that allow significant policy innovation. See MARK
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERN
MENT 94-96 (1995). The loss of discretion might be an especially great deterrent to local
officeholding, because an enormous number of local offices are volunteer positions that pro
vide no salary. See Sydney Duncombe, Volunteers in City Government: Getting More than
Your Money's Worth, 75 NATL. CIVIC REv. 291 (1986); William D. Duncombe & Jeffrey L.
Brudney, The Optimal Mix of Volunteer and Paid Staff in Local Governments: An Applica
tion to Municipal Fire Departments, 23 PuB. FIN. Q. 356 (1995); Sandra Reinsel Markwood,
Volunteers in Local Government: Partners in Service, 76 PuB. MGMr., April 1994, at 6. The
only incentive for participation in such voluntary activities is the opportunity to "make a
difference" - to exercise power. As the real power of such offices diminishes, one would
expect that ambitious or civic-minded persons would direct their energy to other fora private nonprofits, trade unions, and private corporations - where their longing for office,
prestige, or an outlet for altruistic energy can be more easily satisfied.
There is also some evidence that voters and residents are more willing to engage in more
time-consuming political activities - for example, contacting a politician or attending a hear
ing - if their city has neighborhood organizations with genuine policymaking power. See
JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBmTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 89-98 (1993). Moreover,
citizens' willingness to engage in politics is related directly to the willingness of politicians
and other politically active persons to "get out the vote." It is well established that the more
resources that politicians invest in a political campaign - canvassing, advertisements, and so
on - the higher the turnout. See, e.g., Gary W. Cox & Michael C. Munger, Closeness, Ex
penditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections, 83 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 217 (1989);
Gerald H. Kramer, The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior, 34 PuB.
OPINION Q. 560 (1970); Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Getting Out the Vote:
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mandeering of state and local activities is analogous to an excise tax
on state and local political activity. That is, federal commandeering
would reduce the marginal incentive to invest in the burdened
activity.
Of course, it is highly unlikely that a few minor demands of the
Brady Act variety on nonfederal officers would affect the interest of
voters and politicians in those offices. Only pervasive and draco
nian conscription of state and local services would diminish constit
uent and candidate interest in nonfederal office. One might,
therefore, object that Congress never actually conscripts nonfederal
offices so extensively as to deter political participation.
But such a confident assertion is supported by scant data. We
have little evidence one way or another about whether or not Con
gress would refrain from conscripting nonfederal officers if there
were no constitutional norm against such conscription. To be sure,
Congress historically did not conscript nonfederal officers' regula
tory services very extensively prior to 1970. But this abstinence
proves little, given that Congress in the past has operated under the
assumption that such conscription would be unconstitutional.273
Given our uncertainty about Congress's incentives and the substitu
tion rate between private and public activities,274 one might think
that it is at least unduly risky to allow Congress to conscript
nonfederal officers' services and thus diminish the incentives of
candidates and voters to produce such services. Undertaking such a
risk is completely unnecessary if, as argued in Part II, the federal
government can easily purchase the services of nonfederal officers
through intergovernmental transactions. Maybe Congress will
show self-restraint in conscripting nonfederal services. But, given
that such conscription is unnecessary because Congress can
Participation in Gubernatorial Elections, 77 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 675 (1983). Therefore, one
would expect voter turnout to fall as politicians' interest in some elected office diminishes.
Assuming that ambitious, innovative policymakers prefer to have more, rather than less, dis
cretion when they assume office, one expects that such persons would invest fewer resources
and less time to getting out the vote for offices rendered less desirable because of federal
commandeering.
273. For an example of such congressional concern about the constitutionality of con
scripting nonfederal officers to provide regulatory services, see the summary of debates over
§ 1983 in Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 249, 257-66.
274. Clayton Gillette has pointed out to me that selective federal conscription of
nonfederal officials' services simply might cause voters and politicians to redirect their atten
tion away from services likely to be conscripted by the federal government to other govern
mental activities less likely to be so burdened. This is possible if federal conscription of
nonfederal services is limited and predictable in scope. But given our uncertainty about the
likely scope of federal conscription, it might seem unwise to assume such a limited effect on
nonfederal incentives.
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purchase nonfederal officers' "property rule" entitfement free from
high transaction costs, why take the chance?
In sum, commandeering of state or local services seems ineffi
cient in the same way that confiscation of private property or con
scription of private services is inefficient; it places the burden for
providing a service on persons who invest in the production of such
services and thus discourages such persons from continuing to make
the desired investment, at least whenever the supply of private
goods and services responds elastically to increases in costs.
One might respond that commandeering nevertheless might be
more efficient than the use of voluntary intergovernmental agree
ments, because purchasing nonfederal governments' services re
quires

the

national

government

to

raise

revenues

through

potentially inefficient taxation.275 For example, income taxes might
inefficiently induce taxpayers to substitute leisure for labor, while
sales taxes might inefficiently deter taxpayers from consumption of
taxed goods.276 It is a familiar point that conscription of

private

services can be more efficient than purchase of such services
through voluntary agreements precisely because such conscription
reduces the need to use inefficient taxes.277 Why is not conscription
of

nonfederal governments'

services also a good way to avoid such

tax inefficiencies?
The difficulty with such an argument is that, unlike the conscrip
tion of private individuals, the commandeering of nonfederal gov
ernments is neither necessary nor sufficient for avoiding the
275. For a discussion of the deadweight losses resulting from taxation, see JosEPH
STIGLITZ, EcoNOMICS OF THE PUBuc SECTOR 375-76, 390-92 (4th ed. 1995); Charles L. Bal
lard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxes in the
United States, 75 AM EcoN. RE.v. 128 (1985); Edgar K. Browning, On the Marginal Welfare
Cost of Taxation, 77 AM EcoN. REv. 11 (1987); Charles Stuart, Welfare Cost per Dollar of
Additional Tax Revenue in the United States, 74 AM. EcoN. RE.v. 352 {1984).
276. See RICHARD A. MusoRAVE & PEGGY B. MusGRAVE, Pusuc FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 297-303 {4th ed. 1984).
277. This argument applies regardless of whether the government conscripts personal
.

.

services or confiscates property. For an application of the argument to conscription, see
Milton Friedman, Why Not a Volunteer Army?, in THE MILITARY DRAFr. SELECTED READ
INGS 625, 626 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982); Thomas Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive The
ory of Military Recruitment, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 109, 114-15 {1994). For an application of the
argument to regulation of real property, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Spe
cies Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 355-58 (1997) (noting
the danger that the Endangered Species Act may induce farmers to overplow their land to
discourage the presence of endangered species on their property). The argument works only
if conscription functions as a lump-sum tax that one cannot avoid by changing one's behavior.
As Ross notes, however, military conscription does not function in this way; the availability
of exemptions for married persons, students, and so on encourages potential conscriptees to
engage in wasteful draft avoidance such as enrolling in graduate school. See Ross, supra, at

114 n.14.
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deadweight losses of inefficient taxes. Such commandeering is not
sufficient to achieve tax efficiency because state and local govern
ments must impose nonfederal taxes to finance federally mandated
services, and state and local taxation might be every bit as ineffi
cient as the federal taxation that it replaces. State and local govern
ments, after all, raise money by imposing some mix of income,
sales, or property taxes that can distort private choices just as much
as the federal tax code. Therefore, to avoid inefficient taxation, it
would not be sufficient for the national government to demand that
state and local governments perform regulatory services. The na
tional government would also have to demand that state and local
governments finance such services with taxes approved by the na
tional government.
But, if the national government can determine which state and
local taxes are more efficient than federal taxes, then it is difficult to
see why the national government could not simply enact such effi
cient taxes as federal revenue-enhancing measures. There does not
seem to be any efficiency-based reasons for forcing state and local
governments to enact taxes that the national government could sim
ply impose directly as a matter of federal law. The national govern
ment would not necessarily have to administer this federal tax itself;
instead, the national government could purchase the assistance of
state and local governments by transferring some share of the reve
nue derived from such taxes to state and local governments in re
turn for their administrative services.278 Precisely such a funding
mechanism was upheld in New York. Congress authorized the im
position of surcharges on the interstate transfer of waste and allo
cated the proceeds of the surcharge to those states that carried out
the federal siting scheme.279 In sum, unlike the conscription of pri
vate services, the commandeering of the state governments' regula
tory machinery is unnecessary to provide any benefit such as tax
efficiency.280
278. State-federal cooperation in the collection of taxes is well established. See, e.g.,
GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-86-8, TAX ADMINISTRATION: THE FED
ERALISTATE TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM 1-11 (1985) (describing and evaluat
ing the IRS's information exchange agreements with 49 states' tax collection agencies).
279. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992).
280. David Dana presents an interesting argument that state taxes might be systemati
cally more efficient than any federal tax. By forcing state governments to implement envi
ronmental schemes exclusively with state tax revenue, such mandates ensure that the cost of
environmental cleanup within each state will be born by the residents of that state. If the
national government provided funding to each state for such cleanup, then there would be a
likelihood of a cross-subsidy from clean, wealthy states with sophisticated regulatory agencies
to poorer, dirtier states that lack such agencies. Wealthy states, after all, tend to pay more
federal taxes for the same level of environmental regulation, simply because the federal gov-
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One might make a second objection to the argument that com
mandeering is inefficient. One might reason that it proves too
much, because it would seem to condemn preemption just as much
as commandeering. As Publius noted, the federal government
would diminish voters' interest in state and local politics simply by
preempting state and local policymaking in interesting areas like
war and trade and replacing them with federal legislation.281 If it is
somehow inefficient to reduce the influence of state and local of
fices, then why should not such preemption be just as suspect as
commandeering?
Preemption can be distinguished from commandeering on two
grounds. First, unlike commandeering, federal money cannot buy
preemption. As argued in section II.B.2, it would be extremely
costly for the federal government to purchase the power to regulate
activities with interstate commercial effects from state and local
governments, because any individual state's refusal to sell the
power would necessarily prevent uniform enforcement of a federal
regulatory scheme throughout the nation and thus affect other
states' willingness to allow their laws to be preempted by national
legislation. But federal efforts to purchase the use of state and local
governments' regulatory processes do not present this danger, be
cause the national government can bargain with each nonfederal
government one at a time.282 Therefore, even if commandeering
and preemption impose exactly the same harm on state and local
governments, commandeering is less necessary than preemption;
the federal government can use its spending power to secure all of
ernment relies on progressive taxation rather than fees. Likewise, if the federal government
funds mandates, then dirtier states that lack an environmental bureaucracy will tend to re
ceive more funds than states that have already cleaned up their environment. In short, resi
dents of richer and cleaner states might actually prefer that state governments be forced to
clean up the environment without federal funding, as such funding will cause them to export
tax dollars to residents of poorer, dirtier states. See David Dana, The Case for Unfunded
Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 26-35 (1995).
Dana's argument, however, presents a non sequitur. It does not justify mandates but
rather a federal system of financing that does not depend on general revenues. If the United
States wishes to finance environmental cleanup within each state only with funds derived
from that state's residents, then it could easily do so simply by creating a federal scheme
under which environmental regulation within a state would be financed exclusively by taxes,
impact fees, or special assessments imposed exclusively on the state's residents. Tue financ
ing mechanism upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), involved pre
cisely such a system: if a state government did not adopt a system of unemployment
insurance acceptable to Congress, then Congress imposed a special payroll tax only on em
ployers within the state.
281. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 50, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The regula
tion of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition.").
282.

See supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
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the advantages of commandeering, but it cannot use its spending
power as easily to preempt state and local laws.
But quite apart from the necessity of preemption, preemption is
generally less harmful to usefel state and local political activity than
commandeering legislation. So, for example, when Congress for
bids state and local governments from enacting a collective bargain
ing law, a monetary policy, a tariff on out-of-state goods, or a
bankruptcy code,

Congress

does so on the assumption that

nonfederal interest in such topics would be counterproductive. Of
course, lobbyists, voters, and aspiring politicians who are interested
in these topics might have their interest in state and local govern
ment dampened by the preemption of nonfederal governments' ju
risdiction, but that is the point.

Congress essentially makes a

declaration that such interest ought to be dampened, because state
and local institutions should not meddle in what ought to be exclu
sively national concerns.
By contrast, when the national government demands regulatory
services from state and local governments, Congress can hardly ar
gue that state and local governments ought not to be involved in the
regulatory field in question. The whole point of commandeering,
after all, is to use state and local officials to regulate in some federal
field, presumably because such officials are well-suited for such du
ties. By commandeering state or local regulatory processes, Con
gress effectively admits that the institutions that it exploits ought to
be maintained and developed. The perversity of commandeering is
that, by unconditionally demanding services from nonfederal gov
ernments, Congress undermines the very institutions that it seeks to
exploit, by denying them the federal grant revenue that would
otherwise be necessary to induce them to act.283

283. This difference between preemption and commandeering legislation can be ex
plained by an analogy to regulation of private persons. As Jed Rubenfeld notes, the U.S.
Supreme Court generally allows the government to regulate private property to prevent spe
cific uses of the property, even when the regulations impose large costs on private owners. It
is only when the government regulates private property in order to exploit the value of such
property - in Rubenfeld's phrase, to "use" the property - that the Court finds a violation
of the Filth Amendment and a duty to pay compensation. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077 {1993). The distinction between preemption and commandeering follows
similar logic: when the government commandeers state governments for the purpose of ex
ploiting the value of their services, then it makes sense for the government to compensate the
state government so as not to deter persons from investing in the desired activity.
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Distributionally Unjust Confiscation
of Property

So far, this article has raised questions about the efficiency of
commandeering. But, quite apart from efficiency-based objections,
one might worry about the distributional equity of federal laws that
unconditionally demand state and local services. The inequity of
such systems can be illustrated by the hypothetical statute requiring
private landfill operators to provide storage space for low-level ra
dioactive waste. One might object to the statute because it places
the burden of storing low-level radioactive waste on private landfill
operators without any ethically persuasive basis for the imposition.
Landfill operators do not generate the waste being foisted upon
them and therefore do not receive special benefits from the waste
storage program. Landfill operators are distinguished only by their
ability to deliver the service that the government desires. It is hard
to see why this ability suggests a greater moral obligation to bear
the costs of waste storage when such storage benefits society
generally.284
One might generalize from this example and state that the gov
ernment ought not to force private persons to bear the costs of de
livering a service to the public merely because those persons
happen to be most capable of delivering the service. The ability to
provide the service might be distributed unevenly throughout the
population, and there is no reason to believe that the distribution of
this ability bears any relation to a morally plausible distribution of
the costs of government. Such considerations of distributive justice
might explain why the government generally does not obtain spe
cialized services by conscripting them from private persons possess
ing such skills. When the national government wishes to secure the
services of lawyers or tax collectors, it acquires their services
through voluntary contract.
Similar reasoning might suggest that it is distributively inequita
ble for the national government to force state and local govern
ments to bear the cost of implementing federal law. Nonfederal
governments might be well-suited to delivering a service, but it
hardly follows that they should bear the cost of providing it. So, for
284. This point is frequently made concerning military conscription. See, e.g., Comments
of George Hildebrand, AM. EcoN. Assoc: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, May 1967, at 63, 65
("Why should servicemen be required to pay this special tax for the benefit of the rest of the
taxpayers?"). Of course, conscription of private persons - for example, military service and
jury duty - is generally randomly distributed across the entire population by lottery. One
cannot so distribute the burden of other sorts of in-kind contributions that require specialized
skills.
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example, even if county sheriff departments are capable of provid
ing background checks on gun purchasers, none of the standard
theories of public :finance would suggest that allocating the costs of
such background checks to sheriff departments is equitable. If one
wished to distribute the costs of background checks to the persons
that create the need for such checks, then presumably one would
:finance the service by an excise tax on firearms manufacture or
sale.285 Likewise, if one wished to allocate the costs based on abil
ity to pay, then one would use a steeply progressive income tax.
But neither a "benefits received" theory nor an "ability to pay" the
ory suggests that county governments ought to be saddled with the
cost.
One might respond to this argument against commandeering by
complaining that it anthropomorphizes state and local government.
According to this argument, state and local governments are differ
ent from, say, private landfill operators because, unlike private per
sons, nonfederal governments have the power to spread the costs of
federal mandates across the general public through imposition of
state and local taxation. The burden on the nonfederal government
does not translate into any disparate burden on private persons.
Therefore, when the national government commandeers state and
local governments, there is no danger that any real person will be
singled out to bear costs more properly borne by the public at large.
This response, however, exaggerates the difference between pri
vate firms and governmental organizations. It is certainly correct
that state and local governments have the legal power to spread the
costs of mandates among the public through broad-based state and
local taxes. But private firms frequently also have the legal power
to spread the costs of confiscatory regulations among their custom
ers through increasing the prices of the goods or services that the
firms sell. So, for example, in response to a demand that they pro
vide landfill space to generators of radioactive waste, landfill opera
tors can raise the price of the space for nonradioactive waste.
One might object that the capacity of private firms to pass along
the added cost of mandates is limited practically by the consumers'
elasticity of demand for the product that the firm sells; if demand
responds elastically to price increases, then the firm will not be able

285. The House Judiciary Committee's Report on the Brady Act unsurprisingly identified
a major source of firearms used in crimes. See H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at
9 {1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984, 1986.
gun retail stores as
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to increase its prices to cover the burden.286 This is certainly true,
but it does not distinguish private firms from governmental organi
zations, because governments also are constrained by limits on the
taxpayers' demands for the governments' services. No government
can raise taxes at will to cover costs resulting from federal man
dates. Many state and local governments are constrained from rais
ing additional taxes by charter and state constitutional provisions
that require the taxes to be approved by a referendum.287 Even
governments that lack such plebiscitary devices are constrained
practically in their ability to increase state and local taxes by voters'
resistance to higher tax bills.288 Thus, like private firms facing elas
tic consumer demand, nonfederal governments facing elastic tax
payer demand for public goods might find that they cannot
distribute the costs of federal mandates broadly among taxpayers in
the form of a broadly based increase in taxes.289
Instead, the federal mandate might force the nonfederal govern
ment to cut nonmandated services. Such cuts could, in theory, be
broadly distributed across every state or local interest group and
constituency, but, assuming that state legislators respond to normal
electoral incentives, one would expect that legislators would target
those programs favored by the least influential interest groups in
the "benefits coalition" that control a particular level of govem
ment.290 For example, it would be foolhardy for a legislator to fund
a federal mandate by imposing equal cuts on popular programs like
highways and less popular programs such as low-income housing.
Instead, the rational legislator would target the programs with less
powerful constituencies to bear the brunt of the cuts.
Thus, small and less influential interest groups may bear the real
cost of the federal demands for state or local regulatory services,
286. On businesses' ability to respond to product taxes by increasing prices, see
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 276, at 251-53.
287. See Yuri Rozenfeld, Developments in State Constitutional Law, 1993: Legal Limits
on Taxing, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 1265 (1994).
288. State legislators are notoriously fearful of raising their constituents' taxes. See
WAYNB L. FRANCIS, LEGISLATIVE lssUES IN THE FIFTY STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
11 (1967).
289. There is mixed indirect empirical evidence that elected officials will reduce services
rather than raise taxes in the face of increased costs. One study indicates that, when con
fronted with reductions in federal aid, counties in Pennsylvania reduce expenditures rather
than replace the lost aid with local taxes. See William F. Stine, Is Local Government Revenue

Response to Federal Aid Symmetrical? Evidence from Pennsylvania County Governments in
an Era of Retrenchment, 47 NATL. TAX J. 799, 810-12 (1994).
290. A "benefits coalition" is a coalition of interest groups that control a particular level
of government and seek to use such control to extract benefits from the government. See
.ANToN, supra note 2, at 80-99.
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because, if taxpayers resist higher state or local taxes, then
nonfederal governments might finance compliance with the federal
mandate by cutting the budgets of programs favored by the weakest
interest groups. But it would be hard to argue that such targeted
state or local budget cuts are a sensible or equitable way to finance
federal services. There is no reason to suspect that the members of
such groups receive more benefits from, or have a greater ability to
pay for, the federal programs that they subsidize with the loss of
their favored state or local programs. Rather, they are forced to
pay simply because the weaker interest groups' programs are the
most convenient source of revenue.
To be sure, precisely the same distributive consequence would
arise from any federal budget cut that selectively eliminated fund
ing for a program favored by a politically weak interest group.
Thus, one might regard "commandeering" of nonfederal officials'
services as no more alarming than, say, budget cuts eliminating sub
sidies for low-income housing. Apparently arbitrary fiscal decisions
are the inevitable result of democratic dealmaking in Congress.
The distinction between arbitrary budget cuts and conscription
of public or private services, however, is that neither nonfederal of
ficials nor private persons have any prima facie claim to federal
money, whereas both have a prima facie claim to their own services.
Such a distinction requires a defense of a particular, controversial
baseline of entitlement, an issue that I defer until section N.A.2
below.
For now I wish to establish only that conscription of public and
private services creates the same risk of distributional arbitrariness.
One might believe that this risk is small, because arbitrary confisca
tion is indistinguishable from arbitrary budgeting, and arbitrary
budgets are constitutional. The important point is simply that, to
the extent that one regards confiscation of private services as dis
tributionally arbitrary, one should have precisely the same reaction
to confiscation of nonfederal officials' governmental services: the
two stand or fall together.
In short, at least where the supply of private and public goods is
not perfectly inelastic, federal demands for either nonfederal gov
ernments' or private services can impose concentrated costs on spe
cific interest groups that are indefensible under either an "ability
to-pay" or "benefits received" principle of distributive justice. Such
demands for in-kind contributions are defensible only on the theory
that those who are practically capable of providing some service
ought to bear the cost of providing it to the rest of the nation. To
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the extent that such a theory seems morally arbitrary, the comman
deering of regulatory services from state and local governments will
seem just as morally arbitrary as confiscation of goods from private
persons.
Indeed, one can view Printz and New

York as extending protec

tions to nonfederal government that are already enjoyed by private
persons under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. As the
Court has repeatedly noted, the Fifth Amendment's Just Compen
sation Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole."291 But, as ex
plained above, any demand for specialized in-kind contributions
based solely on the contributor's ability to render the service will
tend to impose precisely such an inequitable burden: a demand
that a private landowner take title to other persons' radioactive
waste and store it on their land would certainly seem to be a regula
tory taking.
To be sure, the Court has upheld many governmental demands
that private persons perform various affirmative duties. But these
duties tend to be distinguishable from the obligations that

York and Printz prohibit.

New

First, the Court has upheld "certain civic

duties" owed by every adult citizen to the state - for example, the
duty to testify as a witness,292 jury duty,293 military conscription,294
and so on. But, because such obligations are widely and randomly
distributed across the entire population, they do not pose the same
problem of distributive injustice as duties imposed on particular
persons or organizations, and such universal obligations would
probably be exempt from

New York

and

Printz

as generally appli

cable laws if imposed on nonfederal officials.
Second, the Court frequently has upheld legal obligations to
perform various services as a condition of pursuing particular occu
pations. So, for example, several courts have upheld the obligation
of lawyers to represent the indigent on the theory that lawyers are
officers of the court who owe such duties as a price of exercising a
291. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
292.

See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11

(1973).

293. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916) (describing "services in the army,
militia, in the jury" as outside the scope of involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth
Amendment).
294.

See Selective Draft Law

Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
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public responsibility.295 But, as explained in more detail in section

IV.A, New York

would permit such conditional duties under the

exception allowing conditional preemption, at least if the condition
bore some nexus to the special benefits enjoyed by the occupations'
members. It is also worth noting that courts will strike down even
such conditional obligations as unconstitutionally confiscatory if the
obligation seems unrelated to the conscripted persons' profession296
or commercial pursuit.297
In sum, government almost never unconditionally demands in
kind contributions from particular persons or organizations simply
because they happen to have skills or property that would be useful
to the government: any such demands would likely offend both dis
tributive justice and constitutional doctrine.298 One can regard New

York and Printz as merely extending such norms to nonfederal gov
ernments, providing them not with special state rights but merely
parity with private rights.
C.

Commandeering as Forced Speech

There is a third objection to commandeering legislation. Unlike
preemption of state and local law, federal demands for nonfederal
regulatory services force state and local politicians to advance fed
eral policies with which they might disagree. The conventional ob295. See, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986);
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671,
672 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965).
296. An increasingly large number of state courts have stated that state legislatures can
not force lawyers to represent the indigent without payment of just compensation. See
DeLisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark.
1991); White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989); Makemson v.
Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1986); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747
P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Jewell v. Maynard, 383
S.E.2d 536, 547 (W. Va. 1989). See generally Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel:
The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1990)
(surveying cases).
297. So, for example, some state courts have been suspicious of rent control because it
resembles a demand on landlords to provide the in-kind benefit of housing. See Seawall
Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that an ordinance
establishing a moratorium, requiring 'rehabilitation of certain residential properties, and re
quiring rental at controlled rates is a facial physical taking). The U.S. Supreme Court has
rejected the theory that rent control combined with restrictions against the eviction of ten
ants is a physical occupation taking under Loretto. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519 (1992). But even courts that do not reject rent control across the board recognize its
potential to unjustly concentrate costs on landlords under particular circumstances. See, e.g.,
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (striking down a 12% cap on rent
increases as denying a landowner a just and reasonable rate of return).
298. For an argument that nonmilitary conscription of civilians' services constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property, see Philip Bobbitt, National Service: Unwise or Uncon
stitutional?, in REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFr 323-24 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982).
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jection to such forced association with federal policy is that it might
undermine political accountability by confusing voters about the
true positions of state and local politicians. Political accountability,
however, is only part of the story. Even if no voters are actually
misled about ultimate responsibility for federally mandated regula
tions, one might believe that it is objectionable for the federal gov
ernment to force state and local politicians to promulgate federal
polices at odds with their own ideological views.

It is well-established that the First Amendment bars the govern
ment from requiring private organizations to affirm specific political
causes through speech or action. Since West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,299 the U.S. Supreme Court has construed the
First Amendment to bar government from demanding any "invol
untary af:firmation"300 of "what shall be orthodox in politics, nation
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion."301 Barnette barred the
West Virginia Board of Education from forcing children to pledge
allegiance to the American flag, but later cases extended Barnette
to other contexts in which the government did not so directly de
mand specific endorsements from individuals.
So, for example, the Court has held that governments are barred
from requiring drivers to carry specific messages on their automo
bile's license plates.302 Likewise, the First Amendment constrains
the government's ability to force private individuals to pay dues to
unions, bar associations, or other private organizations for the pur
pose of subsidizing the organizations' lobbying activities and other
political messages with which the contributor disagrees.303 Along
similar lines, the First Amendment limits the power of government
to force a private organization to subsidize the messages of other
groups through in-kind contributions such as place in a parade3°4 or
rebuttal space in a newspaper.3os
How might these limits on private compelled speech be relevant
for evaluating the national government's power to demand regula
tory services from state or local governments? Quite simply, by de299. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
300. 319 U.S. at 633.
301. 319 U.S. at 642.
302. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
303. See Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry.,
Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
{1977).
304. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573-74
{1995).
305. See Miami Herald Publg. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974).
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manding that nonfederal governments enact or enforce laws, the
national government demands that state and local officials speak on
behalf of the federal government by issuing commands to third par
ties. State or local legislation is, of course, speech; when a legisla
tive body enacts a law, its members endorse a command addressed
to the persons covered by the rule. Likewise, in any enforcement
action, executive officials issue commands to regulated persons de
manding that they do or cease to do something which the law com
mands or forbids. In either case, the government speaks to the
citizenry. The national government's demand that nonfederal gov
ernments issue such commands, therefore, implicates worries about
compelled speech suggested in

Wooley, Barnette, Abood,

and other

First Amendment cases.
Of course, the law pervasively and quite properly requires pri
vate and public entities to speak. Persons are obliged to serve as
witnesses when they are subpoenaed, manufacturers must fre
quently place warnings on their products, and employers must often
notify employees about their statutory rights on company bulletin
boards. But commands are an especially troubling sort of speech to
demand from others, because, unlike disclosure of facts, commands
inevitably are hortatory; they necessarily serve the purpose of re
quiring the compelled speaker to lend his or her authority to the
proposition that the command ought to be obeyed.306 This is not to
say that factual statements, warnings, and so on, lack normative im
plications.307 But demands that speakers utter commands or exhor
tations are unique in that one cannot intelligibly require the
utterance of an exhortation ·or command without intending that the
compelled speaker lend his or her authority to the utterance.
Such compelled endorsement of normative beliefs strikes at the
heart of

Barnette's

and

Wooley's

rule against involuntary affirm

ance. This is intuitively easy to see with laws demanding exhorta
tions from

private

organizations.

For example, a federal law

requiring the National Rifle Association to pass a resolution con
demning gun ownership or endorsing gun control would seem to be
a classic example of an involuntary affirmance of an ideological po
sition forbidden by the jurisprudence condemning forced speech.
But

a fortiori

a federal law demanding that county sheriffs issue

306. For a subtle analysis of co=ands, or "exercitives," and their connotation of "advo·
cacy that [something] should be so," see J.L. AuSTIN, How To Do THINGS Wllli WORDS 15556 {2d ed. 1975).
307. The statement "smoking causes lung disease," for example, obviously carries the
connotation that one should not smoke.
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commands barring felons from purchasing guns by performing
background checks on gun purchasers effectively requires precisely
the same exhortation from county officials; the county sheriff's
commands differ from the hypothetical NRA resolution only in that
the sheriff must back his or her words urging compliance with fed
eral policies with actions.
Examining the purposes underlying the Barnette rule confirms
this intuition that the federal government ought to be prohibited
from demanding regulatory speech from nonfederal governments.
For example, the rule against forced speech is often justified as an
effort to prevent listeners from misattributing mandated speech to
the sincere opinion of the coerced speaker.3os Under such a "misat
tribution theory," the purpose of the Barnette line of cases might be
to prevent the government from effectively censoring private
speakers' messages by compelling them to utter governmental opin
ions that would be mistaken for the speakers' own views.309 But
Justice O'Connor's "political accountability" argument justifies

New York

in precisely the same terms as a way to prevent voters

from misattributing compelled utterances as the sincerely held be
liefs of the nonfederal politician.
Justice O'Connor's invocation of "political accountability,"
however, overlooks some other reasons to be wary of forced speech
that are at least as powerful as the risk of misattribution. After all,
if the only purpose of the doctrine against compelled speech were
to prevent misattribution of government-mandated beliefs to pri
vate persons, then the purpose could be accomplished simply by
accompanying every government-mandated message with a dis
claimer explaining that the message was required by law and did
not necessarily reflect the views of the speaker. Under such a the
ory, the government could require PruneYard Shopping Center to
festoon its walls with the government's preferred messages praising
308. So, for example, the Court stated in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 87 (1980), that the owner of a shopping center could be forced by the State of California
to provide pamphleteers with access to his customers and property because "[the shopping
center is] . . . a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they
please" so that "[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or
seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner."
Likewise, in Turner Broadcasting v. F. C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994), the Court suggested that
the Federal Communications Commission could require cable television companies to pro
vide broadcasters with access to the cable system because "there appears little risk that cable
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or
messages endorsed by the cable operator."

309. For such a characterization of the Court's doctrine concerning compelled speech, see
Abner Greene, The Pledge ofAllegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451 (1995). I dis
cuss Greene's views infra note 311.
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managed health care or condemning smoking so long as the owner
could easily post signs "disclaim[ing] any sponsorship of the
message,"310 because then no member of the public would misat
tribute the beliefs to the owner.311 Likewise, Congress could re
quire county sheriffs to issue orders forbidding the sale of firearms
on the theory that the sheriffs had adequate incentive and ability to
inform voters about the true source of the command. The risk of
misattribution seems, in either case, to be highly speculative.
There are other, equally powerful reasons for the

Barnette

doc

trine that do not rest on risk of misattribution,312 and there are like
wise dangers to communication posed by "commandeering" besides
loss of "political accountability." Consider, for example, the danger
of governmental speech becoming overly pervasive. If government
could force private persons to use their property, writings, and
voice to carry government-mandated affirmations or assertions,
then the government essentially would have the power to conscript
all private property and persons into a vast information agency
working to promulgate governmental views. It is a familiar point
that governmental speech can be threatening to private expressive
liberties.313

But, whatever the dangers posed by governmental

speech, they surely are exacerbated greatly if government could
commandeer all private resources - voices, cars, walls, books,
newspapers, front lawns, airwaves, and so on - in order to pro
mote governmental officials' views. Unlike governmental speech
that is funded entirely from general revenues, governmental con
scription of private property to carry governmental messages lacks
the limit imposed by constrained fiscal resources. To the extent
310. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
311. Greene suggests that such a disclaimer itself would unconstitutionally force a private
person to reveal his or her beliefs to the public. See Greene, supra note 309, at 474-75. But
this is not true, because one does not reveal any of one's beliefs by simply stating that one's
statement is compelled by law and does not necessarily reflect one's opinions. Such a dis
claimer does not suggest that one does not, in fact, share the beliefs that the government
requires one to announce. It simply provides a correct description of the law.
312. The Court has never upheld a law compelling speech simply because the law
presented no danger of misattribution. While the Court mentioned that the risk of misat
tribution was low when it upheld the state and federal laws in PruneYard and Turner Broad
casting, the decisions' holdings seem to rest just as much on the fact that, in both cases, the
government had never required the private owners to promote any specific viewpoint. In
both cases, the right of access did not depend on the content of the message being promul
gated. In PruneYard, the Court upheld the limit on PruneYard Shopping Center's rights by
noting that, by granting access to all petitioners and pamphleteers, "no specific message is
dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There consequently is no dan
ger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular message." PruneYard, 447 U.S.
at 87. Likewise, the Court emphasized the content-neutrality of the "must carry" provisions
in Turner Broadcasting. See 512 U.S. at 655.
313. See generally MARK YuooF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
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that one worries that government-favored views will enjoy an over
weening advantage in the marketplace of ideas, one might object to
giving government freedom from such fiscal constraint by allowing
government to conscript in-kind communication services.314 We
would not want government to mandate portraits of Our Leader on
every private house even if it were well-known that such portraits
were present by order of the state, not the wish of the owner.
The same concern about the pervasiveness of Congress's speech
would suggest

New York's

anticommandeering rule. The parallel

between private and governmental entities here is well-stated by
Mark Yudof: Just as the fragmentation of the national economy
into "private economic entities . . . operat[es] as a constraint on
government communications,"315 so, too, "[f]ragmentation [of gov
ernment] is inconsistent with the sort of single voice that appears to
make government communications most effective."316 By demand
ing that nonfederal officials legislate on behalf of the federal gov
ernment, Congress essentially requires them to lend their authority
to the federal policy. It is difficult to see how they could do so
without compromising their ability to lead a rhetorically effective
opposition to such policies.

Barnette

and

New York

The anticommandeering rules of

both deprive the national government of

the communicative capability of state and local governments - a
limit that might be a healthy way to preserve political pluralism.
Aside from worries about overextension of governmental
speech, governmental demands impose an especially demoralizing
psychic cost on persons who are forced to promulgate views incon
sistent with their own purposes. Quite apart from the possibility
that such compelled speech might garble private persons' intended
messages, it is simply insulting to have one's property and person
used against oneself.317 One might call this injury a burden on
one's "integrity" - one's ability to have one's words and actions
match one's beliefs. Some commentators have suggested that cor
porate entities lack this interest in integrity because corporations
cannot feel demoralized or insulted.318 But this view ignores the
314. For an account of how fiscal limitations genuinely can confine governmental speech,
see id. at 57 (noting financial constraints that limit governmental agencies' ability to run
advertisements).
315. Id. at 114.
316. Id. at 115.
317. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-5 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing infringement, in the right-not-to-speak setting, of the individual's interest in
selfhood).
318. See Greene, supra note 309, at 482.
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interest of an organization's members in maintaining the integrity
of a corporation as a way of facilitating the integrity of their own
speech.319 The government, for example, surely would undermine
the integrity of at least some members of the National Rifle Associ
ation by requiring the NRA to issue proclamations endorsing gun
control because membership in the NRA is one important way in
which individuals express their views about firearms. To the extent
that an association provides a means by which its members' views
and voices can be heard, federal policies that distort the organiza
tion's voice pro

tanto

distort the members' voice.

One might object to this analogy between forcing private per
sons to speak and governmental officials to issue commands by not
ing that governments force their employees and agents to speak all
the time: police officers are required to issue commands to sus
pects, district attorneys are required to issue exhortations to juries,
and county commissioners are forced to enact taxes for state pro
grams. For that matter, federal agencies must surely carry out the

will of Congress. If the state can force its agents and employees to
speak as part of their governmental duties, then why cannot the
federal government also force such officials to speak on behalf of
the federal government?
The short and simple answer is that state and local officials have
agreed to speak on behalf of their employer, the state governments;
they have not agreed to speak on behalf of the federal government.
Public or private organizations can certainly require

their agents

to

speak as part of the agents' organizational duties: if the Tobacco
Institute hires a spokesperson, then the spokesperson surely must
say what the Institute tells him to say at a press conference and set
aside his personal scruples about smoking, or else lose his job.
Without such a power, an organization would cease to exist. It
hardly follows, however, that organizations can force persons who
have

not

voluntarily assented to act as the organization's agents to

speak on behalf of the organization. One does not waive one's
right to abstain from speech with respect to every organization just
because one has done so with respect to one organization.
First Amendment doctrine reflects a distinction between gov
ernment's power to control the speech of its own agents and gov
ernment's inability to control the speech of persons who are not its
employees. A government's restrictions on the speech of its own
319. For an account of different ways in which a corporate entity might assert the auton
omy interests of its members, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, Rimrrs, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZA
TIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 60-77 (1986).
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employees can be justified as a necessary concession to bureau
cratic efficiency.320 After all, the very idea of bemg an agent is that
you speak not for yourself, but for your principal.321 By contrast,
nonfederal governments are not agents of Congress.322 If Congress
wishes to induce state or local officials to speak on their behalf,
then Congress can do what it routinely does with private persons: it
can induce them through voluntary contracts to waive their First
Amendment rights.323
But a stubborn insistence on the public-private distinction might
still lead one to object to the analogy between private persons' First
Amendment rights and nonfederal officials' right not to issue or en
force federal commands. One might object that, unlike private or
ganizations, governmental organizations cannot possess an interest
in free expression. As Mark Yudof has noted, "[t]he First Amend
ment has been viewed historically as involving limitations on gov
ernment, not as a source of government rights."324 Several courts
have echoed this view, stating that the First Amendment does not
protect governmental speech.325
But this sharp distinction between private organizations' rights
and governmental immunities is more a product of a habitual obses
sion with drawing sharp distinctions between public and private
spheres rather than an accurate account of the law. As Akhil Amar
has explained insightfully, the First Amendment was not enacted
originally merely to protect individual rights; it was enacted to pro
tect the people's collective right of self-government through petition
320. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
321. Cf. ROBERT Posr, CoNSTITUTIONAL DoMAINs: DEMOCRACY, CoMMUNITY, MAN
AGEMENT ch. 6 (1995) (arguing that the autonomy of governmental agents is necessarily cur
tailed for such managerial purposes when they play an instrumental role in an organization
dedicated to accomplishing some specific goal).
322. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
323. The Court generally has affirmed conditions on government employment requiring
employees to waive specific speech rights when such waiver is related to the job that the
employees are hired to perform. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3
(1980) (holding that a CIA agent may be required to waive his First Amendment right to
publish an account of the agency's operations as a condition of employment).
324. YUDoF, supra note 313, at

44.

325. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The Frrst Amendment protects the press from governmen
tal interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government."); Muir v. Alabama
Educ. Television Commn., 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that it "may be
essentially correct" that governmental speech lacks Frrst Amendment protection); Anderson
v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass. 1978) (stating that a state law forbidding mu
nicipal expenditures to promote a referendum issue could not violate the Frrst Amendment
because "we suspect that the Frrst Amendment has nothing to do with this intra-state ques
tion of the rights of a political subdivision").
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and public speech.326 Doctrines of federalism, likewise, are not sim
ply a matter of "structure," without relationship to "rights" of free
expression. To the contrary, state immunities routinely are justified
by the Court in terms of their power to protect free expression of
nonfederal officials.
Consider, for example, the constitutional doctrine of legislative
immunity. The Court justifies this doctrine by invoking arguments
and rhetoric familiar from First Amendment jurisprudence. The
U.S. Supreme Court has long held that state and local legislators
cannot be held liable for their public statements or legislative ac
tions - their speech, debate, and voting records.327 This immunity
bars liability even for what might otherwise violate the U.S. Consti
tution itself when such injuries are the result of legislative
speech,328 and it limits the power of the federal courts to remedy
what are conceded to be violations of federal constitutional
rights.329 Although the Court has not cited the First Amendment as
a justification for such immunity, the Court's reasons for the immu
nity invoke precisely the same sorts of interests that the First
Amendment protects: the need to protect "the fullest liberty of
speech" in the legislature330 and thereby preserve "the rights of the
people to representation in the democratic process. "331
The Court's doctrine of legislative immunity suggests a view of
state and local elected policymaking bodies as "expressive organiza
tions" analogous to, say, the ACLU or the Sierra Club.332 Such or
ganizations are devoted to promulgating beliefs of the
organizations' constituents by coordinating and amplifying that
voice. Publius seems to share this view of nonfederal governments
when he argues that, by providing "signals of general alarm," state
legislative bodies would coordinate opposition to any attempt by
the federal government to launch a coup d'etat.333 In Publius's
326. See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L J 1131, 1152
(1991).
327. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446
U.S. 719 (1980); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl. Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
328. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373 (invoking immunity to bar a claim under the U.S. Consti
tution that a state legislators' investigation deprived a person of his federal due process
rights).
329. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
330. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373.
331. Lake Country Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 404-405.
332. The phrase is coined by Meir Dan-Cohen. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Col
lective Speech: A Theory ofProtected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and
the State, 19 CAL. L. REv. 1229 (1991).
333. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 50, at 298 (James Madison).
.

.
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view, state and local governments serve the purpose that commit
tees of correspondence served during the Revolutionary War. They
"open a correspondence" and generally overcome collective action
problems that might otherwise hinder opposition to federal policies
through such mechanisms as hortatory resolutions and coordination
of plans of resistance.334 In short, the Court and Publius recognize
what should be obvious: like the leaders of other expressive organi
zations, nonfederal politicians are paid to talk.
Such a role for state and local governments implies that such
governments ought to enjoy an entitlement to withhold their voice
and refuse to implement federal policies enacted by Congress. New
York and Printz provide a right to silence analogous to the Barnette
entitlement that private persons enjoy, a right to silence that is the
mirror image of the protection for speech and debate protected by
Tenney and its progeny. By allowing state and local legislators to
refuse to vote for federally favored programs, New York prevents
the federal government from compromising the legislator's inde
pendence from such policies. At least two courts have noted this
connection between the implied right of free speech enjoyed by
state and local policymakers under Tenney and the power to refuse
to follow the command of the federal government to vote for fed
eral programs.335 In short, the same considerations of autonomous
speech and silence that are used to support the speech rights of
nongovernmental organizations such as newspapers,336 political par
ties,337 or corporations338 can vindicate the New York entitlement.

334. See id.; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurispru
dence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 341, 360.
335. See Clarke v. United States, 886 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d
699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane); Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523 {1st Cir. 1989); see also
Steven Sherr, Note, Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment's Protection of Legisla
tive Voting, 101 YALE LJ. 233 (1991). Clarke, however, is a deeply flawed opinion, because it

fails to recognize that public officials, like private persons, can waive their Flrst Amendment
interests when they agree to act as the agents of a government. In Clarke, the D.C. Circuit
held that Congress could not require the City Council of the District of Columbia to rescind a
"gay rights" ordinance as a condition for receiving federal aid, because such a condition on
the legislative speech of the council members violated their Flrst Amendment rights. See
Clarke, 886 F.2d at 417. But D.C. City Council members, like members of the other federal
agencies, have agreed to act as federal agents. It is difficult to see why their acceptance of
federal office should not waive their right not to carry out Congress's policies.
336.
337.
338.

See Miami Herald Publg. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974).
See Democratic Party of United States v. WISconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
See Frrst Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 {1978).
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IV.

FOUR .APPLICATIONS OF THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY:

"GENERALLY .APPLICABLE LAWS," CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, MANDATES ON

EXECUTIVE

AND

JUDICIAL OFFICIALS, AND FUNDED MANDATES

This article, relying on general intuitions about the cost of inter
governmental transactions and the propriety of forcing persons to
make in-kind contributions to government, has argued so far that
the states ought to have an entitlement to refuse to implement na
tional law. Even if the general allocation of authority provided by

New York is sensible, however, four more specific questions remain
concerning New York's application. These are: (1) whether New
York should be applied to so-called "generally applicable laws"; (2)
the limits on conditional preemption that a doctrine of unconstitu
tional conditions ought to impose;

(3) the application of New York's
(4)

anticommandeering rule to executive and judicial officials; and

the possibility of allowing the federal government to impose funded
mandates on nonfederal governments - that is, the possibility of
protecting state and local governments from commandeering only
with a liability rule. Using the defense of New

York in Parts II and

m as a benchmark, Part IV answers these four questions, refining
and qualifying the case for New York and Printz.
A.

"Generally Applicable Laws, " Conditional Preemption, and
the Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions

One might object to the arguments presented so far by noting
that the government routinely and uncontroversially requires pri
vate businesses to comply with federal mandates. Consider some of
the requirements imposed on business enterprises by the modern
regulatory state that require economic enterprises to pay employees
a minimum wage, pay unemployment insurance premiums, install
safety devices on consumer products, install wheelchair ramps to
provide reasonable access for the handicapped, bargain in good
faith with collective bargaining units, install scrubbers in smoke
stacks, and otherwise provide dozens of in-kind contributions to
protect the health and safety of consumers and employees. What
distinguishes these sorts of duties that are routinely imposed on
businesses from the sort of obligations forbidden by
The majority in

New York

New York?

sidestepped any careful analysis of

such regulatory burdens by simply exempting them from the scope
of New York without any explanation. In a cryptic paragraph, the
Court distinguished the minimum wage law imposed on a local gov-
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ernment in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority339
from New York on the ground that the minimum wage law in
Garcia was "generally applicable" to both private and governmen
tal organizations. By contrast, in New York, Congress had not
"subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private par
ties."340 The Court did not hazard any opinion as to why this dis
tinction should matter, even in the face of Justice White's complaint
that the distinction was "an insupportable and illogical distinction,"
because "an incursion of state sovereignty hardly seems more con
stitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' spe
cific actions also applies to private action."341
Some commentators have attempted to make sense of the dis
tinction between "generally applicable laws" and laws applicable to
governments alone by arguing that the political process is more ca
pable of preventing the former.342 But, as this article noted in sec
tion I.A, such an argument is unpersuasive. Indeed, as explained
below in section IV.A.1, the entire concept of general applicability
should be mostly irrelevant to the scope of New York. "Generally
applicable laws" should be exempted from New York, not because
they apply to private persons as well as nonfederal officials, but
rather because such laws typically have the form of conditional pre
emption rather than unconditional command; they give both pri
vate and governmental organizations the option of reducing their
activity level - laying off workers, ceasing to emit air pollution,
and so on - rather than complying with the standard of care im
posed by the federal government.
As section IV.A.2 suggests, if such a power of conditional pre
emption were unlimited, New York would be rendered an empty
formality. If the Court constrains conditional preemption with a
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, however, allowing condi
tional preemption of nonfederal policymaking only when the condi
tion mitigates the costs of a preemptible nonfederal government's
activity, then all properly constrained conditional preemption - in
cluding generally applicable laws - ought to be exempt from the
anticommandeering rule of New York.

339. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
340. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
341. New York, 505 U.S. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting).
342. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 1384.

918

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 96:813

Generally Applicable Laws and the Functional Defense of
State Autonomy

1.

All governments frequently place conditions on private activi
ties, prohibiting anyone from engaging in those activities unless
such activities meet governmentally defined standards. So, for ex
ample, the federal government places a myriad of restrictions on
economic enterprises: federal labor and employment law bars en
terprises from hiring employees unless they meet federal standards
regarding wages, hours, unemployment insurance, and workplace
safety;343 likewise, federal environmental laws bar manufacturers
from burning fuel unless they meet federal air pollutant emission
standards,344 and federal consumer safety laws prohibit the sale of
goods that do not meet consumer safety standards.345
As a formal matter, one need not invoke the notion of "general
applicability" to explain why such regulatory duties can be ex
tended to nonfederal officials: quite apart from their application to
private persons, such laws are not formally covered by the

York

New

doctrine because such laws are instances of conditional pre

emption rather than unconditional demands for goods or services.
Such laws typically give both private and governmental organiza
tions the option of either reducing the levels of some costly activity
- for example, incinerating waste, dumping sewage into rivers, em
ploying workers, or selling goods - or conducting such activity ac
cording to federal standards of care. In other words, the federal
government "preempts" some activity unless the activity conforms
to federal standards. One theoretically could uphold the applica
tion of minimum wage laws to state and local governments on the
same theory that New

York expressly

permits other systems of con

ditional preemption such as the OSHA. Just as OSHA gives state
governments the option of either getting out of the business of reg
ulating workplace safety or regulating according to federal stan
dards,

so,

too,

the

Fair

Labor

Standards

Act

gives

state

governments the option of getting out of the business of employing
persons in covered occupations or employing them according to
federal standards.
Of course, the fact that such laws formally give regulated orga
nizations the "option" of reducing activity levels might seem trivial,
given that such an "option" might require the abolition of the or343. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
344. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994).
345. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994).
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ganization itself. There are, however, two reasons to believe that
such an option is less trivial than one might believe at first glance.
First, many such conditional duties can be described as efforts to
preempt undesirable activities by requiring private or governmental
entities to mitigate the costs of their own socially harmful activities.
So, for example, consumer product safety standards, environmental
laws, workers compensation, disability insurance, and a plethora of
other social welfare legislation are all analogous to tort duties of
care. Like Pigouvian taxes, they ensure that governmental and pri
vate enterprises internalize the costs of their own costly activities by
requiring them either to reduce activity levels, take precautions
against hazards, or offer insurance to cover the likely costs of such
hazards. The option provided by such laws to reduce activity levels
is not a trivial formality but rather a central mechanism by which
the purpose of such laws is realized.346
Thus, when federal environmental laws bar a municipal sewage
treatment plant from dumping sewage into a river unless the sew
age is treated according to federal standards, the federal govern
ment is not conscripting the municipality into providing clean
water, but rather barring ("preempting") it from injuring the public
through water pollution. Likewise, the federal government is not
conscripting states when it forces states to provide a state judicial
forum to hear complaints that their own officers violated a com
plainant's federal constitutional rights347 because the state can
avoid the duty to provide a forum simply by abstaining from the
preemptible conduct. In all such cases, federal laws serv:e the same
purpose as simple preemption - elimination of preemptible activi
ties - but do so by giving the nonfederal government an option to
reduce the activity levels ex ante - for example, by reducing sew
age output or civil rights violations - or remedying them ex post by treating the sewage or providing state courts to hear constitu
tional violations.
Moreover, to the extent that "generally applicable laws" serve
the purpose of mitigating the social costs of state and local govern
ments' own activities, it is not difficult to see why such laws are
consistent with the functional defense of New

York and Printz that

Parts II and III of this article presented. Recall the argument in
section III.A concerning efficiency. According to this · argument,
346. See WILUAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 66-71 (1987) {discussing how a reduction in activity levels is an option for reduc
ing tort liability under a strict liability regime).
347. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
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the federal government's unconditional demands for nonfederal
governments' regulatory services tend to be inefficient because such
demands for in-kind contributions tend to discourage investment in
the goods or services that the federal government demands.348 But
such an argument based on efficiency has less application to federal
laws that force state and local governments to internalize the costs
of their activities. Such laws certainly discourage nonfederal gov
ernments' activities, but, if the activities impose costs on society,
then they ought to be discouraged. Compare the mandate to an
excise tax on a harmful activity like smoking, gas consumption, or
gambling. To the extent that the taxed activity really imposes costs
on society, the disincentive to engage in the taxed activity is needed
to ensure an efficient level of the harmful activity.349
Likewise, as noted in section ID.B, it may be distributively un
just to force state and local governments to pay for some public
service if those nonfederal governments do not create any special
need for the service, derive no special benefit from the program, or
have no special ability to pay for the program. This objection, how
ever, is inapplicable to federal demands that nonfederal govern
ments mitigate the costs of their own actions. It is intuitively
obvious that such governments - like private organizations ought to pay for the costs that they impose on society.
Not all conditional prohibitions, though, can be described as ef
forts to force actors to internalize the costs of their activities. It
would be difficult, for example, to characterize minimum wage laws
as having such a purpose. Instead, such regulatory burdens are typ
ically justified as efforts to prevent employers or producers from
reaping "exploitative" profits by engaging in "unfair" commercial
practices. In effect, such statutes prohibit the regulated entities
from forming "unconscionable" contracts with their employees,
customers, etc.3so
348.

See supra section III.A.

349. For the conventional case in favor of excise taxes to discourage costly activities, see
JosEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 195 (5th ed. 1987).
350. Consider, for example, the Senate's justification for the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619, 2631-2636, 2651-2654 (1993):
A central reason that labor standards are necessary is to relieve the competitive pressure
placed on responsible employers by employers who act irresponsibly. Federal labor
standards take broad societal concerns out of the competitive process so that conscien
tious employers are not forced to compete with unscrupulous employers.

S. REP. No. 103-3, at 7 (1993); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (uphold
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act on the theory that the statute was a reasonable means of
preventing low-wage paying employers in states lacking employment regulations from de
pressing wages in other states through "unfair competition").
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Like Pigouvian taxes, such limits on "exploitative" contracts are
entirely consistent with the functional defense of the New York en
titlement presented in this article. The presumption of regulations
barring some contractual relationship - say, employment contracts
that pay the employee wages beneath the statutory minimum - is
that such agreements do not represent welfare-maximizing bargains
because of inadequate information or other impediment to fair bar
gaining. Such regulations also presume that the gains from such
"exploitative" trade represent ill-gotten gains from "unfair compe
tition." Depriving the parties of such gains, therefore, is not dis
tributionally unjust.
None of these arguments in favor of generally applicable laws
depend on the notion that such laws are applicable to private as
well as governmental organizations. It is true as a matter of fact
that most generally applicable laws - that is, environmental regu
lations, regulations of employees' working conditions, and so on can be defended as conditional preemption of what legislators re
gard as socially costly activity. But whether a law is "generally ap
plicable" is a distraction that confuses the real normative issue
raised by such laws - whether the federal regulation requires the
regulated entity to mitigate or insure against the costs of the entity's
own activity or disgorge profits from inefficient or unconscionable
contracts. If it does, then the functional argument suggests that
should interpose no barrier to such a federal

New York and Printz
demand.

2.
Invoking

Conditional Preemption and the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions
New York's

exception for conditional preemption to

uphold generally applicable laws, however, raises some difficult
questions that

New York

does not attempt to answer. If there are

no limits on Congress's power to use conditional preemption, then
New York is a meaningless formality, because the national govern
ment could always require that state and local governments either
make policy according to federal standards or disband themselves.

If such a broad use of conditional preemption seems fanciful,
consider the Court's decision in FERC v. Mississippi.351 In FERC,
Mississippi challenged Titles I and III of the Public Utility Regula
tory Policies Act ("PURPA"). These provisions required the Mis
sissippi Public Service Commission to "consider" the adoption and
351. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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implementation of specific rate designs and standards of regulation
for the purpose of encouraging the conservation of energy.352 In
upholding these provisions, the FERC Court characterized these
provisions as conditional preemption, asserting that "[t]here is
nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legis
lative program."353
"Congress

Rather, the Court reasoned that, because

could have pre-empted the field

[of utility rate

making]," Titles I and III of PURPA "simply condition continued
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of
federal proposals."354 The Court acknowledged that it would be
difficult for the states to abandon the field of utility regulation
given that "Congress . . . has failed to provide an alternative regula
tory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default. "355
The Court stated, however, that "in other contexts the Court has
recognized that valid federal enactments may have an effect on
state policy - and may, indeed, be designed to induce state action
in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress' regulatory au
thority."356 To support this statement, the Court cited

United States Civil Service Commission,357

Oklahoma v.

observing that Congress

has the power to attach conditions to federal funds that, if imposed
unconditionally, would be beyond Congress's power to regulate.358
The

FERC

Court's analogy between the power of conditional

preemption and conditional spending, however, uncritically abdi
cates any responsibility for defining a baseline of state entitlements
by which to define federal coercion of state governments. It cer
tainly may be true that Congress can attach any conditions to fed
eral funds without depriving state governments of autonomy.359 It
hardly follows that they can attach any conditions to denial of pre
emption. When Congress refuses to provide a grant-in-aid to state
governments, it denies them an asset that, absent federal efforts to
raise and appropriate revenue, would not be available to the state
governments.360 In other words, the federal government is denying
352. See 456 U.S. at 746-48.
353. 456 U.S. at 765.
354. 456 U.S. at 465-66.
355. 456 U.S. at 766.
356. 456 U.S. at 766.
357. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
358. FERG, 456 U.S. at 766.
359. The Court seems to have come close to such a position, over Justice O'Connor's
objections. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
360. This is not to deny that the federal taxation required to fund a grant-in-aid makes
state taxation more difficult by decreasing the tax base available to the state. But a reduction
of federal taxes by the amount of the federal grant program certainly would not increase
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the state governments a "benefit" that is largely the product of
Congress's legislative effort. By contrast, when the federal govern
ment preempts existing state laws, the federal government deprives
state governments of something that, absent federal action, state
governments would retain. In conventional terms, the federal gov
ernment is imposing a "cost" or "harm" by destroying something
that is largely the result of state legislative effort. Conflating the
two regulatory techniques is as illogical as arguing that, when a lo
cal government downzones a private parcel of land to reduce its
purchase price, it acts no more improperly than when it simply
purchases the lot with its revenues.361
To be sure, one need not accept uncritically such a distinction
based on conventional understandings of "harms" and "bene
fits."362 But, while no baseline can be described as natural, some
are less arbitrary than others.363 One plausibly can argue that Con
gress's spending power should not be constrained by a doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions because, as section II.A suggests, the
federal government has no monopoly over the power to generate
revenue.364 By contrast, Congress does have a monopoly over the
power to waive preemption of state or local policies; no other insti
tution can reinstate nonfederal policies that Congress has prestate governments' revenue by the same amount as the bestowal of a federal grant-in-aid.
The benefit of the federal grant to the state, therefore,
is the amount of the grant minus the revenue loss to the state resulting from the increase in
federal taxes necessary to fund the grant and consequent loss of tax base available for state
taxation.

See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 144-46.

361. The former technique is generally condemned as unconstitutional by state courts.

See, e.g., Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); City of
Miami v. Silver, 257 So. 2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. v. City of
Detroit, 40 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 1949).
362. The judicial decisions and academic literature dealing with regulatory takings have
repeatedly criticized the distinction. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit
conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsi
bility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVIL
L.J. 433 (1995). Lucas itself invokes the distinction, however, just before criticizing it. See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 ("[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with them a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm."). The conflation of harms and benefits certainly makes sense from an
economic perspective. But, as William FISchel, an economist, has observed, "[i]t is cleverness
of this sort by which economists read themselves out of the takings debate." WILLIAM F1s
CI-1EL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, EcoNoMics, AND PoLmcs 354 (1995).
363. The literature on the definition of baselines for defining unjustified coercion is rich
and large. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 3-103; CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTI
TUTION (1993); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1351-78 (1984); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HAR.v. L. REv. 1413, 1421 (1989).
364.

See supra notes

179-84.
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empted. Therefore, following one frequently defended theory of
unconstitutional conditions, one might wish to constrain Congress's
conditional preemption of nonfederal policies in order to prevent
abuse of monopolistic power.365
By conflating conditional preemption and conditional spending,
the

FERC

Court essentially abandoned any effort to define a doc

trine of unconstitutional conditions that might be invoked for the
defense of federalism. While this sort of formalism has been used
by both academic commentators and judicial opinions to deprive
state governments of meaningful constitutional protection, it is hard
to see why the notion of unconstitutional conditions should be re
pudiated when applied to federalism doctrines but accepted in
other contexts.366
How might one avoid such a result and yet preserve the tool of
conditional preemption for Congress's use? Following the Court's
theory of unconstitutional conditions suggested in Nollan v. Califor
nia Coastal Commission, 367 one might prohibit conditional preemp
tion of state or local policies whenever

(1)

the condition that the

nonfederal government must meet would, if imposed uncondition
ally, be unconstitutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption
of nonfederal policy merely to gain leverage to extract compliance
with the condition.

Nollan

provides an illustration of how such a

theory would operate in practice. The Court struck down the Cali365. For arguments that the theory of unconstitutional conditions is well·suited to con
strain the monopoly power of the government, see EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 52-58;
Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
One also might argue that the "normal" entitlement enjoyed by nonfederal organizations
in the United States ought to define nonfederal governments' baseline of entitlement.
Robert Ellickson has argued that, in the context of land-use regulation, the "normal behav
ior" within a community ought to define the landowners' baseline of entitlement against the
state. See Robert Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE LJ. 385, 419-21 (1977). Reasoning by analogy, one might argue that nonfederal
governments ought to enjoy a baseline of entitlement rooted in the normal behavior ex
pected of other organizations within the United States. That is, like private organizations,
nonfederal governments should not be required to make in-kind contributions of goods and
services to finance federal operations.
366. The Supreme Court, for example, rejected the notion that Congress's power to block
the movement of goods and services across state boundaries is constrained by a doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Professor David
Engdahl has applauded this decision, asserting that Congress should be free to pursue any
purpose whenever it uses a regulatory technique enumerated in Article I. See David
Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE LJ. 1, 17-21 (1994). Engdahl, however, presents no
sustained argument for why such a view of the Article I either makes any functional sense or
even is required by the text of Article I. For a criticism of Darby, see Donald Regan, How to
Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Re-Write United States v. Lopez,
94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 576-77, 589 (1995).
367. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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fornia Coastal Commission's conditional denial of a building permit
because, according to the Court, the denial of the Nollans' applica
tion for a building permit was nothing more than a way to pressure
the Nollans into donating a lateral easement across their private
beach to the public.368 The Court reasoned that an unconditional
demand for such an easement would certainly constitute a regula
tory taking.369 But, if the denial of the permit served no purpose
except as a device by which to punish the Nollans for refusing to
donate the easement, then the denial of the permit was just as un
constitutional as an unconditional demand for the easement.370
The analogy to conditional preemption is straightforward: if the
only purpose of preemption of state or local policy is simply to pres
sure state or local governments into enacting regulations according
to federal standards, then the preemption would be just as unconsti
tutional as an outright demand for the regulatory services. In such
a case, the threat of preemption would be no more than a sanction,
akin to a fine or prison sentence, with which to enforce an admit
tedly unconstitutional demand.

If one applies such Nollan analysis to New

York,

then the crucial

question becomes determining the purpose of a federal threat to
preempt state or local policy. Following

Nollan,

one might make

this determination by asking whether there is a "nexus" between
the threatened preemption and the condition that the nonfederal
government must meet to avert preemption. If the government
genuinely believes that the activity threatened with preemption im
poses a cost on society and if the government also believes that the
condition tends to mitigate that cost, then one might uphold the
conditional preemption as a more refined effort to achieve what the
government is entitled to achieve through outright preemption. On
the other hand, if there seems to be no similarity - no "nexus" between the purposes served by preemption and those served by
the nonfederal governments' compliance with the condition, then
one might suspect that the threat of preemption is nothing more
than a convenient sanction with which to exert leverage over state
and local governments and induce them to yield their

New York

entitlement.
Using this test of unconstitutional conditions, the system of con
ditional preemption upheld in FERC would seem to be at least sus368. 483 U.S. at 841.
369. 483 U.S. at 831.
370. 483 U.S. at 840-41.

926

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:813

picious. The FERC Court reasoned that, because the United States
could preempt all state regulations of public utilities, the United
States' demands that state public utility commissions consider vari
ous energy-saving proposals could be regarded simply as implicit
preemption of all state utility regulations that did not meet federal
standards.371 But this reasoning does not explain how the implicit
threat of preemption has any nexus to the goal of insuring that utili
ties implement federal energy-saving standards. After all, unless
unregulated utilities are somehow more inclined toward conserva
tion of energy than regulated utilities, the preemption of utility reg
ulation does nothing to advance, and might even impede, PURPA's
purpose. Like the California Coastal Commission's denial of a
building permit, the preemption of state utility regulation resembles
nothing more than an effort to exert pressure on state governments
to comply with federal regulatory standards. Knowing that it is po
litically infeasible for states simply to cease regulating utilities, Con
gress threatened to eliminate ratemaking as a way to induce
compliance with the federal regulatory scheme.
Most conventional systems of conditional preemption avoid the
suspect character of PURPA by calling for federal agencies to im
pose federal regulations if the nonfederal government decides to
withdraw from the regulatory field. The willingness of the federal
government to occupy the field with its own regulations suggests
that the national government really regards nonfederal law as im
posing costs that can be mitigated either by federal preemption or
by the nonfederal governments' regulation according to federal
standards. Overruling FERC, in short, would not entail judicial dis
ruption of many other established regulatory programs.
What about generally applicable laws - regulations of wages
and hours, employment discrimination, worker safety, emissions of
pollutants, and so on - that are frequently applied to state and
local governments? As suggested above, such federal standards
seem rationally defensible as efforts to mitigate the costs of private
or governmental activities by requiring the regulated organizations
either to reduce their own activity levels or to conduct the activity
according to federal standards. But these characteristics would also
allow such laws to survive the unconstitutional conditions analysis
suggested here.
Take, for example, the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to a local government in

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan

371. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-66 {1982).
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Transit Authority. 372

As observed above, such a law has the form of

conditional preemption. The statute gives state and local govern
ments the option either of ceasing to employ persons covered by
the statute or of setting wages and hours in conformity with federal
standards. The law arguably imposes no unconstitutional condition,
because both options provided by the statute serve the same pur
pose; they both prevent unscrupulous employers from forcing their
competitors to impose harsh working conditions on employees in
response to unfair competition. If the transit authority pays the
minimum wage, then there is no danger that transit authority wages
will drive down the wages of competitors. But, if the transit author
ity stopped paying substandard wages by simply ceasing its opera
tions altogether, then the danger of unfair competition would also
be averted, albeit at greater cost.
The same case can be made for virtually all common-law or reg
ulatory standards - such as OSHA, the Clean Water Act, or the
common law rule against negligence - imposed on nonfederal gov
ernments. So long as the federal government genuinely imposes
conditions on the activity to reduce or insure against costs arising
out of the activity, the conditions bear a sufficiently close nexus to
the complete prohibition of the activity. As section III.D.1 noted,
such conditional preemption also would be consistent with the
functional defense of New York. In this sense, the test for unconsti
tutional conditions that Nollan suggests in the context of govern
mental regulation of private actions also is suggested by the
functional argument in Part III of this article for federal regulation
of nonfederal governments' activities.
B.

The Functional Theory and Federal Laws That Commandeer
Nonfederal Judicial and Executive Officers
Aside from the exception for generally applicable laws, a second

important qualification to the New York entitlement has inspired
controversy in the Court and among commentators - the excep
tion allowing Congress to impose duties upon state courts and,
more controversially, state and local executive officials. Since the
Court

first

Dennison, 373

announced

the

doctrine

of

state

autonomy

in

it has been suggested that the doctrine ought not to

372. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
373. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
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apply to "ministerial duties" of executive officials,374 and, since the
Court's decision in Testa v. Katt, 375 the doctrine has provided that
Congress can force state courts to adjudicate federal cases, at least
when the federal issue is "similar" to state law issues that such state
courts resolve.
The

Printz

tions raised by

decision and numerous scholars canvass the ques

Testa

and analogous issues of executive duties to

implement federal law. This section shall explore a much more lim
ited issue: what does this article's functional argument suggest con
cerning the propriety of such exceptions?
1.

Testa v. Katt

In

Testa,

and the Federal Commandeering of State Court
Judges

the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state courts of

Rhode Island could not refuse to enforce the Emergency Price
Control Act, a federal wartime measure allowing buyers of goods to
sue sellers in state court for selling goods above the federally im
posed price ceiling.376 The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied
the traditional rule that state courts do not enforce the penal laws
of the United States or sister states. But the

Testa

Court rejected

the Rhode Island court's premise that the state courts have "no
more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United States
than [they have] to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign
country."377

Testa's

ambiguous character has long been recognized. The case

can be read either as suggesting that state courts have only a duty of
nondiscrimination against federal law or as implying a broader un
'
conditional obligation on the part of state courts to hear federal
claims and cases. In favor of the former "nondiscrimination" the
ory, one can cite the

Testa

Court's statement that the case presented

the question of whether Rhode Island courts could refuse to adjudi
cate federal questions "though their jurisdiction is adequate to en
force similar Rhode Island 'penal' statutes. "378
suggests that

This language

Testa amounts to nothing more than a specific applica

tion of the rule that states may not discriminate against federal in374. See 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 80 (relating the suggestion by counsel for Kentucky that the
rule against forcing state officials to assume federal duties does not apply to the "ministerial"
duty of extraditing a fugitive from justice).
375. 330 U.S. 386 (1946).
376. See 330 U.S. at 394.
377. 330 U.S. at 389.
378. 330 U.S. at 388.
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stitutions and laws379 - a norm first suggested in dicta from
and developed in both case law and federal statutes
expounding the doctrine of federal tax immunity.381 Indeed, this is

McCulloch380

how Justice O'Connor interprets

Mississippi when

she describes

Testa in her dissent in FERC v.
Testa as holding that "a State may

not exercise its judicial power in a manner that discriminates be
tween analogous federal and state causes of action."382 On the
other hand, commentators have noted that

Testa also seems to

give

Congress an unconditional right to demand that state courts hear
federal causes of action.383 Such a view is suggested by
proving quotation of language from

Testa's ap
Mondou v. New York stating

that the policies chosen by Congress were deemed to be the policy
·

of all states - " 'as much . . . as if the act had emanated from [the
states'] own legislature."'384
Other writers have thoroughly canvassed the doctrinal case for a
nondiscrimination rule.385 This article asks a narrower question:
Which view of

Testa -

the nondiscrimination view or the broader

duty-to-hear-all-federal-claims view - makes more functional
sense in light of the arguments already presented in Parts II and
ill? Part II suggested that a congressional power unconditionally
to conscript state courts is utterly unnecessary. Congress probably
can obtain the services of state courts simply by paying the costs of
such service to state legislatures. Moreover, the considerations of
distributive justice that section ill.B discussed suggest that Con
gress should pay for the services that it receives from state govern379. See McNett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233.34 (1934) ("A state may not
discriminate against rights arising under federal laws."); Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill,
Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Juris
dictional Rules and the Conflict ofLaws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 838 (1983) (stating that "[s]tates
may refuse to adjudicate federal claims when the jurisdictional restriction applies neutrally");
Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State
Court, 75 MicH. L. REv. 311, 350 (1976) (summarizing the nondiscrimination position).
380. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (suggesting the rule
requiring nondiscrimination when taxes fall on private persons holding beneficial interests in
federal property).
381. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1977) (describing
the basic doctrine forbidding state taxes that discriminate against federal interests).
382. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 776 n.1 (1981) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
383. Professor Sandalow notes that the Testa Court's reliance on Mondou v. New York,
223 U.S. 1 (1911), suggests that Testa imposes an unconditional duty on state courts to hear
federal claims. See Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 187, 205-06.
384. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1946) (quoting Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57). Professor
Caminker relies heavily on Testa's invocation of this language from Mondou to support the
argument that, because federal law is the supreme law of the land, it is also the supreme "in
state" law as far as the state government is concerned. See Caminker, supra note 31.
385. See Collins, supra note 99, at 42 n.6.
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ments just as it 1pays for the services that it receives from private
contractors. As Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of
Appeals recently has noted, state courts' dockets overflow with the
judicial business of the nation.386 Why should the federal govern
ment not pay for these costs in an intergovernmental transaction?
Is there any sensible reason why such costs should be borne by the
consumers of state-provided services - the frustrated state-court
litigants who suffer delay as a result of state courts' preoccupation
with federal claims?387
The traditional response to such objections invokes the so-called
"Madisonian Compromise" - the view that Congress implicitly has
the power to demand that state courts hear federal questions, be
cause Congress was given the option not to create lower federal
courts by Article III, section 1.388 Such a view implicitly assumes
that, if Congress lacked the power to conscript state courts to hear
federal claims, then some Article III business would go unheard
unless Congress could conscript the services of state courts.
Whatever the grounds for such a view in precedent or original un
derstanding,389 the view makes little functional sense because it as
sumes that, if Congress cannot conscript state courts' services, then
it cannot obtain such services at all. But this premise is as ground
less as the assumption that Congress must have the power to confis
cate private property in order to construct federal buildings.390 The
end of cooperative federalism simply does not justify the means of
conscription, for the latter is unnecessary for the former. As Part II
explained, a lively intergovernmental market exists through which
the federal government can purchase state court services.
The functional argument outlined in Parts II and III, therefore,
suggests that conscription of state courts is unnecessary and im
proper. But what about a duty of nondiscrimination that Testa also
386. See Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES (Late New York Edition),
Dec. 13, 1994, at A29.
387. Justice Story relied on precisely such a consideration of distributive justice when he
stated that the state legislature "may refuse to allow suits to be brought [in state courts]
'arising under the laws of the United States"' because such adjudication of federal cases
"may most materially interfere with the convenience of their own courts, and the rights of
their own citizens, and be attended with great expense to the state, as well as great delays in
the administration of justice." Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496,
499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9662) (Story, Circuit Justice).
388. See Collins, supra note 99, at 42-43 (summarizing the argument based on the Madis
onian Compromise).
389. See id.
390. See Amar, supra note 326, at 1168 (noting that inferences of congressional power to
conscript state courts from the congressional option to use them is just as illogical as inferring
power to conscript tax collectors from the power to collect taxes).
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suggested? Is such a duty also improper, or is it justifiable in func
tional terms?
The answer to this question is ambiguous, because the concept
of discrimination depends on ambiguous notions of the baseline en
titlement by which "equal" treatment is measured. As a general
matter, some sort of state governmental duty not to discriminate
against the federal government is perfectly consistent with the func
tional theory. As argued in Part II, the functional theory concedes
that the national government needs to preempt state law and carry
out federal tasks with purely federal institutions: the federal gov
ernment would likely be unable to purchase preemption of state
laws with its spending power. Such a power of preemption presup
poses, however, that the state governments cannot interfere with
the federal government by harassing or intimidating federal
officials.
"Discrimination" against the federal government might consti
tute precisely such a form of harassment. So, for example, if a mu
nicipal police force generally protected all other persons from
burglary within a city but refused to protect the U.S. Post Office
building from such crimes, it would be obvious that the discrimina
tory inaction formed a sort of harassment of a federal agency. Like
wise, if the state courts within a jurisdiction generally adjudicate
disputes arising under the laws of other jurisdictions but refuse to
hear federal claims, then such refusal to hear the federal claims can
be viewed as a sort of attack on the federal government.391
The functional theory, therefore, does not condemn the general
duty of state officials not to discriminate against federal interests,
and such a duty can be invoked to prevent state courts from dis
criminating against federal law. A familiar difficulty arises, how
ever, because nondiscrimination norms depend on a concept of
"equality," and the notion of equality notoriously depends on com
plex and often inarticulate definitions of a baseline by which equal
treatment is to be measured.392

The duty not to discriminate

against the federal government easily mutates into a duty to give
federal interests the same benefits and services that the state pro391. Certainly, such a refusal can impose costs on the federal government just as surely as
a refusal to provide police protection to federal officials. If claimants asserting both state and
federal claims arising out of the same transaction are barred from pressing both in state
court, then they will be forced either to forfeit their federal claim or instead file both claims
in federal court, taking advantage of the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction. In effect,
the state would be forcing the federal court to hear state business by depriving federal liti
gants of a state forum for related federal claims.
392.

See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990).
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vides to its own interests, simply because the Court will often take a
state's treatment of its own interests to be the relevant baseline by
which to measure whether federal interests are receiving equal
treatment.

Testa

provides a case in point. In

Testa,

the Court rejected the

notion that the Rhode Island courts afforded equal treatment to
federal law by treating federal law exactly as they treated the law of
other foreign states. Instead, the Court insisted that the proper
baseline was the state courts' treatment of its own state legislature's
analogous laws. As other scholars have noted, this moves

Testa

very close to being an unconditional duty to enforce federal law,
because the

concept of an

analogous law is

nebulous

and

expansive.393
The potential expansiveness of nondiscrimination norms is not
peculiar to the

Testa

doctrine or state court duties to hear federal

claims. The Court has also expanded the duties of state legislatures
in precisely the same way. So, for example, in

Department of the Treasury, 394

Davis v. Michigan

the Court held that Michigan must

exempt pensions paid by the federal government from state taxa
tion just as Michigan exempted pensions paid by the Michigan gov
ernment from such

taxation.

Michigan's

tax policy

actually

subjected federal pensioners to the same tax obligations as the vast
majority of pensioners in Michigan, because the state only ex
empted the pensions of its own employees from state taxation as a
sort of additional form of deferred compensation.395 But the Court
reasoned that the proper baseline of comparison was Michigan's tax
treatment of its own former employees, not Michigan's tax treat
ment of the majority of state residents, and so it ordered the state to
provide tax refunds to federal pensioners residing in Michigan.396
There are reasons to object to both the

Davis

and

Testa

base

lines for measuring discrimination. The notion that a state govern
ment cannot use state-funded institutions to advance its own
policies is a bit odd. It is difficult to see how Michigan is somehow
taxing federal interests because it does not provide the same sub
sidy to former federal officers that it provides to state officers. It is
not the state governments' job to provide compensation, deferred
393. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22
725, 750-66 (1981).
394. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
395. See 489 U.S. at 805.
396. See 489 U.S. at 815 n.4, 817-18; see also Robert Mueller, Rejection of the "Similarly
Situated Taxpayer" Rationale: Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 43 TAX LAW. 431
(1990) (noting that Davis departs from the traditional rule for defining discrimination).

WM. & MARY L. REv.
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or otherwise, to federal employees.

Likewise, the notion that

Rhode Island is somehow impeding the federal government be
cause it wishes to use its own courts for its own claims seems
strained. In either case, the Court defined the federal government's
baseline of entitlement in such a way that the state was forced to
give extraordinary fiscal and judicial preference to federal policies.
An antidiscrimination norm that is defined so expansively might be
viewed as contradicting the argument in Part III that the federal
government should pay for the services that it receives.

2.

The Commandeering of State Executive Officials

Nondiscrimination norms apply with less force to state and local
executive officials who typically do not enforce laws or policies
other than those of their own state or local policymakers. More
over, any mechanical rule giving Congress the power to demand
services from certain categories of state officials is likely to founder
on the fact that state and especially local law does not permit neat
distinctions between legislative, judicial, and executive offices.
Even state courts have some legislative functions.397 Likewise, the
same local agencies are sometimes considered to be acting quasi
judicially and sometimes considered to be acting legislatively.398 It
is a perennial question whether a local legislature's decision to
re-zone a single parcel is legislative,

quasi-judicial,

or both

simultaneously.399
Nevertheless, there might be good reasons for allowing the fed
eral government to demand some sorts of services from nonfederal
executive officials. The functional theory suggested in Parts II and
III suggests two circumstances that indicate when such conscription
might be proper.
First, if certain services only can be provided by specific state or
local officials and cannot be duplicated by federal officials, there
might be greater dangers of holdout problems absent a federal abil397. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
731-34 (1980) (holding that the state supreme court enjoys legislative immunity in rulemak
ing for the state bar).
398. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti
Federalism from the Attack on 'Monarchism' to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 96
(1989) (describing local governments' rejection of many federal constitutional principles, in
cluding separation of powers).
399. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Commrs., 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (holding
that small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial); Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d
565, 566-67 (Cal. 1980) (holding that small-scale rezoning is not quasi-judicial); Margolis v.
District Ct., 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981) (holding that small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial
for purposes of judicial review but legislative for purposes of eligibility for plebiscites).
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ity to demand such services. The best example is the state and local
provision of unique records or information to the federal govern
ment. Assuming that only one state or local government has access
to such information, the normal competitive framework for inter
governmental relations described in Part II is missing, and federal
demands for state or local assistance might be necessary to accom
plish legitimate federal purposes.
Second, the national government might have a greater entitle
ment to demand services that do not require state or local officials
to issue commands to third parties. As noted in section III.C, such
demands for local officials to enforce federal policies by command
ing third parties to obey such policies strongly resembles a demand
that such nonfederal officials endorse federal policy with their of
fice. Such forced speech might be objectionable for the same rea
sons that demands for private organizations' speech are widely
regarded as unconstitutional. But such worries about forced affir
mation of belief do not apply to federal demands that state officials
undertake other services that do not require them to issue com
mands. Again, a federal demand for state officials to turn over
unique records would not offend any rule against forced speech,
any more than the normal rule that witnesses can be forced to tes
tify would constitute either a regulatory takings or involuntary ser
vitude.400 Like analogous rules applicable to private persons - for
example, the rule that private witnesses can be forced to testify in
court - such demands enable the federal government to obtain
services that it can get no other way, at a relatively modest cost to
state or local autonomy.
C.

The Impracticality of Protecting Nonfederal Governments'
Autonomy with a Liability Rule

Even if one accepted all of this article's arguments made so far
in favor of the anticommandeering rule in

New York

and

Printz,

one still might have reservations about protecting nonfederal gov
ernments' power over their regulatory processes with a property
rule. One might agree that it is inefficient, distributionally unjust,
and an unwarranted invasion of expressive autonomy for the fed
eral government to force nonfederal governments to implement
federal policy. But one might also believe that, if the national gov
ernment is willing to pay the objective cost of a federal mandate to
400. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (upholding the power of the gov
ernment to force a witness to testify against a Thirteenth and Fifth Amendment regulatory
takings challenge).
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a state or local government, then the national government should
be entitled to receive the services of that nonfederal government.
In effect, such a doctrine would give the national government a
power of eminent domain over nonfederal governments' regulatory
processes.

,
Justice Souter seems to have endorsed precisely such a rule
when the national government commandeers the services of state
or local executive officers.401 In theory, such a rule would have sev
eral advantages. It presumably would mitigate any distributive in
equities caused by commandeering, and it would eliminate any
inefficient tendency of federal mandates to undermine incentives to
participate in state and local politics. Such a rule could even reduce
the danger of unjust invasions of expressive autonomy.402
Justice Souter's proposal seems especially attractive if one is not
completely convinced by this article's argument in section II.B.2
that intergovernmental transactions are free from transaction costs.
Such a skeptic about intergovernmental transactions might prefer a
rule that allows the national government to bypass voluntary mar
kets when transaction costs are high. Moreover, such a rule is sug
gested by the analogy to private organizations, which are only very
rarely protected from governmental condemnation of their prop
erty.403 Why give public organizations more protection for their
regulatory processes? Such deference to governmental decisions to
use eminent domain arguably makes sense, because, as Professor
Merrill notes, such decisions may be self-policing: the costs of liti
gating "just compensation" are so high that prudent politicians gen
erally use condemnation only when voluntary transactions are
impractical because markets are thin and there are significant risks
of private strategic behavior.404
Therefore, Justice Souter's "liability rule" proposal appears to
represent an ideal compromise position, one that protects state au
tonomy but also protects national supremacy. But Souter is wrong.
Justice Scalia is perfectly correct to note that such a rule would be
401. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2364, 2404 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I do
not read any of The Federalist material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could re
quire administrative support without an obligation to pay fair value for it . . . . If, therefore,
my views were prevailing in these cases, I would remand for development and consideration
of petitioners' points, that they have no budget provision for work required under the Act
and are liable for unauthorized expenditures.").
402. Professor Rubenfeld notes that the liability rule provided by the Fifth Amendment's
Just Compensation Clause has such a tendency to prevent the instrumentalization of persons.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 283, at 1139-47.
403.
404.

See Merrill, supra note 157, at 63.
See id. at 74-81.
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completely impractical in that it would "create a constitutional ju
risprudence [for determining when the compensation was ade
quate] that would make takings cases appear clear and simple. "4os
The difficulty with Justice Souter's proposal is that the cost of
implementing federal policy is

not simply the fiscal outlay necessary

to fund such implementation.

Such a measure would grossly

overcompensate some jurisdictions and undercompensate others.
Federal law can impose what appear to be costly demands on state
and local officials that, in fact, are costless, because the federal pol
icy might be no different than the preexisting state policy.406 By
contrast, one can imagine fiscally cheap demands - say, a demand
that sheriffs perform background checks on local inhabitants that would be extremely costly in practice because local residents
experience high nonfiscal costs as a result of the program.
Therefore, in order to determine the real, as opposed to nomi
nal, cost of a federal mandate, courts would have to calculate the
size and matching formula of a hypothetical grant that a state would
have to be offered to implement the particular program imposed on
them by the federal government. It defies credibility to believe that
judges are capable of managing such a counterfactual inquiry.407
405. Printz, 111 S. Ct. at 2374 n.7.
406. So, for example, detailed federal restrictions requiring localities to spend categorical
grant money on developmental purposes - say, downtown redevelopment - might impose
no costs on the locality, because the locality probably wants to spend money for precisely
such a purpose. See PETERSON, supra note 32, at 23-27.

407. Indeed, both federal and state efforts to make such hypothetical calculations in other
contexts have not been notable successes. In the state context, some state constitutions re
quire state legislatures to provide a "fiscal note" with mandates imposed on local govern
ments estimating the cost of the mandate. As Edward Zelinsky notes, these requirements
have imposed no serious restriction on state mandates, because no court can assess whether
fiscal notes are accurate. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 1366-67.
In the federal context, many federal grants have "nonsupplanting" or "maintenance-of
effort" conditions attached to them requiring state governments not to supplant state dollars
devoted to a federal purpose with federal grant money designed to supplement those dollars.
See Mark Greenberg, HHS Policy Guidance on Maintenance ofEffort, Assistance, and Penal
ties: Summary and Discussion, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING PoVERTY 315 (1997) (describing
maintenance-of-effort provisions). But federal administrative efforts to enforce such provi
sions often have been mechanistic and incomplete - in part due to the almost metaphysical
difficulty of the inquiry of calculating what state contributions would have been absent the
federal grant. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People
Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation ofAmerican Values, 4 VA. J.
Soc. POLY. & L. 3, 102 (1996) (arguing that maintenance-of-effort rules do not take into
account depreciation of state effort due to inflation); Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some
Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & PoLY. R.Ev. 1, 19 (1996) (arguing that
maintenance-of-effort rules may "lock[ ] the state into an outdated and undesirable pattern
of expenditure"). Such enforcement efforts also have been hotly controversial. See, e.g.,
Robert Pear, States Bristle at U.S. Welfare Spending Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRin., Dec. 29,
1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 12584353 (noting that a federal suggestion that state ex
penditures on legal immigrants might not satisfy the maintenance-of-effort requirement
under federal law has sparked a national controversy). Justice Souter's proposal essentially
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But even if courts could manage the empirical difficulties of Jus
tice Souter's proposal, there are conceptual problems with liability
rules in this context that are even more daunting. Consider, for
example, how courts should define the proper measure of compen
sation: Should this measure be based on the mandated jurisdic
tion's costs of implementing national programs or on the national
government's benefit from nonfederal implementation? These two
definitions might produce quite different results. For example, it
might cost the states very little to use their sheriffs and municipal
police chiefs to process applications for firearms, while it might cost
the national government an enormous amount to expand the ATF
or FBI to undertake such mundane administrative duties. In such a
case, there is a question about how to divide the gains from trade.
Conventional wisdom in eminent domain regards such gains as
"rents" to which the condemnee has no entitlement. The con
demnor ought to get all gains from trade, while the condemnee de
serves only its opportunity costs.408 But such a convention might be
based on the case of condemnations of real estate, where the con
demnee supplies the asset of land to some regulatory project con
ceived by the condemnor.

Following some sort of Georgist

intuition of distributive justice,409 one might argue that the con
demnee ought to receive nothing more than its opportunity costs
for passively contributing an asset like land that the condemnee did
nothing to create.410
Such an intuition fails when one is dealing with the "condemna
tion" of the state's regulatory machinery. Unlike land, the creation
of regulatory processes

take political

energy

and

creativity.

Whether a police force is honest or crooked, efficient or over
staffed, trusted by the public or despised as an occupying army, all
depends in part on the political courage and energy of civilian re
view boards, mayors, activists, city council persons, and so on. If
the federal government decides to use such a force to implement
federal law, why should the federal government get to retain all the
budget savings that such an efficient and trustworthy force creates?
would require that the Court constitutionalize an analogous controversial and policy-laden
inquiry.

408. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH.
U. L. REv. 721, 736-38 (1993) (describing the controversy in courts about whether to award
gains from trade to condemnee based on the principle of restitution).
409.
410.

See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Modem Lib. ed.

1938).

See Merrill, supra note 157, at 85-86. Richard Epstein makes a similar point when he
argues that the gains from trade ought to be allocated to those persons who initiate the
transactions that create the gains. See EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 95.
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Under any sort of Lockean intuition of distributive justice, the state
politicians and their constituents who contribute their political la
bors to forge such a force ought to get at least some of the gains
from intergovernmental trade.411
This is not to say that such a Lockean theory is necessarily com
pelling. It has become conventional wisdom to argue that such a
theory is indefensible.412 We have no uncontroversial way to divide
up gains from trade, and there is no reason to assume that the na
tional government should get all of them. Moreover, if the
nonfederal governments get only their opportunity costs and no
share of the rents derived from creating a valuable resource, then
the national government can be expected to overuse forced sales in
order to capture all of the gains from intergovernmental trade. Al
lowing Congress to force the states to accept funded mandates, in
short, might encourage Congress to engage in "secondary rent
seeking" in order to confiscate all gains from cooperative
federalism.413
In short, while there is no reason in principle why one could not
protect adequately the states' New York entitlement with a liability
rule, a property rule seems preferable for practical reasons. Be
cause the danger of holdouts is low, it is wisest to let Congress fend
for itself in the intergovernmental marketplace and keep the courts
from being drawn into a practically impossible inquiry into the costs
of cooperative federalism.

V.

BEYOND NATIONALISTIC DUAL FEDERALISM: PROTECTING
NONFEDERAL GOVERNMENTS' ROLE IN THE NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

This article has argued that the doctrine of state autonomy an
nounced in New York and Printz makes good functional sense. Yet
the Court's decisions expounding the doctrine of state autonomy
have not provided a functional basis for the doctrine. Instead, as
explained in section I.B, the Court has relied either on palpably
untrue statements that the federal and state governments operate in
separate, independent, and mutually exclusive spheres or on con
clusory assertions that commandeering legislation deprives states of
411. See Jo.HN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. 5 (Thomas Peardon ed.,
1952). For a modem restatement of Locke's labor theory of value, see LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, PROPERTY RJoHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 2-4 (1977).
412. For one such prolonged effort, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE R1mrr TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY ch. 6 (1988).
413. See Merrill, supra note 157, at 85-88 (describing "secondary rent-seeking").
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sovereignty. In short, we have a useful rule without a persuasive
reason in the judicial precedents.
Is there any persuasive way to show that the functional argu
ment that I proposed actually fits into the text and constitutional
traditions of the U.S. Constitution? This final section provides a
preliminary outline for how the functional arguments really are re
flected in constitutional tradition. But the tradition is not the bank
rupt theory of dual federalism as reflected in Dennison and Day.
Rather, it is the tradition of individual and organization rights re
flected in the jurisprudence of takings and free speech under the
First and Fifth Amendments. The crucial consideration is not to
ensure that federal and nonfederal governments operate in mutu
ally exclusive spheres. Rather, the doctrine presupposes plentiful
intergovernmental bargaining and instead seeks to ensure that such
transactions occur in the same spirit of fairness as bargains between
private organizations and the federal government, a spirit that pre
cludes resort to conscription or confiscation unless there is some
clear necessity for such extreme measures.
Consider, first, how the functional argument maps on to the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, section

8.

The general

power to demand regulatory services from state and local govern
ments nowhere is granted expressly to the national government.
Congress, therefore, has the power only if it is "necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" Congress's other enumerated
powers.414
Part II suggests why such a commandeering power is not neces
sary. Congress can obtain the services of nonfederal officials simply
by entering into an intergovernmental agreement with them. It has
no need to conscript them any more than it needs to conscript jani
tors or secretaries or FBI agents. This is not to say that nonfederal
governments will never tum down federal proposals to implement
federal programs. But, given the degree to which nonfederal gov
ernments compete with each other for federal funds, they rarely
will decline such revenue if it covers the real fiscal and nonfiscal
costs of assisting the federal government.

Hous
all state im

This view of necessity echoes Justice Story's argument in

ton v. Moore, 415

except that Justice Story implied that

plementation of federal law was unnecessary, because the federal
government can create its own tribunals. By contrast, the argument
414. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
415. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
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in Part II of this article suggests only that coercion of state govern
ments is unnecessary, because the assistance of state officials can be
obtained without direct orders. Put in the terms of Calabresi's and
Melamed's system of entitlements, Story would protect state auton
omy with an inalienability rule, whereas the functional theory here
would protect it with a property rule, allowing state governments to
sell the entitlement for federal revenue.
One might respond that such a constrained view of "necessity"
contradicts the broad discretion enjoyed by Congress under McCul

loch

to choose the means by which it attains legitimate purposes.

As suggested in section I.B, however,

McCulloch

provided Con

gress with such discretion in order for Congress to make itself

dependent

in

from state governments by fashioning its own federal

bureaucracy. The deep purpose of the opinion was to give Con
gress the power to fashion its own institutions so that it would not
have to rely on state officials. Nothing in

McCulloch

suggests that

Congress should also have the power to demand assistance from
state and local institutions that it did not create.
Ironically, it is the very nationalism of McCulloch that provides
the practical basis for a vigorous doctrine of state autonomy. The
tradition of nationalistic dual federalism has forced the United
States government to develop its own institutions - federal trial
courts, field offices, and administrators - rather than rely on state
officials. As a result, the United States is blessed with regulatory
redundancy - two sets of officials capable of performing identical
tasks. Such redundancy undercuts the capacity of state officials to
"hold out" when Congress seeks their services. In other words, the
tradition of dual federalism has fortuitously created the conditions
necessary for a purely voluntary system of intergovernmental rela
tions: precisely because the United States has slowly developed an
independent regulatory capacity, it is not necessary for the United
States to conscript nonfederal officials' services.
Part III suggests why the national government's demands for
nonfederal governments' services also is not proper. First, as sec
tion III.B suggests, such demands are analogous to the confiscation
of private property in that they force state and local governments to
bear the costs of federal programs that serve needs that nonfederal
governments do not create and that create benefits for which
nonfederal governments have no special ability to pay. Second, as
section III.C suggests, such programs force state and local officials
to act as the spokespersons of the national government, requiring
them to issue commands to third parties with which the officials
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might disagree. Both of these consequences suggest that federal
commandeering of federal governments is analogous to both regu
latory takings forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensa
tion Clause and a deprivation of the freedom of speech protected
by the First Amendment.
The impropriety of such demands suggests a second reason why
demand regu

McCulloch would not give Congress the discretion to

latory services from state and local governments. As Professors
Lawson and Granger argue, the original understanding of the Nec
essary and Proper Clause suggests that Congress would not have
broad discretion to judge the propriety of its own actions. Rather,
the definition of "proper" action set jurisdictional limits on Con
gress's power reflecting concerns about individual rights, separation
of powers, and federalism.416
As Lawson and Granger admit, their analysis provides little gui
dance about what sorts of burdens on state power would be im
proper burdens.417 The analysis provided in Part III, however,
provides the beginnings of an answer; one might model states'
rights on the rights of private organizations such as political parties,
nonprofit corporations, and business enterprises. One could argue
that federal burdens upon state and local governments are im
proper if they deprive state and local officials of rights extended to
private organizations by the Bill of Rights. By using the Bill of
Rights as a standard by which to measure the institutional rights of
state and local governments, one can provide content to the Neces
sary and Proper Clause that it otherwise lacks and that is consistent
with its original jurisdictional purpose.
This is not to say that one mechanically would extend to all
nonfederal governments all of the rights enjoyed by private persons
under the Bill of Rights. To the contrary, there are at least two
good reasons to provide fewer protections to nonfederal govern
ments than to private individuals or organizations. First, govern
ments are organizations with involuntary members; by giving
government officials constitutionally protected powers, one can
sometimes endanger the rights of their captive constituents. For ex
ample, one could not give government officials the right to use tax
dollars to advance those officials' or the majority of the constitu
ents' free exercise of religion without establishing religion in viola416. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267 (1993).
417. See id. at 331.
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tion of the constituents' First Amendment rights.418 Second, one
should not anthropomorphize any organization, whether private or
governmental; a constitutional right is not necessarily endangered
just because an organization lacks the same immunities enjoyed by
individual persons. For example, freedom of speech would not ob
viously be endangered if private, for-profit corporations were de
nied the same right to contribute money to political campaigns that
private individuals enjoy.419
But, despite these qualifications, there is no reason to exclude
categorically nonfederal governments from enjoying at least some
of the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution.420 The trick is to
discover the purpose of the particular right and determine whether
that purpose would be well-served by extending the right to cover
nonfederal governments. Indeed, the Court has already made such
an extension, holding, for example, that the Filth Amendment's
Just Compensation Clause bars the federal government from taking
nonfederal governments' property without paying just compensa
tion.421 Similar considerations suggests that federal demands for
nonfederal governments' regulatory services should be regarded as
so distributionally improper as to be precluded by the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
By analogizing a theory of states' rights to the constitutional
rights enjoyed by private individuals and organizations, the Court
would depart from an unpromising tradition of dual federalism and
instead embrace a theory of administrative federalism. By adminis
trative federalism, I mean a theory of nonfederal governments' en
titlements that assumes that such governments will administer
418. For an account of how organizations with involuntary members ought to have con
strained rights of expression under the First Amendment, see Victor Brudney, Association,
Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995).
419. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(holding constitutional a statute prohibiting corporations from making expenditures from
their general treasuries).
420. Indeed, such an application of the Bill of Rights may be more consistent with the
spirit in which they were originally enacted. As Professor Akhil Amar argues, the Bill of
Rights was not originally understood to be concerned exclusively or even primarily with the
protection of people as individuals. Rather, the Bill of Rights protected the collective "peo
ple's" right of self-government. See Amar, supra note 326, at 1133 ("The essence of the Bill
of Rights was more structural than not (in 1791]."). The essence of the proposal in this article
is to treat state and local governments as vehicles through which this collective right is real
ized - one of the "various intermediate associations" similar to the "church, militia, and
jury" through which "an educated and virtuous electorate" is created. See id. at 1132. As
Amar argues, this was not a peripheral purpose of the Bill of Rights in 1791; it was a central
purpose.
421. See Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Ques
tion of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1989).
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federal law but then ensures that they will enjoy a certain minimum
of discretion in such implementation. Such a theory of administra
tive federalism animated the Articles of Confederation, which enti
tled the states to administer the Continental Congress's requisitions
for troops and revenue. Articles

83-89 of the German Grundgesetz

(Constitution) also embody such a theory of administrative federal
ism, because the lander (the German analogue to states) enjoy the
constitutionally protected prerogative to administer the laws en
acted by the federal government. 422
As Justice Breyer noted in his

Printz

dissent, such systems en

hance rather than denigrate the position of their subnational juris
dictions by giving them responsibilities to administer the national
government's law. Breyer concluded that, when the national gov
ernment demands regulatory services from state governments, it
also enhances the influence of the state governments in a similar
way.423
But Justice Breyer's contention overlooks a critical difference
between genuine systems of administrative federalism in Germany
or under the Articles of Confederation and the system provided by
the commandeering of nonfederal governments by Congress. In
the former, there are constitutional rules requiring the national gov
ernment to respect the administrative autonomy of the subnational
jurisdictions. In the latter, Congress has constitutionally unlimited
power to control the state and local governments in the execution
of their federal duties.
By giving state and local governments an entitlement to with
hold from the federal government,

Printz

and

New York

enhance

the bargaining position of such governments and allow them to ex
tract a degree of discretion or revenue for the implementation of
federal law that such governments would otherwise lack. Contrary
to the repeated assertions of the dissents in

Printz,

this entitlement

hardly suggests that national law will be administered exclusively by
a national bureaucracy. One might as well argue that McDonnell
Douglas's ability to withhold their warplanes from the Pentagon

will lead the Pentagon to produce aircraft in-house. Rather, the
entitlement extended by Printz and New York simply allows
nonfederal governments to extract a fair price for their services 422. I borrow the term "administrative federalism" from the German context. Under a
system of administrative federalism, the central government is forced to use the bureaucracy
of the local governments to implement national law. See .ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, LoCAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 203 (1986).
423. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2404-05 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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an entitlement "already enjoyed by private persons and organiza
tions when they deal with the national government. In this way,

Printz

and New York provide a mechanism to produce the sort of
system of administrative federalism that Justice Breyer rightly

praises.

